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Abstract

THE TECHNICAL FIX OR THE SYSTEMIC SOLUTION FOR URBAN
WATER QUALITY?
A CASE STUDY OF GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM ON BEHALF OF
NEW YORK CITY’S DRINKING WATER
by
Mirele B. Goldsmith
Adviser: Dr. Cindi Katz
This case study examines the activities of the Croton Watershed Clean Water
Coalition from 1996 until 2004. The Coalition opposed construction of a filtration plant
for the Croton water supply. The study traces the Coalition’s campaign against filtration,
which took place in the context of the widely heralded New York City Watershed
Memorandum of Agreement (1997). Although the Agreement permitted New York City
to avoid filtration for its Catskill and Delaware water supplies, plans were laid for
filtration of the Croton supply.
My study is informed by political ecology which provides a framework for
understanding politics, practices and contradictions involved in natural resource
management. The arguments of the Coalition reflected the precautionary principle,
which is applied to the question of water filtration for the first time in this dissertation.
The filtration issue and the Coalition’s strategy are analyzed in terms of theories
concerning the production of scale and the influences of scale on the outcome of the
controversy. The Coalition was an unusual grassroots effort to engage urban water
consumers and suburban residents within the watershed area on behalf of watershed
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protection. Place-based organizations from the two areas made up the Coalition and
struggled to balance protection of their own local places with protection of the entire
watershed.
My research illustrates the role that grassroots organizations can play in reframing
environmental policy issues. As a grassroots organization, the Coalition was part of an
explosion of grassroots anti-toxics, environmental justice and watershed organizations
that emerged in recent decades. In contrast to the bureaucratized and professionalized
environmental organizations that also were concerned with the New York City water
system, the Coalition was free to reframe policy questions and challenge prior decisions.
Its unique role is explained by the fact that it was not constrained by prior relationships
and commitments. However, it faced significant limitations on its ability to influence the
policy controversy. This study provides insights into the nature of environmental
problems, emerging responses to these problems, and the political obstacles to turning
new approaches into policies.
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Chapter 1: The Technical Fix or the Systemic Solution
for Urban Water Quality?
Introduction
As of 2004, New York City was one of only ten large cities in the United States
that were permitted by the federal government to avoid filtration of their water supplies
(Pires, 2004). New York City negotiated an agreement with the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) that allowed it to be exempted from
requirements to filter water obtained from the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. This
agreement was touted by New York City as an example of enlightened fiscal and
environmental policy. Yet at the same time New York City was pursuing a very
expensive and controversial plan to implement filtration for water obtained from the
Croton watershed. Opposition to this plan came almost exclusively from grassroots
activists, led by the Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition (Croton Coalition), an
unusual alliance of urban water consumers and suburban watershed residents. My
dissertation research examines the Coalition and its activities to explore the role that
grassroots activism plays in promoting new environmental policies. I explore the
experiences, activities and practices of the Croton Coalition during the period between
1996 and 2004, when it championed watershed protection and pollution prevention as an
alternative to filtration. My research highlights how the Croton Coalition’s policy
proposals contrasted with that of established environmental organizations, as well as with
that of government agencies. I also address the obstacles that the Coalition faced from
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within and without: From within, as a coalition of place-based organizations. And from
without, as a small grassroots effort that aimed to reframe a complex, multi-dimensional
policy issue in opposition to multiple government agencies and powerful special interests
engaged in the water sector.
Despite advances in knowledge about the hydrologic cycle and the risks posed by
the pollution of water supplies, municipal water treatment has changed little since the
1920’s. Decisions about technology made over 100 years ago are rarely challenged and
few alternative technologies are given serious consideration. Agencies responsible for
water supply have favored the “technical fix,” such as water filtration, over “systemic
fixes” such as prevention of pollution in the first place (Rogers,1996). What has been
called by Peter Gleick (2002) the “hard path” in water -- centralized decision-making that
controls similarly centralized infrastructure that delivers water only of one quality -remains the accepted paradigm. The competing “soft path” paradigm -- decentralized
infrastructure, efficient technology, meeting different needs with water of varying
qualities, consideration of ecological health and complexity, and investments in human as
well as financial capital -- is beginning to be considered in some places but is rarely taken
seriously in the major cities of the United States.
Although the importance of water in urban life may seem self-evident, the public
often pays little attention to questions of water supply policy. In industrialized/developed
cities with well-developed infrastructure, extensive service and low cost for water,
citizens may take clean water for granted. In fact concerns have been raised that,
counter-intuitively, public interest in, and support of, city water systems may even be
diminishing as citizen fears about the safety of municipal water increase. If this is so, and

3
the evidence is primarily found in the skyrocketing sales of bottled water, it may become
even more difficult to engage citizens in the issues of municipal water supplies (Gleick,
2004).
As in other areas of public service provision of critical importance to industry and
connected to urban growth, the process of determining water policy tends to take place
away from the public eye and to be controlled by special interest groups with privileged
access. Business as usual in the water sector is a tightly controlled policy-making process
concerned mostly with urban growth and other development. Regulatory agencies and
water industry players tend to hold similar perspectives on water management issues.
Non-traditional perspectives, such as the environmental perspective, are often excluded
because they are not brought to the table or because of entrenched interests.
Cities are currently faced with a number of serious water policy challenges. The
United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has estimated that by 2019 the
accumulated gap between actual and needed investments in water and sewer systems in
the United States will be $650 billion (Revkin, 2002). Partly in response to these costs,
but also in response to even more powerful social and economic factors, many cities are
considering new privatized arrangements for financing and providing water supplies.
Efforts to control threats from contaminants in the water supply (some of which have
been only recently discovered) add to the cost pressures on cities. New regulations and
requirements are one result of these efforts to control the quality of water. Additional
new regulations and regulatory bodies also result from the complexity of privatization
and other changes in the way water systems are financed and managed, as governments
seek means to provide oversight for new private management.
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Although New York City has one of the oldest and largest water systems in the
United States, little scholarly attention has been paid to the process of water policymaking there. Overall, water policy in the West of the United States has received far
more attention than similar topics in the East. More attention is focused on the social,
political and economic problems of water in cities in developing countries than in
industrial/developed countries. This study demonstrates that although developed
countries have more infrastructure and financial resources, the process of water policymaking is fraught with environmental and social challenges, and as such, deserves our
attention. In examining these challenges and the responses to them through a case study
of the controversy about filtration of the Croton water supply, this research contributes to
the policy debate about the future management of New York City’s water resources, and
by extension to the literature on water policy concerns and practices more broadly.
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Background
As early as the colonial period, residents could no longer drink water procured
within New York City and tapped water sources in other areas of Manhattan. The search
for water sources outside New York City eventually resulted in the construction of
reservoirs and an aqueduct, completed in 1842, to bring water from the Croton River
north of New York to urban residents. The history of the decision to build, and the
construction of, the Croton Aqueduct is chronicled by Koeppel (2000). Other accounts of
the early history of the system include Weidner (1974) who addresses the period from
1897-1966 and Goldman (1997) who addresses the politics of building New York’s
sewers in the 19th century.
Within 40 years the Croton system, expected to provide enough water for
generations, became inadequate. Seeking larger quantities of water, New York City
made plans to tap watersheds even farther away. In 1927 the City completed the Catskill
system and in 1965 it completed the Delaware system (together referred to as the “West
of Hudson” or WOH system in contrast to the Croton, “East of Hudson” or EOH system).
All three systems required the displacement of upstate communities for the construction
of reservoirs. Under normal conditions, approximately 90% of the water used daily in
New York City at the start of the 21st century came from the West of Hudson system.
Today the New York City water system draws from a total watershed area of
1,969 square miles – approximately the size of Delaware. This is the area commonly
known as the New York City Watershed; it is a human construction which does not
include the Hudson River or other areas that for other purposes might be defined as part
of the natural catchment area of the water courses that supply New York City with water.
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The water collection and distribution system includes eighteen reservoirs and three
controlled lakes with a combined capacity of 550 billion gallons of water; three
aqueducts and seven tunnels; a distribution network of over 6,000 miles of water mains.
This system is complemented by a wastewater treatment system, which includes fourteen
treatment plants and associated facilities (New York City Municipal Water Finance
Authority, 2001; NYC DEP, April 2001). The history of this expansion is recounted in
Galusha (1999), which covers the period of expansion to the Catskill and Delaware,
describing the engineering and construction challenges and the displacement of upstate
communities.
At this point it may be helpful to clarify terms. The term watershed refers to the
land that drains into a watercourse. Watersheds are also called catchments or drainage
basins. The boundary between two watersheds is called the divide. This is an area of
high land from which water flows in different directions. Every small stream has a
watershed, and as a tributary stream joins a larger stream or river, its watershed is joined
to the watershed of the larger stream. Thus watersheds are nested within each other. The
watershed of the tiniest stream is located within that of a larger stream and then an even
larger river. The increasingly smaller units within a watershed are sometimes referred to
as sub-watersheds. Any human activity that is defined as being related to a watershed
must specify the area under consideration (Allaby, 1998; Griffin, 1999; Pielou, 1998). In
this dissertation, I use the definitions established by the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection to refer to the New York City watershed and the areas within
it. The Department uses the term New York City watershed to describe the entire area
from which it collects water to be used to supply New York City. This area is divided
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between the West of Hudson watershed, which includes the Catskill and Delaware
watersheds, and the East of Hudson watershed, which is also called the Croton watershed.
It should be noted that these areas, as the Department defines them, do not correspond to
the watershed of any natural stream or river. Thus, although much of the land included in
the New York City watershed drains into the Hudson River, the New York City
watershed is not identical with the Hudson River watershed.
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Illustration 1
Map of the New York City Water Supply System.
Available:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/wsmaps.html
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Illustration 2
Map of the Croton Watershed.
Available:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/croton.html
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The New York City Department of Environmental Protection, which manages the
water system, is responsible to multiple regulatory authorities including the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the New York State Department of Health,
and the Delaware River Basin Commission (created in 1961 by the states of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and New York to manage the water flows in the Delaware
watershed). In 1984 two new public authorities were established with responsibilities for
the water system. These authorities were the New York City Water Board and the Water
Finance Authority. Since 1984 New York City has leased the water system to the New
York City Water Board, which determines and collects the fees for water and sewer
services. The Water Finance Authority issues bonds for capital investment in the water
system. These authorities were established primarily to enable New York City to borrow
funds at lower cost, however they also serve to insulate the budget of the water system
from the electoral process. In 1996 then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed completing
the transfer of the municipal water system to the New York City Water Board by actually
selling it to the Board for 2.3 billion dollars. The sale was to be financed by bonds issued
by the Water Board and would have appeared in the budget as income which would
reduce New York City’s budget gap. The City Comptroller, Alan Hevesi, refused to
approve the sale, which was purely fictional since the buyer would have been another
New York City government entity. The Comptroller’s position was upheld in court
(Hennely, 1996).
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The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, passed in 1986 by the US Congress
in response to national concerns about increasing outbreaks of water borne diseases, had
important repercussions for New York City. Regulations established by the US EPA
under this Act required that all surface water supplied to large cities be filtered, unless the
cities could prove that they could adequately protect water quality in other ways.
Filtration refers to the process of allowing water to pass through layers of porous material
in order to remove suspended particles. This process mimics the way in which water is
naturally filtered by seeping through layers of earth. The original filtration plants were
constructed to allow water to seep slowly through layers of sand of progressively finer
grade. Rapid gravity filtration is faster and takes up less space. Filtration is only one
step in water treatment. Water treatment plants may use a number of different processes.
These processes include preliminary screening to remove large particles. Smaller
particles may be removed with the help of chemicals such as alum (aluminum sulphate)
through the coagulation and flocculation process. The chemicals and particles are then
removed through coagulation and flocculation. The chemicals are then removed through
sedimentation or other means. Water may also be disinfected with chlorine, chlorine
dioxide, chloramines or ozone. Although disinfection of water was a major health
advance when it was first introduced, concerns have been raised about disinfection
because it may result in harmful by-products. Ultraviolet irradiation (UV) and
membrane filtration are newer methods of water treatment (Stauffer, 1996). Wastewater
and residuals from the treatment process must then be disposed of.
The regulations established by the US EPA prompted New York City to propose
new watershed protection regulations to be applied in the watershed communities in
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1990. The communities in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds, which resented this
intrusion into their affairs, formed the Coalition of Watershed Towns, filed lawsuits
against New York City and forced the City to negotiate with their Coalition over the
proposed regulations. They were joined by the communities in the Croton watershed,
which were represented in the negotiations by Westchester and Putnam Counties. The
contentious negotiations over the watershed regulations drew on a history of conflict
between New York City and the upstate communities. Upstate residents clearly recalled
the communities displaced by the construction of the Delaware system, completed as
recently as 1965. Residents feared that restrictive land use regulations would further
depress the economy of their already poor region.
The negotiations between New York City and the watershed communities resulted
in the New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which established
the context within which the controversy over filtration of the Croton water supply took
place. In 1997, following the intervention of New York State Governor George Pataki,
the agreement was signed by New York City, New York State, the communities in New
York City’s watershed, the US EPA and several environmental organizations, including
Hudson Riverkeeper, the Trust for Public Land and NYPIRG. The MOA required the
City to cede powers, including the power of eminent domain, formerly granted to it by
the State, to the watershed communities. New York City agreed to spend hundreds of
millions of dollars on projects in the watershed. These included projects specifically
related to watershed protection such as upgrades of sewage treatment plants and
development of plans to prevent polluted runoff from farms, as well as projects to support
economic development that is compatible with watershed protection (NYC DEP, 2001).
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As part of the New York City Watershed MOA, the US EPA allowed New York
City to defer filtration of water from the Catskill/Delaware system until 2002. The
agreement stipulated that if water quality could be maintained and future quality insured,
this supply would be exempted from the Federal mandate to filter. Social scientists have
paid limited attention to these important developments, with most of the focus on the
response of the watershed communities. A recent dissertation by Stave (1998) addresses
the resistance of communities in the Catskill Mountain Region to the proposal of new
watershed protection measures from 1990 to 1995, finding that important factors were
residents’ conceptions about their communities and landscape, as well as about urban
stakeholders. Wagenet, et al. (1999) and Stycos, et al. (1999) and their colleagues have
also studied the response of watershed communities to public education about water
protection measures. Pires (2004) examines the politics surrounding the needed changes
in land use policy, and Pfeffer (2002) examines the conflicting values about land use that
emerge as rural and urban residents are both affected by the same water system. Houser
(2003) is currently investigating the reasons for the deterioration of water quality in the
Croton watershed.
Although the New York City Watershed MOA provided New York City with an
opportunity to avoid the financial and political costs associated with filtering the water
from the West of Hudson system, the City did not pursue a waiver for the Croton supply.
The reasons for this omission are multiple, and are explored in this research. There were
long-standing plans to filter the Croton supply and New York City was also more
concerned about avoiding filtration for the West of Hudson system, which is much larger
and supplies a much greater share of the City’s water, than about insuring the quality of
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water in the Croton system. The Croton watershed has a much larger population than the
Catskill and Delaware watersheds, and the more extensive, and increasing, development
taking place there is associated with threats to water quality. Avoiding filtration would
necessarily require curbs on development, and this provokes controversy. Plans for
construction of a filtration plant for the Croton supply also became controversial and
moved ahead in fits and starts, slowed partly as a result of opposition in the
neighborhoods selected as locations for the plant. These processes and issues are the
focus of my research.
Beginning in 1997 a small grassroots coalition known as the Croton Watershed
Clean Water Coalition (the Croton Coalition) worked to prevent the construction of a
filtration plant and to encourage New York City to protect the Croton watershed rather
than initiating filtration of the water supply. Despite the history of conflict between New
York City and the watershed communities, the Croton Coalition included both New York
City organizations and watershed community organizations among its members. The
member organizations were also diverse in their areas of focus, including community
development organizations, low-income housing associations, environmental
organizations, and local community organizations concerned with stopping sprawl and
preserving open space. The Croton Coalition united these organizations from the urban
Bronx and suburban Westchester and Putnam counties around the position that the
natural filtering capacities of the watershed should be actively protected by New York
City and that no filtration plant should be constructed anywhere. Although the Croton
Coalition activists did not use the term, in essence the Coalition advocated for application
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of the precautionary principle to the initiation of filtration for the Croton waters supply.
The activities of the Croton Coalition form the core of this research.
The formation of the Croton Coalition highlighted the changing regional dynamic
in urban use of water. Urban and suburban interests that are typically at odds, or ignorant
of one another’s existence and concerns, joined together in the Croton Coalition to
oppose filtration. The groups that made up the Coalition framed the filtration issue in
different ways, including as an environmental, environmental-justice, tax equity, or antigrowth issue. There were tensions between the various groups, and over the course of the
research most of the urban groups left the Coalition. Exploring the motivations of the
Coalition activists led me to interpret their organization as an alliance between placebased groups, which may be situated within the explosion of such grassroots
environmental groups that took place during the last decades of the twentieth century.
The Croton Coalition favored protection of the natural capacity of soil and
wetlands to filter water that is polluted by non-point sources such as road runoff. This
could be accomplished using the same strategies New York City was currently employing
in the West of Hudson watershed, such as land purchases, sewer plant upgrades and
regulations to protect buffer zones. The Coalition also researched alternative purification
techniques (ozone and chlorine dioxide) that could supplement chlorination (the current
technique) since the EPA required two techniques be used to ensure water quality.
In contrast to the Croton Coalition’s position, the New York City government and
the US EPA pursued filtration of water from the Croton watershed on its way to the New
York City at a centralized plant. Although New York City claimed that it was pursuing a
“multi-barrier approach” that included both watershed protection and filtration, the
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Coalition argued that it was doing almost nothing to protect the watershed while plans for
the construction of a filtration plant continued to move forward.
Key New York City environmental organizations that monitored, or at least
occasionally attended to, the water system were divided over the issue of filtration for the
Croton supply. Their involvement provided an opportunity to examine how the Croton
filtration controversy challenged traditional conceptions of environmental politics, and
how and why grassroots organizations take different positions from established
environmental organizations. Sierra Club volunteer leaders were active in the founding
of the Croton Coalition and led the Club to take an active position against filtration. On
the other hand, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), supported by
Environmental Defense and the New York League of Conservation Voters, provided
timely support for the New York City Department of Environmental Protection’s (NYC
DEP) position that filtration of the Croton water supply was necessary (Johnson, New
York Times, May 23, 2003). Riverkeeper, another key organization because of its active
role opposing development in the Croton watershed, chose not to take a strong stand
either way.
In its efforts to derail plans for the filtration plant and to champion aggressive
watershed protection for the Croton watershed, the Croton Coalition confronted a
confusing array of governmental actors, including the New York City, New York State
and two county governments and their various regulatory agencies, as well as the federal
US EPA. They also confronted the influence of business interests. These included real
estate developers who play an important role since land use decisions are so critical to
watershed protection. Construction firms looked forward to contracts for construction of
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the filtration plant and found a common interest with construction unions. This research
explores how and why the Coalition developed its position, the results of its advocacy
efforts and the implications that the policy alternatives in the filtration controversy had
for New York City and the watershed region. The study of the Croton Coalition’s role in
the controversy provides an entry point for gaining an understanding of New York’s
hydro-social cycle and, more broadly, the challenge of incorporating emerging
environmental approaches into urban water management.

Literature Review
Scholars interested in the social, cultural and economic aspects of water supply
may turn to literature in many disciplines including environmental history, cultural
anthropology, political economy and resource management. The complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the issues involved in water supply call for an integrative
framework for analyzing human-environment interactions. I chose to use the framework
of political ecology, associated mainly with geography, in this study because I sought to
understand the politics, practices and contradictions involved in natural resource
management. Political ecology offered a framework that was well-suited to the study of
the New York City water system because of its emphasis on the region as a unit of
analysis and on political economy as it affects particular ecologies, as well as its
emphasis on the agency of social actors in their interaction with the environment.

My

research also built on work about the politics of scale, environmental justice, citizen
participation in environmental policy-making, and the history and politics of urban water
supply to develop an understanding of the possibilities and pitfalls of grassroots activism
to influence New York City’s water policy.
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Political Ecology
Political ecology evolved from efforts to link cultural ecology with political
economy. Cultural ecology is a school of anthropology that focuses on the dynamic role
of cultural practices in regulating people’s interactions with their physical environments.
This approach tends to be place-based, at the scale of individual communities or tribes,
while focusing attention on the adaptation of people to their physical environments. Its
limitation is in seeming to ignore the influence of political and economic forces at larger
scales. Political economy, with its focus on the connection between politics and
economics, provides a corrective to the narrow focus of cultural ecology by taking
colonialism and the global economy into account in explaining local developments.
Political ecology has also been informed by a renewed interest in Marxism by political
economists who concentrate attention on how inequality affects the workings of markets
and results in injustice. It is “explicitly normative, focused on the intersection of multiple
forms of marginality and vulnerability,” and critical of dominant approaches to
environmental problems that may ignore these issues (McCarthy, 2005, p. 955). The
political ecology framework has been adopted and influenced by geographers,
environmental sociologists, and natural resource sociologists. (For particularly helpful
reviews, see by Belsky, 2002; Paulson, Gezon & Watts, 2005.)
The political ecology approach is predicated on the awareness that nature and
society are completely intertwined and that their relationship is political, economic and
cultural. Nature and society influence each other continually, resulting in environmental
practices and landscapes that we experience as natural although they are produced
through this dynamic process. A major question is how certain relationships between
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people and nature result in environmental degradation and social injustice, while other
relationships produce these outcomes less commonly. Political ecology looks for
answers to this question in the history of politics and economics, paying much attention
to the transformations wrought by capitalism as nature has been commodified under this
system (Swyngedouw, 1999; Smith, 1996; Castree, 1995), as well as other modes of
oppression, domination and exploitation.
Blaikie and Brookfield’s (1987) influential book, Land Degradation and Society,
laid out a framework for regional political ecology that was adopted by a number of
researchers focusing on the causes of environmental degradation associated with
development projects in rural areas. These researchers examine the long term
consequences of various factors and decisions that change the patterns of interaction
between people and their environments, resulting in environmental degradation. Hecht
and Cockburn (1989) examine the causes of deforestation in Amazonia. Grossman
(1998) explores the influence of contract farming in the Eastern Caribbean. A recent
example is Gardner’s (2005) exploration of the response of Bedouin to rangeland
degradation in Saudi Arabia and the relationship of this degradation to a series of factors
including the burning of the Kuwaiti oilfields during the Gulf War.
Reflecting the roots of political ecology in cultural ecology, studies guided by this
framework generally take a “ground up” approach beginning with resource users such as
farmers or fishers. Discourse analysis may be used to uncover how different people and
groups vary in their perceptions of the sources and dimensions of problems (Peet and
Watts, 1996; Zimmerer, 1996). The concept of scale plays an important role in
developing an understanding of the influences on behavior, as the investigator seeks to
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uncover relevant political and economic forces and practices at different scales. The
investigator seeks to identify how these forces affect people and the landscapes in which
they live and work, and how people, communities and social organizations respond to
these forces and in turn alter and affect these landscapes. (The concept of scale will be
treated more fully below.)
Recent works in political ecology emphasize the need for sensitivity to questions
of agency in political ecology. The term agency refers to the power of people to resist
and to change their circumstances in the face of structural forces. An important aspect of
agency, and often the first step toward resistance, is defining and reframing problems to
reflect your own perspective. Pulido (1996), in a case study of the United Farm Workers’
(UFW), emphasizes how the political and economic position of farmworkers led to their
definition of pesticide use as a problem and to their strategy for addressing it. Pulido’s
account reveals how the farmworkers connected the issue of pesticide use with the
struggle for power of workers to protect themselves from oppression by growers. She
points out that prior to the farmworkers’ campaign in 1965-71, the growers, and even
environmentalists, did not see the use of pesticides in agriculture as a concern. At first the
growers dismissed it, claiming that the farmworkers raised the issue of pesticides merely
to harass them. Similarly, the Croton Coalition as a grassroots group outside of the circle
of organizations that generally influenced policy decisions about New York City’s water,
developed a novel perspective on the problem of water quality.
It is particularly important to understand the potential for agency on the part of
relatively powerless or subaltern people (Bennett, 1995; Miller, Hallstein & Quass and
other contributions in Rocheleau, Thomas-Slater & Wangari, 1996). However, the
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current case raises questions about the obstacles faced by varied groups of people – even
those who are relatively powerful - in influencing environmental policy. Because of New
York City’s expansive “water footprint,” its water policy affects low-income inner city
residents, wealthy suburbanites, rural dwellers and farmers far from the city limits,
among others.
It is frequently noted that in the past cities have been neglected both by
environmentalists and by scholars interested in environmental questions (Mertig, Dunlap
& Morrison, 2002). Political ecology is no exception. As we have seen, the political
ecology framework has been most widely used to address human-environment
interactions in rural settings. Reflecting political ecology’s roots in cultural ecology,
early studies focused on land managers such as agriculturalists or collectors of forest
products in their relationship to natural resources. Later, scholars began to use the
political ecology approach to explore questions about human-environment interactions in
urban settings (Bru-Bistuer, 1996; Miller, Hallstein & Quass, 1996; Kaika, 1999; Smith,
2001; Gandy, 2002; Williams, 2001). Political ecology has also been influenced by
analyses of urbanization in works such as Nature’s Metropolis (Cronon, 1991) and City
of Quartz (Davis,1990), that highlight the dynamic of capitalism as it has influenced
cities and their regions and reconstructed the landscapes of city and country in tandem
(Swyngedouw & Kaika 1997).
Studies in industrialized countries and in cities have broadened the scope of
phenomena chosen for investigation guided by the framework of political ecology.
Researchers examine how different groups with different relationships to, and needs for,
resources find these relationships affected by power and by larger political and economic
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frameworks. (For a recent example, see the June 2005 theme issue of Environment and
Planning A, edited by James McCarthy.) So while early studies tended to examine local
production practices and their effect on the environment, studies in new locales have led
scholars to use similar methods to examine consumption practices, working backwards to
understand their influence on power relationships and landscapes (Keil et al., 1998;
Steinberg & Clark, 1999; Heyman, 2005). These studies provide a useful corrective to
the early focus on poverty as the proximal cause of environmental deterioration,
providing balance with intimate study of the influence of affluence that was previously
treated as a structural factor (Peet & Watts eds., 1996). Globalization has necessitated
the study of the interrelationships of widely separated urban and rural communities. Katz
(2004) explores the social reproduction of livelihood strategies by contrasting the effects
on children of a development program that introduced irrigated agriculture to a Sudanese
village, and children in Harlem in New York City. Urban protest movements, such as
those in opposition to the North River Sewage Treatment Plant in New York City (Miller,
Hallstein, & Quass, 1996) and the response to waste disposal facilities in Spain (BruBistuer, 1996), have provided another topic of study.
Moving more specifically to the treatment of urban water issues, in an overview
of political ecology as applied to urban water systems, Swyngedouw, Kaika and Castro
(2001) demonstrate that the perspective of political ecology is highly relevant to the study
of urban water supply by highlighting themes such as the co-determination of
environmental and social change, the uneven effects of such change on various social
groups, and how power relationships shape such changes. Swyngedouw and his
colleagues are producing a body of work that explores several key issues in urban water
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supply. These include the production of nature through the urbanization process; the
commodification of water; the current shift toward privatization and the relationship of
this shift to regulation; and water supplies as a factor in the sustainability of cities.
Regarding the first theme, the production of nature, Kaika and Swyngedouw
(2000) explore the creation of urban environments and how movements for
modernization were explicitly linked to the engineering of water supplies. As
conceptions of modernity changed, the infrastructure of water became invisible. Their
analysis helps to explain how nature in the city and the routes through which we draw on
ecosystem services such as water, although all around us, escapes notice (also see
Swyngedouw & Kaika, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1999). Kaika (1999) and Bakker (1999)
address the discourse of water scarcity and how political and economic programs are sold
to the public as being necessitated by crises that are constructed as natural disasters.
Even in New York City, with its generous water resources, fear of drought plays an
important role in justifying decisions about increasing water supply capacity. The current
research reveals that one of the arguments for introduction of filtration was that with
filtration, it would be possible to use lower quality water, thus maximizing the quantity of
water that could be drawn from the Croton water system.
In relation to the second theme, commodification, privatization and regulation,
Bakker (1998) describes and analyzes the shift toward privatization of water in England
and Wales, highlighting some of the contradictions inherent in programs to commodify
water, and the resistance of consumers/citizens to the commodification of this necessity
of life. While New York has so far avoided privatization of its water system, it has
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adopted some of the priorities and techniques of privatization. However citizens are
unaware of the long-term implications of these changes.
These two themes, the production of nature and the implications of
commodification of water, are taken up by Gandy (2002) in his wide-ranging book about
New York City. Gandy uses the water system as a case study to illuminate the politics of
the relationship between the city and nature. Gandy describes how the construction of
New York’s water system was emblematic of a vision of modern, urban society and was
carried out to further urban growth and the expansion of capitalism. Now there is an
“aura of uncertainty” (p. 18) that contrasts with the celebration of technology and the
perception of total control of nature in the service of the city that reigned in the previous
period. The water system is threatened by the reduced investment in cities and the
reduced power of the city in relation to its region. In an era characterized by the mobility
of capital we can expect disdain for the materiality of physical infrastructure and neglect
of the fixed capital of the water system. Gandy’s conclusion is that as an inherently
collective service, that must be maintained in an era of emphasis on individual rights and
privatization, the future of the water system may depend very much on democratic
participation. This conclusion is supported by the current investigation of the unique role
played by the grassroots activists of the Croton Coalition in the filtration controversy.
The theme of the sustainability of urban water supplies is explored by Kaika
(1999) in her study of the relationship between nature and urbanism in Athens. She
describes the expanding, and likely unsustainable, use of water that has accompanied the
urbanization process in that city. One facet of this process of expansion is the effect that
it has on people in the supplier regions. Many histories of such expansion have stressed
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what Steinberg and Clark (1999) call the “critical water resource narrative” which
emphasizes confrontation and domination of rural areas by the more powerful urban
exploiter. Steinberg and Clark studied the residents of the area surrounding the
Wachusett Reservoir that provides water to the Boston Metropolitan area and found
attitudes similar to those that I heard expressed by the suburban residents that participated
in the Croton Coalition. Residents in their study generally supported active management
by the metropolitan water agency, recognizing that the agency’s actions prevented
development and provided them with recreational benefits. Steinberg and Clark find that
the “critical water resource narrative” is too simplistic. They demonstrate that the
relationship between the resource extraction region and the urban sink is not necessarily
only conflictual. The people of the region where the water comes from may have a shared
interest with the city based on aesthetic and recreational benefits stemming from the
water system, and may even come to identify with the altered landscape. (Also see
Brogden & Greenberg, 2005 who address similar issues in Arizona.)
My case study, which examines the participation of the Croton Coalition in the
filtration controversy, is well-suited to contribute to an understanding of how community
and environmental groups in an urban setting can influence environmental policy and
how that influence can be stymied or rerouted. This case study makes a contribution to
the emerging literature of political ecology as applied in urban settings in industrialized
countries. There are still relatively few empirically grounded studies in this area,
although the number is growing (Kaika, 1998; Gandy, 2002; Keil & Desfor, 2003).
Perhaps more importantly, this study is unique in the political ecology literature in its
focus on the obstacles to the implementation of environmentally sound approaches to
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water system management as well as the peculiarities of the New York City water
system.

The Politics of Scale
Scale is a key concept in political ecology, bridging the gap between place- based
analysis and analyses based on consideration of structural forces that influence, but are
not located in, the particular place. Critical geographers have led the way in
considerations of how we habitually assign questions to be addressed at one scale or
another, taking the division of space into various levels as natural. In fact, they have
pointed out, all differentiations by scale are socially produced and have multiple
dimensions including the material, geographical, economic and political. Differentiation
between scales and the establishment of new scales results from a process of negotiation
and struggle (Smith, 1992). The multi-scale aspect of the filtration controversy is
immediately obvious and is explored in this dissertation.
Empirical studies undertaken to explore the production of scale reveal how the
assignment of problems to different scales can have powerful consequences. Robert
Williams (1999), in a study of environmental injustice in the United States, examines
how people living in communities of color affected by environmental problems view the
problems as linked to a pattern of injustice at a national scale. Others, who see the
problem as purely local, explain the same problems away as predictable results of the fair
workings of the market. Williams suggests that politics becomes the arena in which we
negotiate how to resolve problems when there is a divergence between the scale at which
a problem is generated and the scale at which it is expected to be addressed. This
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divergence is present, and the politics played out, every time an unwanted facility such as
the Croton filtration plant is proposed for a specific location.
The production of scale may be used as a tactic to gain power by those lacking in
power. For example, Steven Silvern (1999) examines a case in which the Wisconsin
Ojibwe sought to protect tribal rights to use and manage natural resources. The tribe used
a scalar strategy, challenging the State of Wisconsin in court to achieve recognition as a
political entity on the same scale as the State. Towers (2000) describes a case in which
grassroots activists opposed siting of a power line by strategically calling attention to
who would benefit and suffer from the siting at various scales. Andrew Herod’s (1997)
study of the efforts of the International Longshoreman’s Association to achieve a single
contract for union workers in all North American ports describes a scalar strategy with
remarkable similarities to that utilized by the towns in the New York City watershed that
resulted in the New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement. Herod describes
how the Longshoreman’s Association, recognizing that competition between ports would
make it impossible for workers at one port to achieve gains in bargaining, created a new
scale of bargaining at the continental scale. The strategy was utilized again when the
activists around the Jerome Park Reservoir reached out to communities in the watershed
to oppose construction of the Croton filtration plant.
Alternatively, a new discourse of scale may be adopted by those with power in
order to achieve their aims. Karen Bakker (1999), in a study of the Mekong River basin,
describes how actors promoting hydropower development are creating a discourse
focused on the watershed scale to conceal different interests at other scales. This
discourse aims to focus attention on the benefits to the basin as a whole – at a scale which
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has little meaning to most people that live in the basin. The production of scale in this
case is a strategy to distract attention from the predictable negative consequences at other
scales as well as the rescaling of power that will be achieved by “capital intensive
exploitation, in which revenues are literally tapped and diverted away from local
communities in the form of flows of water and energy” (p. 220).
Despite this example from the Mekong River basin, investigations of scale may
challenge common assumptions that there is a hierarchical relationship between scales
with power flowing from “higher” scales at the regional, national or global level to the
“lower” local scale. However the significance of scale has been shown to be primarily a
matter of relation so that labels that presume the content of the relationship and the
direction in which power flows should be viewed with caution (Howitt, 2000; Cox,
1998). Pauline McGuirk (1997) used a study of the evolution of an urban development
program in Adelaide, Australia to demonstrate how policy outcomes are the result of
interactions between scales. She points out that the local and regional can influence the
national scale and, in a perspective that resonates with concerns about agency in the
current study and in political ecology in general, that people at the local scale have power
to determine how they will respond to the moves of those at higher scales.
These insights about the production and manipulation of scale resonate strongly in
relation to issues of the management of water resources that are the focus of the current
research. The selection of the watershed as a focus of attention is an example of the
production of scale. Although it is now commonly accepted to think of the watershed as
a naturally bounded area, and a logical unit within which water resources will be
managed, this unit of scale is no more given than any other. Ecosystems, and all aspects
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of the water cycle, are interconnected at various scales (Ruhl, 2000). Water is typically
managed according to multiple scalar systems, including those based on biophysical or
hydrological considerations, political, or economic considerations. Historically, in the
United States, attempts to manage water at the scale of the watershed have not been very
successful because this scale does not correspond to any political scale (Rogers, 1993;
Kenney, 1999).
The concept of scale provides a useful lens for examining the history of the New
York City water system. In the material dimension, the history of the system is a history
of manipulation of natural processes to create new scales. This process began with the
construction of the Croton aqueduct which tied New York City to the Croton watershed,
and continued with the expansion of the system to its present size by the incorporation of
the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. This super watershed provides water to the City
that is then discharged in areas far from where the water was extracted.
The creation of new scales in the material dimension can result in the creation of
matching scales in the political dimension at several different points. For example,
creation of the “super-watershed” described above resulted in the creation of a new level
of government. Following several failed attempts (beginning in 1908) to create a
political institution that could match this new scale, the Delaware River Basin
Commission was created in 1961 by the federal government and the states of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and New York to reflect the new scale of material changes in the
landscape. This institution at the regional level manages the water flows in the Delaware
watershed to maintain adequate flows in the Delaware River (Citizens Union Foundation,
1987).
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As scholars have noted, flows of capital powerfully influence geographical scale
(Smith, 1992). This relationship may be discerned in the reorganization of the New York
City water system in 1984 when two new public authorities were established with
responsibilities for the water supply system. The primary reason for the establishment of
the Water Finance Authority and the Water Board was to enable New York City to
borrow funds for capital investments in the water system in the bond market at a lower
cost. The transfer of control of the water system to the Water Finance Authority
represented an increase in the influence of forces at a new scale – that of the bond market.
As we have seen, the actions of New York City on the watershed scale also
prompted the organization of protest movements. In 1991 the Coalition of Watershed
Towns represented the efforts of the communities in the West of Hudson watershed to
create a political presence at the scale of the material changes in the landscape caused by
the development of the water system. The creation of this Coalition resulted in the New
York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement. The Croton Coalition, the subject of
the research, followed suit in 1997 using a similar strategy to mount its opposition to the
Croton filtration plant in the East of Hudson watershed.

Urban Water Supply
Metabolic metaphors are commonly used to describe the urban system by those
attuned to the ecology of cities (White, 1994). These metaphors capture the idea that
flows of air, water, food, people and waste sustain life in the city. This biological
approach hints at the complex relationships between flows both within the city, and
between the city and its environment. The city is a complex ecosystem in which the
processes of consuming resources and producing wastes result in many unforeseen
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changes. For example, when engineered urban water supply systems were introduced in
the 19th century, cities were faced with an unexpected problem of how to dispose of
vastly increased quantities of wastewater. The introduction of new flows of water led to
the construction of sewer systems. Other examples of such challenging interactions are
the phenomena of urban heat islands (an interaction between urban construction practices
and weather systems) and land subsidence due to pumping of groundwater (an interaction
between urban water use and land systems).
Cities are dynamic systems. Studies of urbanism examine processes of socialecological change in cities. These processes of change can result in conditions that are
dangerous and destructive. The concentration of people in cities worsens many problems
of the physical and social environment. These problems include those that affect the
people in the city, as well as those that may affect natural systems and people in the
region of the city, in distant regions, or the biosphere as a whole (Gottlieb, 1993; Spirn,
1984: Steinberg, 2002; White, 1994).
Water is one of the key factors supporting urban existence, it is “the city’s life
blood: It drives industries, heats and cools homes, nurtures food, quenches thirst, carries
waste and protects health. Cities import more water than all other goods and materials
combined. Sufficient water is not only a prerequisite for health, it is essential for life”
(Spirn, 1984, p. 129). White (1994) has pointed out that the flow of water is the “largest
metabolic feature of the urban system, being 60-100 times the size of the flow of fuel” (p.
125). The infrastructure that carries water embodies the relationship between nature and
the city, tying the city to its environment. The collection and transport of water to the
city is a feat that requires tremendous investments of social and financial capital.
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In a masterful summary of the role of water in the urban environment that
introduces her work on grassroots protest regarding water in Monterrey, Bennett (1995)
introduces the major issues around urban residential water use. As she explains, the need
for water begins with the requirements for appropriate access to adequate quantities of
water for survival and hygiene. The quality of water must match the use to which it will
be put. In the city, water is a commodity that must be purchased. As such it is a “pillar
of the capitalist system: the transformation of water into a commodity forces people to
work in order to insure their very survival” (p. 21). Water services, which are provided
collectively, provide the government or other provider with power over consumers that
may be exercised through decisions about extensions of service, setting of water rates and
rationing in times of shortage.
Historically, urban water systems have been viewed as engines of urban growth.
They have been the impetus for new political arrangements such as regional water
districts (Elkind, 1998). Water systems have been, and continue to be, sites of conflict
over the proper role of government and private industry in meeting human needs. In the
ongoing conflict and negotiation over urban water systems we see how natural systems
become constructed and continually reconstructed as social realities.
Water supply in the United States is the subject of study from many social
scientific perspectives. The current study draws particularly on historical scholarship that
has revealed the politics of water management. These studies place the issues of urban
water supply in its broader context of the connection between water and power in various
settings. Frequently cited works in this vein include Hundley (1992, 2001), whose
history of water in California explores how various human cultures related to the
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waterscape, the intersection of values and technology, the role of government, and
California’s efforts to procure water from wherever it was available. Reisner (1986,
1990) and Worster (1992) explore themes of the unseemly history of the Western water
development and the potential for crisis as population growth taxes supplies in arid areas.
Gottlieb (1988) explores the water industry, focusing on how decisions about water
policy are made, and the changes that took place in the last decades of the 20th century.
In the contemporary era the process of supplying the city with water has become
invisible and taken for granted (Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000). Tracing the processes of
social-environmental change that have re-created the landscapes of entire regions,
political ecologies of urban water systems bring the relationship between city and nature
back into view. An historical perspective makes it clear that the current relationship
between city and nature is only one of many possible relationships. Environmental
historians have traced some of the ways that these relationships have developed. Notable
contributions have been made by Melosi (2000) who points out that cities were forced to
tackle the disposal of wastewater when piped water supplies became available and
overwhelmed the capacity of older approaches to managing sewage. His analysis
illumines the connection between water supply and wastewater disposal, a theme of
current environmental thinking about closing loops in natural resource use. He also
explores how decisions about technology made in the late 19th and early 20th century have
created “path dependencies” such as commitment to certain technologies and the
infrastructure that was built accordingly, that are a major factor in water policy-making
today. Choices such as the use of chlorine and the use of water filtration may be
examples of such decisions.
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In related work on urban pollution and waste disposal Tarr (1996) examines the
choice of separate or combined sewers in water-carriage systems. The choice of
combined sewers is rued today as cities, including New York, are forced to expend huge
sums to address the problem of combined sewer overflows that send raw sewage into
receiving waters after rainfall events. Tarr explores how these choices were made and
put into place, suggesting how they influenced the formation of regional governmental
forms such as the special district, and created new scales at which authority for water
would be exercised. This process of the renegotiation of the scale at which water will be
managed continues today as New York City and the communities in its watersheds
develop new approaches to protecting water quality.
Several histories of particular urban water systems have explored issues of
relevance to my study. Elkind’s (1998) study of the water systems of the East Bay and
Boston is focused at the scale of the region. Both systems draw on extensive watersheds,
as is the case in New York City. Elkind highlights the political and environmental costs
of regional approaches to meeting the needs of cities for water. Foss-Mollan (2001)
analyzes the political history of Milwaukee’s water system. She pays particular attention
to the complex causes of the cryptosporidium outbreak of 1993. This outbreak occurred
despite (and in fact may have been exacerbated by) filtration. Foss-Mollan argues that
the crisis was the result of politicization of decisions that should have been informed
more extensively by science. This case is cited frequently by activists opposing filtration
in New York City. Bennett’s (1995) study of the extension of water services in
Monterrey, Mexico focuses on two areas of relevance to this study. First, she highlights
the importance of the interaction between various layers of government in determining
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the water policies of Monterrey. Progress in improving water supply in Monterrey was
stymied for many years because of the conflictual relationship between the national
government and Monterrey’s private sector elite which exerted its power at the local
level. Although the political dynamics are very different in the case of the Croton
watershed, political conflict between levels of government is similarly of great
importance. Second, Bennett analyzes the influence of citizen protests on policy change.
She finds that the citizen protests did influence government actions, pointing out the
potential for such activities to be effective despite numerous obstacles, when permitted
by circumstances such as changes in political leadership.
My study adds a new dimension to this literature by focusing on urban water
supply as an environmental problem inextricably linked not only to urban growth and
change, but also to the relationship between urban areas and their broader geographical
contexts. This research sheds light on why procuring clean water for cities remains
problematic despite the progress made under the Clean Water Act and other
environmental laws. This study addresses the role that grassroots citizen organizations
can play in interpreting, applying and promoting pro-environmental ideas about water
management. The policy advocated by the Croton Coalition, the systemic solution of
watershed protection, is a form of pollution prevention (Fiorino, 1995). In a novel use of
this principle, I argue that implicit in this position is advocacy for application of the
precautionary principle to the initiation of water filtration. The debate over whether this
kind of radical reorientation is possible is one that profoundly divides the environmental
movement (Dryzek, 1997). Some believe that it is impossible under a capitalist system
and that only ecosocialism, with investment and production under democratic control,
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can achieve true environmental progress (Faber, 1998b). Others advocate a policy of
ecological modernization in which government, business, science and the environmental
movement work together to restructure capitalism along lines more sensitive to
environmental concerns.

Environmental Justice
In this research the Croton Coalition is treated as a grassroots expression of
environmentalism. But what kind of environmentalism does the Coalition represent? The
Croton Coalition activists came from different communities, represented different kinds
of organizations, and focused their attention on different aspects of the filtration issue. In
fact, the activists preferred not to refer to their Coalition an environmental organization
(although they did claim that the siting of the filtration plant in Norwood was an
environmental injustice) and only some of them referred to themselves environmentalists.
I analyze the Croton Coalition in terms of the concerns and characteristics of the
environmental justice movement because the Coalition opposed the siting of the filtration
plant in a poor community and brought attention to the public health consequences of the
siting – concerns that are the focus of much environmental justice organizing.
The environmental justice movement is usually dated from protests against the
planned disposal of toxic wastes in Warren County, North Carolina in 1982. Some
scholars view the newly-recognized environmental justice movement of the 1980’s as a
combining of the anti-toxics and civil rights movements to create a new form of protest
(Szasz, 1994; Gottlieb, 1993). However, historians who have explored the responses of
Black activists to the environmental problems in their communities argue that this was
not a new movement but a change of tactics (Di Chiro, 1998). As Greenberg (2000) has
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pointed out, these protests built on a history of resistance by people of color and others
against oppression manifested as threats to health and safety. Greenberg argues that in
New York, “The legacy of slavery focuses an inequitable distribution of well-being as old
as the ecological transformation occasioned by the city’s founding” (p. 224). She
documents the “breadth of the protest vision” of Black activists who articulated that
health and welfare were human rights that were denied to people in their urban
communities. Thus, the environmental justice movement constituted primarily a change
in tactics to address documented discrimination, rather than a new movement.
After the Warren County protests, Benjamin Chavis, former head of the NAACP,
called the new movement a response to environmental racism. This term situated the new
movement in the tradition of the civil rights movement. A narrow definition of
environmental justice is that it is about distributional inequities in the siting of noxious
facilities, which has been extensively documented. The Croton Coalition called on this
definition when it criticized the New York City administration for siting the filtration
plant in a neighborhood with a large population of poor people of color.
McGurty (2000), in her account of the Warren County protests, as well as other
scholars note that right from the start organizers in Warren County realized that if their
struggle was to be located in the context of social justice and civil rights, they could not
call for another community to bear the burden they rejected. As such, a principle of the
environmental justice movement became NIABY (not in anybody’s backyard). Thus a
broad definition of waste, and a critique of societal processes that produce waste
emerged.

38
Broader definitions of environmental justice advance a critique of capitalist
investment and production practices and define it primarily in terms of class-based
conflict rather than racism (Cable & Cable, 1995). Faber (1998b) argues that
environmental regulation cannot succeed in protecting and safeguarding people and their
environment. In the pursuit of increased profits, environmental costs are externalized on
workers and the environment. Burdens are inevitably displaced, increasing pollution,
spreading its effects and undermining any progress made to address isolated problems. In
his view, the efforts to accommodate environmental goals within a capitalist system are
bound to fail.
Environmental justice is frequently defined in terms of its contrast with the
environmental movement as it was perceived in the early 1980’s. According to
environmental justice activists, the movement was defined by the large, professionalized
environmental organizations with offices in Washington, DC that (at least at that time)
focused primarily on lobbying for environmental regulations by the federal government.
Scholars, and the environmental justice activists themselves, compared their ideas about
nature and their constituencies to those of these established organizations. The
environmentalism of these organizations was motivated by Euro-American ideas about
the separation of nature and people that led them to be concerned about conservation of
wildlands rather than the health and safety of people (Di Chiro, 1996). In contrast,
environmental justice defined the environment as being where people live, work and
play, and was concerned with a broader spectrum of issues. This definition of the
environment has had far-reaching influence on environmental activism and scholarship,
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and the current research draws on it to explain the significance of the controversy over
filtration.
While some defined the environmental justice movement in terms of the kinds of
injustices it highlighted, others defined the movement in terms of its constituency. In
contrast to participants in the national, professionalized environmental organizations, the
participants in the environmental justice movement were people of color, the poor and
working class, women, and other oppressed groups. Pulido (1996) suggests that the
common thread among these groups is sub-alternity, which permits inclusion of
oppressed people both in the United States and around the world as being within the
purview of the environmental justice movement, and also explains why environmental
justice is intrinsically counter-hegemonic. Pulido’s analysis focuses on how the identity
of the movement’s constituents becomes the source of new forms of environmentalism.
As a counter-hegemonic movement that interprets environmental problems as
being the result of oppression, environmental justice movements demand empowerment.
The environmentalism of the national, professionalized organizations is criticized as
reformist, consisting merely of government watchdogs that rely on technical solutions
and compromises to try to achieve progress, while environmental justice seeks
meaningful participation in decisionmaking, or procedural equity (Faber, 1998b;
Sandweis, 1998).
The inadequacy of mechanisms for citizen participation in decisionmaking about
environmental policies is documented in the current research. Two policy issues
occupied the Croton Coalition. The first, which was the initial impetus for the formation
of the Coalition, was the siting of the filtration plant. The policy process for the siting of
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the filtration plant clearly revealed the shortcomings of the mechanisms that were
supposed to provide for participation by the community. In relation to this issue the
critiques by the environmental justice movement of the siting process for noxious
facilities, the initial focus of the movement, are extremely relevant. The second issue was
advocacy for watershed protection to avoid filtration, reflecting the environmental justice
and anti-toxics movements’ critique of end-of the pipe solutions to the waste crisis.
Conflicts over siting typically have aspects of both distributional and procedural
inequity. An infamous case in New York City is the siting of the North River Water
Treatment Plant (NRWTP) in 1962 which spawned the grassroots activist organization
West Harlem Environmental Action (Miller et al., 1996; Greenberg, 2000). In this case
the plant was sited in a closed-door process. A site in Harlem was chosen over a more
appropriate site near the area that was later developed as Lincoln Center. The New York
City Administration’s response to the protests was to place a park on the top of the plant,
a strategy similar to the plan for the Croton filtration plant which includes a driving range
on its roof. In an analysis of three cases of the politics of siting in New York City,
Rodriguez (1999) studies the NRWTP, a medical incinerator in the South Bronx and a
waste incinerator proposed for Greenpoint-Williamsburg in Brooklyn. In all three cases
the communities did not become aware of the decision to site the facilities in their areas
until long after the decisions were made. He finds that legislated procedures under the
Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP, Fair Share, and the State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA), policies intended to increase public participation, failed to
provide meaningful influence on the decision-making process. He finds that the
environmental bureaucracies were extremely resistant to the efforts of community groups
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to participate, and that only intervention by a key elected official offered any hope for
stopping the siting of the facilities. Another infamous New York City siting conflict was
over the Westway, a highway that was to be built along the Hudson River in Manhattan.
This project was eventually derailed as a result of a legal judgment that governmental
agencies had not adequately complied with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in considering the harm that the highway could do to Hudson River fish
(Wanderstock, 1984).
Inequity in the extension of water service is another type of distributional inequity
that has been explored as environmental injustice. Foss-Mollan (2001) discusses how
Polish wards were denied water service in Milwaukee prior to 1910. In a study that uses
political ecology as the framework for analysis, Smith (2001) describes how efforts to
extend water service to townships in Cape Town, South Africa, in the post-apartheid era,
are being stymied by several factors. These factors include pressure from the
international community pushing toward reliance on the private sector and demand-side
management. Bath, Tanski and Villarreal (1998) argue that the failure to extend service
to Mexican-American colonias in El Paso County, Texas was not directly the result of
racism. But their analysis reveals the indirect effects of racism through economic and
political processes
Some progress in addressing environmental injustice has been made with the
establishment of various federal and state policies that recognize the existence of
environmental injustice and require that it be considered in siting decisions (Sexton &
Zimmerman, 1999). However, it is still extremely difficult for affected communities to
have any influence through these procedures (Sandweiss, 1998). As Williams has
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pointed out in his application of the concept of scale to the politics of environmental
justice, focus on distributional equity leads to a narrow definition of the problem as local
and not requiring a societal response (Williams, 1999). Over time the issues raised by the
environmental justice movement have also been incorporated by the environmental
movement more broadly, and there seems to be a coalescing of perspectives (Camacho,
1998 citing Bullard, 1993). This coalescing was discernible in the arguments of the
Croton Coalition against filtration which drew on ideas from all sectors of the
environmental movement, as well as in the Coalition’s collaboration with national
environmental organizations.

Citizen Participation in Environmental Policy-making
Advocates advance either functional or ethical-normative arguments on behalf of
citizen participation. Those who stress the functional role of participation argue that
participation makes the system work better by insuring that all information is considered
and support for policy decisions is maximized (Kweit, 1987). Those who stress the
ethical-normative argument hold that everyone has a stake in the environment and has a
right to participate in decisions that affect them (Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 1996), and that
participation nurtures responsible citizenship which is the basis of democracy (Landy,
1993).
Mechanisms that allow for citizen participation in government decision-making
processes in the United States were introduced primarily as means to protect the legal
rights of citizens in the face of government regulation. These mechanisms tend to be
utilized by special interests that are highly motivated and equipped to assert their rights
through an adversarial process. To some extent they have been designed to
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institutionalize limitations on the freedom of action of bureaucracies. Therefore it should
not be surprising that these mechanisms do not function effectively to promote
widespread citizen participation in policy-making (Webler, 1995; Etheridge, 1987).
The environmental movement is associated with an expansion of the participation
of citizens in governmental processes of decision-making, and innovations in
participation have taken place in this arena. Timing seems to be the most frequent
explanation for this association. Growing support for citizen participation coincided with
rising concern about the safety of technology and environmental problems. Awareness
that experts viewed the risks of technology and pollution differently from lay people,
played an important role in encouraging people to demand greater opportunity to have
their perspective considered (Fiorino,1996). However, despite the innovations in citizen
participation associated with the environmental movement, such as right-to-know laws
and environmental impact statements, it has proven extremely difficult for citizens and
small interest groups to influence government policies (Webler et al., 1995; Etheridge,
1987; Desario & Langton, 1987). In fact, the disappointment experienced by grassroots
activists when they try to utilize these avenues for participation often results in increased
mistrust of government and radicalization (Freudenberg & Steinsapir, 1992; McCloskey,
1992). Although the Croton Coalition was adept at utilizing the opportunities provided
by these innovations, this account confirms that it is difficult to for citizens to have a
significant influence on decision-making by utilizing the mandated mechanisms provided
for citizen participation.
As we have seen in reference to the environmental justice movement,
paradoxically the environmental movement itself is criticized for not fostering

44
participation within its ranks. Many of the largest and best-known organizations are led
by professional staffs and unelected boards of directors, and provide little opportunity for
the average member to participate (Brulle, 2000; Duffy, 2003). The environmental
justice movement has self-consciously adopted a different approach stressing grass-roots
participation, flexible coalition structures and decentralization. In addition to increasing
participation, some scholars believe that this form of organization may be more effective
because it mirrors the decentralized forms of power that are characteristic of globalization
(Schlosberg, 1999).
The issue of scale is crucial in understanding citizen participation in
environmental policy-making. Scholars argue that participation is most likely to be
effectively implemented at the local scale (Fiorino, 1996; Landy, 1993). Unfortunately
(at least in terms of participation), authority over environmental issues has increasingly
been transferred to the national or global level. The causes of many environmental
problems are also found at these scales, although problems may be framed by
corporations or governments as local issues in an effort to undermine the formation of
oppositional alliances (Williams, 1999; also see Faber, 1998a and 1998b).
The terrain of water politics in the United States makes it difficult for grassroots
activists to participate in decisionmaking. This has been documented in previous
research about urban water supplies, irrigation projects, dam construction, etc, which has
described the inadequate regulatory framework, proliferation of regulatory agencies and
influence of special interests representing private capital. Gould, Schnaiberg and
Weinberg (1996), in their study of several cases of grassroots efforts to address water
quality issues, describe the activists as participants in “wars of attrition” in which their
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opponents have most of the resources (p. 79). Urban water policy has been described as
particularly resistant to citizen influence due to the close connection between water
policy and urban growth (Gottlieb, 1988). The current research confirms that these
sweeping generalizations apply in New York City.
In the face of these challenges, scholars highlight the critical importance of the
grassroots or civil society more generally as the source of alternative approaches to
environmental problems that may not emerge through official participation channels
(Cable & Cable, 1995; Camacho, 1998; Dryzek, 1996; Keil, 2003). Grassroots
environmentalism is viewed by some activists and scholars as an important component of
a wider movement to reinvigorate American democracy (Cable & Cable, 1995; Shutkin,
2000). Understanding the inner workings of grassroots environmental coalitions, and
their experiences in the policy process, thus becomes an important challenge. Grassroots
coalitions, such as the one that is the subject of this research, may include people with
diverse backgrounds and interests and may not identify themselves primarily as
environmental organizations. Scholars note that the complexity of environmental issues
in an era of privatization and globalization have led to the emergence of new alliances
and new forms of coalition organizing (Sirianni & Friedland, 2001). The environmental
justice movement has self-consciously adopted an approach stressing grass-roots
participation, flexible structures and decentralization (Williams, 1999; Faber, 1998a).
The current research demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of mobilizing a
coalition to confront decentralized environmental problems such as water quality and
decentralized forms of power.

46

Research Questions
On the broadest level, the goal of this project was to further understanding of how
environmental progress and change occur. As a city-dweller conscious of the importance
of urban sustainability for a future in which most people will live in cities, I was
interested in shedding light on the hidden processes of urban metabolism by which cities
draw on natural resources to sustain their existence. These processes, in which technical,
social and political processes are intertwined, have enormous impact on the physical and
social sustainability of cities.
My case study of the Croton Coalition’s involvement in the controversy over the
filtration of the Croton water supply was intended to reveal how grassroots activism
contributes to the policy process, as well as how such activism is thwarted. Through this
case study I hoped to shed light on New York City’s hydro-social cycle more broadly and
to contribute to greater awareness of the critical importance and complexity of urban
environmental issues in industrialized countries, as well as to the policy debate about the
future management of New York City’s water resources. Thus, the questions that guided
my research were:

How does grassroots political activism, as practiced by the Croton Coalition,
contribute to the achievement of environmental change?

What can the experience of the Croton Coalition in the controversy over
filtration teach us about the social processes by which cities draw on water
resources to sustain their existence?
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These aims led me to ask the following specific question about the Croton
Coalition’s members and their perspectives, positions and activities: 1. Who are the
participants in the Croton Coalition? What are their values and interests? What power
do they have? What alliances have they made? 2. What access did the Coalition have to
the policy-making process? What role did it play? What influence did the Coalition
have on the policy process? 3. What was the Coalition’s understanding of the history of
water quality in the Croton watershed? 4. How did the economics of water in New
York City affect the Coalition’s claims, strategies and ability to influence the policy
process? 5. What was the policy advocated by the Croton Coalition? What are the
potential environmental, political and economic effects of this policy for the New York
City region? Who stands to benefit/suffer from this policy alternative? These questions
guided my interviews and other data collection activities.

Methodology
My choice of method was guided by the framework of political ecology because I
was drawn to that framework’s focus on natural resource use within a broad theoretical
perspective. I sought to gain a holistic understanding of how political and economic
processes at different scales influenced the possibilities for environmental progress.
Proponents of political ecology recommend a “bottom-up” approach to understand
processes taking place across multiple time and spatial scales (Belsky, 2002), and the
case study method is considered to be appropriate for the study of complex contemporary
social phenomena that cannot be studied in the laboratory but must be understood in
context (Yin, 1984). As such I chose to carry out a case study of a specific
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environmental controversy that seemed to offer the possibility of exploring how
environmental progress is furthered or thwarted.
My choice of cases was influenced by several considerations. The provision of
adequate supplies of clean water to cities is widely acknowledged to be a critical
environmental challenge around the world. New York City, although currently unique in
the size of its system, provides a good opportunity to study how a major city is
responding to the challenges of managing its water supply in the current era. A growing
number of expanding cities around the world are facing the challenges that New York
City has faced and is facing today. In examining the filtration controversy and the Croton
Coalition, I soon recognized that following the evolution of the Coalition presented an
opportunity to study how environmental progress might be furthered from the bottom up.
At the same time, the complexity of the filtration issue and the multi-layered policy
process seemed as if they would provide a window into the broader issue of New York
City’s management of water as a natural resource.
Throughout the course of this research I had to constantly remind myself to focus
on my research questions about the role and influence of the Croton Coalition in the
policy controversy over the filtration of the Croton water supply. It was tempting to
wander off course into various related questions about the New York City water system,
questions that were closely or not so closely related to the filtration controversy.
However, guided by the research questions, I tried to maintain my focus on gaining a
deep understanding of the Coalition in context. I explored the experiences, activities,
practices, knowledge and perspectives of the Coalition through the eyes of its members,
supplemented by the perspectives of other key participants in the filtration controversy
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who were familiar with the Coalition. My goal was to uncover what happened in this
controversy, situating the issue in its specific context of place, time, and social
relationships and tracing the formation and evolution of the Coalition’s positions and
strategies.
The primary source of data for this research was interviews conducted with 25
key informants. The most important interviews were conducted with 12 Croton Coalition
founders and board members, some of whom were interviewed more than once. What I
learned from these interviews forms the core of this research, since I learned from them
about the policies and politics of the Coalition. Each of these activists also had a wealth
of knowledge about and a unique perspective on the history of the filtration controversy.
These activists served on the Croton Coalition board as representatives of various
community organizations, so they were able to provide me with their perspective on these
organizations’ relationship to the filtration controversy as well.
I also interviewed key participants in the water filtration controversy and the
water policy process in New York City. These interviewees included a former
commissioner of the New York City Department of Environmental Protection, the New
York City Watershed Inspector General, a New York State Assemblyman, a former
assistant general of the United Stated Department of Justice and the former Supervisor of
Yorktown in Westchester County, a watershed community. I also interviewed
representatives of environmental organizations involved in the controversy. A full list of
the interviewees, almost all of whom agreed to be named, is attached. These
interviewees provided me with information about the background and evolution of the
filtration controversy. They helped me to better understand the arguments for filtration
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that were opposed by the Croton Coalition. Several were also able to provide outsiders’
perspectives on the effectiveness of the Croton Coalition.
I attended meetings related to the filtration controversy over a period of about
four years from 2001 to 2004. I attended a range of Croton Coalition meetings, DEP
hearings, and other relevant meetings that took place during the research period. I
observed the relationships between members representing different groups, the evolution
of their ideas about the controversy, and the development of their tactics for influencing
the policy process. Although I was not an active participant in the Coalition’s activities, I
was a sympathetic supporter and developed friendly relationships with several Coalition
leaders.
I used documents extensively. The Croton Coalition newsletters were an
important source of information on the Coalition’s activities and perspective. I was able
to visit the Coalition’s office to study documents, memos and meeting minutes. I also
used NYC DEP reports, policy statements, letters to and from public officials, and media
reports. Reports published by Riverkeeper and the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) provided useful background on the management of the New York City
watershed. John Klotz, who served as the Croton Coalition’s first lawyer, has archived
many legal documents related to the controversy on the website of his law firm. These
documents were extremely useful in tracking the legal cases pursued by the Coalition.
The Norwood News covered the filtration controversy extensively, and archived all of the
relevant articles online. This was very helpful to me in establishing a chronology of
events (see Appendix I). I used all of these sources to identify issues of importance, to
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provide portraits of key actors and events in the filtration controversy, to construct a
chronology of Coalition activities, and to analyze Coalition positions.
As my research progressed and I identified areas of particular importance, I was
able to review several videotapes from a collection of approximately 600 videotapes of
Croton Coalition board meetings, NYC DEP public hearings and other meetings during
which filtration and related policy issues were discussed by Croton Coalition members
with regulators and politicians. These videotapes were made by David Ferguson, one of
the Coalition’s leaders. They contain a record of the activities of the Croton Coalition
and arguments made by both Coalition activists and other participants in the policy
process. Future researchers may wish to note the existence of this exceptional resource.
In analyzing the case I focused at first on understanding what happened from the
perspective of the Croton Coalition. I identified turning points in the history of the
Coalition that helped me to understand the obstacles and opportunities that presented
themselves to the leaders of the Coalition in their efforts to influence the outcome of the
policy controversy. My analysis of the development and activities of the Croton
Coalition was guided by the research questions that focused on how the policies and
activities of the Coalition grew out of the positions of the grassroots activists and
organizations the Coalition represented, how forces at different scales influenced the
Coalition and structured the conflict over filtration. My analysis of the dissolution of the
alliance between the urban and suburban activists led me to focus on the characteristics of
place-based organizing around environmental issues. During the course of my research I
was struck by the contrast between the positions of the Croton Coalition and the
established environmental organizations involved in advocacy for the New York City
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water system. This necessitated a detour into the history of the environmental movement
to help me to understand the reasons for these differences. And finally, I have attempted
to assess the extent of the influence of the Coalition on the policy process.

Plan of the Dissertation
Reflecting the framework of political ecology that guided this research, Chapter 2
explores the multiple aspects of the filtration controversy and its significance as an
environmental issue. This chapter explores the physical setting, particularly the
hydrology of the Croton watershed, the issue of water quality, and the social and political
context at multiple scales. The history of the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement is reviewed, focusing on the difference in treatment of the West of Hudson
watersheds (Catskill and Delaware) and the East of Hudson watershed (Croton) in that
agreement. The Croton Coalition is introduced as the main source of opposition to
filtration following the abandonment by New York City of the original site for the
filtration plant in the Jerome Park Reservoir. I argue that the significance of the Croton
Coalition’s position was that, in essence, it advocated for application of the precautionary
principle to the management of New York City’s water system. The precautionary
principle has been applied most extensively as a response to the release of toxic
substances into the environment. More recently it has been utilized in relation to the
protection of ecosystem resources (for example, Bryce Thorne-Miller, 2003 who applies
the precautionary principle to fisheries management), that is directly relevant to the issue
of watershed management which is addressed in this study. My study is the first to apply
the precautionary principle to the issue of filtration of water supplies.
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Chapter 3 is an account of the participation of the Croton Coalition in the
filtration controversy over a period of about six years. This chapter explores the
controversy from the perspective of the Coalition and highlights the agency of the
Coalition activists. The chapter is structured around four turning points in the history of
the Croton Coalition and the evolution of the filtration controversy. This chapter
highlights the surprising collaboration between city residents and watershed residents in
advocating for watershed protection and avoidance of filtration, the complexity of their
motivations and positions, and the dissolution of the alliance between the Bronx
contingent and the activists from the watershed communities. I argue that the Croton
Coalition does not fit into traditional categories of environmental organizations, partly
because it developed in response to multi-dimensional problems.
Chapter 4 examines the role that the Croton Coalition played as a grassroots
organization involved in the filtration controversy. The Croton Coalition drew on ideas
and strategies developed by grassroots community organizations that emerged as part of
the explosion of alternative expressions of environmentalism during the last decades of
the twentieth century. These expressions included the hazardous waste, toxics,
environmental justice and watershed movements which shared a place-based orientation,
concern for urban environmental problems, and advocacy for pollution prevention as a
response to the environmental problems created by industrial production. The Coalition
situated itself as a coalition of place-based community organizations, providing a bridge
between the local concerns of neighborhoods and towns and concerns at the scale of the
watershed. In this chapter, the uniqueness of the Coalition’s role in the controversy is
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revealed by contrast with that of the environmental organizations most prominent in
advocacy for New York City’s water which did not oppose the filtration plant.
In my conclusion, I discuss a number of issues that emerged as central in my
research about the Croton Coalition and the significance of these issues to other
controversies about complex environmental challenges. First, I discuss how this research
reveals the unique and important role that grassroots organizations play in reframing
policy questions and introducing new ideas, such as application of the precautionary
principle, into the policy process. Second, I address how this case illustrates the
usefulness of the concept of scale and how this concept illuminates controversies over
environmental policies. The formation of the Croton Coalition was an example of
rescaling as a political strategy, and the evolution of the controversy presented many
examples of the dynamic processes associated with the production of scale. Third, I
examine how this case provides insights into the nature of place-based activism, and how
such activism may support or undermine coalition-building. The Croton Coalition drew
on the energy created by local activists’ attachment to their communities. While this
attachment led to a strategy of NIABY (not in anyone’s backyard), it also presented
challenges to the maintenance of an alliance between people from very different
communities. Fourth, I review the reasons for the Coalition’s political successes and
failures. While the Coalition had many successes in persuading communities in the
watershed to increase watershed protection efforts, it failed to change New York City’s
policy regarding construction of the filtration plant. These different results may be
attributed to factors such as timing, the social location of the activists in the watershed in
contrast to those within New York City, and the opportunities for citizen participation at
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the different scales of the watershed communities and New York City. Finally, I address
the implications of my research for the future of New York City’s water system,
emphasizing the need for public and scholarly attention to the politics of watershed
protection.
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Chapter 2: What is Wrong With Filtration? The
Significance of Filtration as an Environmental Policy
Choice

The Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition, formed in 1997, is dedicated
through regional action to maintaining, improving and protecting the quality of
the waters in the Croton Watershed and to alternatives to filtration. The Croton
Watershed provides high-quality drinking water, as it has for nearly a century, to
more than a million of the state’s residents. Does an expensive and prominent
chemical filtration plant meet our needs, or is the safe, cost-effective, and nearly
maintenance-free method of source protection the answer to our future? (Cover of
CWCWC general publicity brochure, January 2003)

One rainy day I traveled up to Bedford, New York to interview Marian Rose,
chairperson of the Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition. It was dark and rain was
pouring down when the train stopped in Bedford. Still, I was struck by the quiet as I
always was when I stepped off the train. It seemed almost silent after the din of Grand
Central Station and the noise of the train itself.
Marian had graciously offered to meet me at the train. As we drove the winding
roads, we followed the path of a stream. In the rain and fog, the road seemed like a
tunnel passing through a forest. As we came closer to the house, perched on a steep hill,
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Marian told me to look out for wild turkeys. Sure enough, as we entered the house
through the kitchen, we saw a pair of turkeys crossing the lawn.
When we sat down at the kitchen table, Marian told me a little bit about herself.
She had come to the United States in 1940 when her family fled from Belgium. She
studied at Barnard College, received her PhD in physics from Harvard University, and
worked on the beginnings of the Manhattan Project. She worked in applied mathematics
and physics until she retired.
As I began to question her, Marian told me about how she had become involved
in the Sierra Club and later served as chairperson of her town’s watershed committee.
When she became chairperson of the watershed committee, her first act was to refuse a
permit to a developer who applied to fill in a wetland. She was taken aback by the
response. She told me that she hadn’t known that no previous chairperson had ever
refused a developer a permit. She said that she had been very naïve – she had thought
that the job was to protect the wetlands.
As she began to tell me about the watershed, she expressed a bit of
embarrassment. She said that at the risk of sounding sentimental, she felt that she had a
personal relationship with the watershed. She thought of the watershed as a living being
that breathes and exhales, that pumps the water like blood circulating through the body.
We injure it by destroying wetlands, cutting down trees, building houses – but it recovers.
It is amazingly resilient. Marian said that she felt that she must do whatever she could to
save it (M. Rose, interview, November 30, 2001).
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Illustration 3
Marian Rose, President of the Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition
December 7, 2005
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Introduction
From its inception in 1997, the Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition opposed
the construction of a filtration plant for the Croton water supply and advocated for
application to the Croton watershed of the same policies that New York City had chosen
to apply to the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. The Croton Coalition activists
believed that filtration for the Croton supply was unnecessary and undesirable. This
chapter provides the context for understanding the filtration question by introducing the
biophysical and social characteristics of the Croton. This chapter also explores why and
how different policies were applied to the Croton watershed as opposed to the Catskill
and Delaware watersheds, both regarding the introduction of filtration and the extent of
watershed protection as instituted in the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). The chapter concludes by comparing the analysis of filtration by the
Croton Coalition to the precautionary principle. This comparison reveals the significance
of the Croton Coalition’s reframing of the question of whether to filter the Croton supply
as one of great environmental importance.
When the Croton Coalition became involved in the controversy over building a
filtration plant for the Croton water supply, its leaders aimed to reframe the policy
question. Filtration is a widely-used physical procedure for cleaning polluted water.
Although some chemicals may be used to aid the process, it primarily consists of
treatment through sedimentation and filtration through a medium such as sand. Filtration
is generally viewed as a solution to a problem. Filtration, or water “treatment,” is
generally thought of as a procedure that will insure clean water and protect human health.
Yet the Croton Coalition leaders argued that filtration was likely to threaten human health
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and harm the environment. The Croton Coalition claimed that the primary issue was
about how best to assure a safe water supply, and beyond that, to examine how the
residents of the watershed and of New York City could continue to depend on the
ecosystem services of the watershed. The Croton Coalition activists argued that what
appeared to be a seemingly straightforward policy of implementation of an accepted
approach to resolve a public health problem was, in fact, a problem of much more
complexity and very great ecological importance.
In some ways, the Croton Coalition’s argument appeared to be simple common
sense. As Marian Rose, chairperson of the Coalition, expressed so movingly when I met
with her, nature gives us life and should be protected. The Coalition’s position had
resonance because it reflected basic principles of the environmental movement that have
become axioms in American society. Sylvia Tesh (2000) gives voice to this perspective
in her discussion of the core principles at the heart of the environmental movement:
…environmentalists have worked hard to promote a novel view of nature. They
argue that instead of lacking intrinsic value, nature has its own integrity and thus
should be revered; that instead of being divisible into discrete parts, nature is
intricately interconnected and thus best understood as an organic whole; and that
instead of being tough and resilient, nature is highly vulnerable to human
technology and thus endangered. (p. 65-66)
These principles, which have wide public acceptance according to public opinion
research (Guber, 2003; Kempton, Boster & Hartley, 1999), underlay the Coalition
position.
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Despite public acceptance of these principles, the Croton Coalition faced distinct
challenges in applying these ideas to the filtration controversy. Applying these ideas to
filtration was not a simple matter since the nature the Coalition sought to protect was a
watershed that had already been thoroughly and obviously disrupted by human
interventions. The Coalition argued that the watershed was a natural system that was
highly vulnerable and in need of more vigorous protection, reflecting the
environmentalist argument. But at the same time, in order to make its case, the Coalition
had to argue that the watershed was tough and resilient enough to survive human abuse
and protect human health. While environmentalists usually argue for stringent measures
to protect public health, the Coalition position was that the specific protective measure of
water filtration should be foregone. Both the Coalition’s framing of filtration as an
environmental problem, and the policy positions that stemmed from this way of framing
filtration, were new, and represented a radical change in approach to the management of
many environmental problems.
In this chapter I argue that the Croton Coalition was in essence, without using the
term, advocating for the precautionary principle to be applied to the question about
filtration. I draw on scholarship about this principle, which is a framework that provides
guidelines for the consideration of environmental problems related to pollution.
Stemming from a general principle of German law, this framework has been applied most
widely to the issue of the release of toxic substances into the environment (Jordan &
O’Riordan, 2003). Over time its use has been extended to issues of genetically modified
organisms, biodiversity conservation and natural resource management, notably in the
area of fisheries. Although my application of the precautionary principle to water quality
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management is unusual, it is helpful in placing the Croton Coalition’s arguments against
filtration in the context of approaches to ecosystem management inspired by the
environmental movement.
Within the realm of management of environmental problems, the Coalition’s
position was specifically a challenge to prevailing ideas about the management of water.
Peter Gleick (2002) has used the term “the hard path for water” to summarize these ideas
which have emphasized centralized approaches to controlling pollution without
addressing the inter-relationship between water quality and other environmental
problems. The Coalition’s stance reflected a newer approach to water management that
has been called “the soft path for water,” a framework for water management that
incorporates an environmental perspective.
For at least 100 years New York City’s water managers had assumed that they
would eventually implement filtration of the Croton supply. This policy reflected a
general consensus among regulators and water managers in favor of filtration as a
universal approach to the management of urban water quality. When the Surface Water
Treatment Rule was promulgated in 1989, New York City’s administration made
significant efforts to secure a waiver that would allow the City to avoid filtration for the
Catskill and Delaware supplies. As we shall see, federal regulators only reluctantly
agreed to allow New York to avoid filtration for the Catskill and Delaware supply.
However, at the same time, the City moved ahead on long-standing plans to construct a
filtration plant for the Croton supply. When the communities in the Catskill and
Delaware watersheds objected to new restrictions on activities in the watersheds that
would protect water quality in the absence of filtration, New York City attempted to
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secure their cooperation. But in the Croton watershed, New York City was reluctant to
invest the political or financial capital necessary to secure the communities’ cooperation.
After all, it was not as important to keep the Croton supply clean. It would be filtered
anyway. The contradiction between the policy that New York City adopted for the
Catskill and Delaware and the policy that it adopted for the Croton is an example of the
uneven adoption of new ideas emerging from the environmental movement.
Looking back, the Croton Coalition activists identified the negotiations over the
New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) as an important turning
point in the controversy over filtration. They blamed the “growth coalition” in the
Croton watershed for New York City’s decision to build a filtration plant for the Croton
supply rather than to try to achieve its water quality goals through watershed protection.
Real estate developers stood to benefit from less regulation of their activities and thus had
an interest in seeing the plant built. Their opposition to the enforcement of watershed
protection activities contributed to a context within which avoidance of filtration seemed
an unrealistic goal. However, as we shall see, at the time of the negotiations over the New
York City Watershed MOA, New York City was firmly committed to filtration for the
Croton. The question of whether the Croton supply would be filtered was never raised in
the negotiations with the Westchester and Putnam County governments. There was no
controversy yet.

The Setting
The Croton watershed is a 387 square mile area located east of the Hudson River,
beginning immediately north of New York City (see map in Chapter 1). The watershed
lies within 2 states, 4 counties (primarily Westchester and Putnam) and 22 towns. It
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encompasses 12 drainage basins and 74 sub-basins. The Croton watershed drains the
waters of 3 branches of the Croton River and tributaries including the Titicus, Cross,
Kisco and Muscoot Rivers. The Croton system provides about 10% of the daily supply
of water of the entire New York City water system. During a drought this may increase
to 20-30%. In 2002, the total surface water system for New York City supplied 1.2
billion gallons per day to 8 million people in New York City and about 1 million people
in Westchester, Putnam, Ulster and Orange Counties (Galusha, 1999; Kane, 2003; NYC
DEP, 2002a). All water supplied to New York City from all three of the City’s
watersheds was disinfected by chlorination but remained unfiltered as of 2005.
An important issue in the controversy over filtration was the quality of the water
in the Croton system. There was general agreement among proponents and opponents of
filtration that the quality of the water supplied by the Croton watershed was high. The
Croton Coalition emphasized that the water was at least as clean as the water from the
Catskill and Delaware supplies. The New York City Department of Environmental
Protection, while claiming that the water was perfectly fine and healthful, emphasized
that there was seasonal variation in quality and that there were times when the water from
the Croton had to be mixed with higher quality water from the Catskill and Delaware
(West of Hudson) supplies in order to be used. In times of drought, when more Croton
water might be needed, quality problems might limit the amount of water that could be
drawn from the Croton supply. Michael Principe, Deputy Commissioner and Director of
the Bureau of Water Supply, stressed in an interview that New York City needed to be
able to obtain the maximum quantity of water from the Croton for system redundancy.
The NYC DEP planned to begin taking the West of Hudson (WOH) system off-line for
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repairs beginning in 2010 and would then need to depend more heavily on the Croton
supply (M. Principe, interview, September 1, 2005).
However, questions about future quality were more important in the filtration
controversy than those about current quality. In this regard, proponents and opponents of
filtration highlighted several specific characteristics of the Croton watershed in
comparison with the West of Hudson watershed, that is the Catskill and Delaware
watersheds. The Croton watershed had significantly larger areas of wetlands than the
West of Hudson watersheds. Wetlands contribute to water quality by slowing runoff and
filtering contaminants, but also contribute organic carbon to the water. Organic carbon,
added to water both by wetlands and by erosion caused by stormwater runoff, was a
source of concern in the Croton watershed because it interacts with treatment chemicals
to cause dangerous by-products. Excess phosphorus, primarily from fertilizer washed
into reservoirs, contributes to the problem because it promotes the growth of algae which
then decays, adds additional organic carbon to the water, and leads to a chain reaction of
adverse impacts that require the use of more treatment chemicals. Excess phosphorus can
lead to eutrophication of water bodies, as in the famous case of Lake Erie in the 1960’s.
In this condition the excess nutrients lead to explosive growth of algae, which reduces
oxygen levels and make the water inhospitable to fish and other aquatic species. The
Croton reservoirs were described as “borderline” eutrophic (Tierney, 2003 and P.
Mankiewicz, interview, January 7, 2005).
Contact with soil is the primary vehicle for the filtration of water in nature. For
this reason, land use is a very important factor in water quality. When the Croton system
was built, between 1837 and 1911, Westchester County was a rural area. By the 1990’s
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Westchester was a suburbanized county and Putnam County was the frontier of
suburbanization. Pires (2004) utilized a variety of sources to conclude that land use in the
watershed was 40% residential, 30% undeveloped, 10% industrial and commercial, 14%
recreation, and 6% agricultural (p. 165).
The size of the population in the watershed was one of the primary reasons given
to justify the need for filtration. As described above, many of the activities of people
have the potential to affect water quality negatively. According to the NYC DEP, in
2003 there were 190,000 people living in the Croton watershed and 69 sewage treatment
plants. By way of comparison there were 98,000 people and 35 sewage treatment plants
in the West of Hudson watershed (Freud, 2003), and 68% of the land was forested (Pires,
2004, p.165). Although the activities of a growing population certainly have the potential
to negatively affect water quality, it is the interaction between people and the biophysical
environment that determines whether water quality is actually impaired. There was
general agreement among both government agencies and environmentalists that the water
supplied to New York City from the Croton watershed was clean enough to meet all of
the relevant federal and state health standards. The Croton supply sometimes failed to
meet standards for color and taste. Sub-standard color and taste may or may not be
related to the healthfulness of the water. While the Croton Coalition activists
downplayed their significance, regulators considered sub-standard color and taste to be
indicators of possible problems.
The characteristics of the constructed water system also influence water quality.
The reservoirs in the Croton system were interconnected by streams rather than pipes.
This means that all of the water flowed above ground. Thus water quality could be
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directly affected by land use and discharges of effluents all along these watercourses. At
the same time, the flow of water through interconnected streams and reservoirs provided
opportunities for materials to settle out of the water, potentially improving water quality.
In contrast, in the West of Hudson system (Catskill and Delaware watersheds),
constructed later, water flowed from the reservoirs in underground pipes. The New
Croton Aqueduct, which was completed in 1893 and was the oldest of New York City’s
aqueducts and tunnels, conveyed the water from the New Croton Reservoir which is the
collecting reservoir for the Croton system, to the Jerome Park distributing reservoir. This
aqueduct was designed to allow infiltration or seepage of water to augment the quantity
delivered to New York City. As the watershed developed this feature became
problematic as the infiltrating water could be contaminated. Once it reached New York
City, water from both systems was vulnerable to contamination by street runoff and
sewage that was able to infiltrate the old and deteriorated water mains and pipes of the
distribution system.
The system of reservoirs was an overwhelming feature of the environment for
people living in the watershed. The reservoirs were not hidden away. Many roads were
built right next to the reservoirs and even passed over them. In fact, many communities
were perched on hillsides around the reservoirs, since the valleys were flooded to create
the reservoirs. The people in the Croton watershed valued the reservoirs as an aesthetic
and recreational resource. Many people in the watershed had direct experience with the
interconnection of water systems because their homes were equipped with septic systems
and private wells that supplied drinking water. They had seen what happened when
water was over-pumped. This was very different from the situation in New York City
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where residents’ direct experience of the water cycle was limited. There, by contrast, the
joke was that most people thought that water came “from the faucet.”

Sources of Water Pollution in the Croton Watershed
Source waters may be polluted in a variety of ways, which can be grouped into
two categories. The first category, point source pollution, refers to site specific sources
and includes deliberate disposal of sewage and industrial wastes into water bodies. For
example, there were 68 sewage treatment plants that discharge into the waters of the
Croton watershed. Non-point source pollution is dispersed pollution that may result from
runoff from agriculture, lawns, roads and buildings. Much non-point source pollution
reaches water bodies during rainstorms when pollutants are washed away as stormwater.
It was generally accepted that the main cause of water pollution in the Croton
watershed was stormwater. According to James Tierney, New York City Watershed
Inspector General (2003),
Polluted runoff is broadly accepted as being by far the largest source of pollutants
currently entering the New York City Watershed. This, even though there are over
100 sewage treatment plants that discharge directly into drinking water streams.
Most stormwater pollution occurs during major rainstorm or snow melt events.
(p. 3)
Since stormwater was generally agreed to be the main source of pollution in the Croton
watershed, land use was the focus of attention in efforts to reduce pollution. Although
agriculture may be a source of polluted stormwater, and was a problem in New York
City’s two other watersheds (known collectively as the West of Hudson watersheds) it
was no longer a major source of concern in the Croton watershed because agriculture had

69
all but disappeared from the area. However, suburban development was of great concern.
Suburban houses are typically surrounded by lawns that are managed with fertilizers and
herbicides. New parking lots and roads increase the amount of stormwater runoff. Since
much of the valley land in the Croton watershed was occupied by reservoirs, and more
desirable housing lots had already been built upon, there was pressure to construct
housing on steep slopes. Construction on steep slopes may increase road runoff and also
lead to leakage from septic systems. Loss of wetlands exacerbates the problems caused
by runoff because wetlands are natural filters. Although the Croton watershed was rich
in wetlands, wetlands were rapidly being lost to development.
As proposed by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection, the
Croton water treatment (filtration) plant was to employ a conventional process. The
process included a number of steps. The first step was mixing the raw water with
coagulants to remove suspended particles (coagulation and flocculation). Then, dissolved
air flotation, which is a less common technique that replaces the more common technique
of sedimentation in settling tanks to remove the coagulated particles. These steps would
be followed by filtration, disinfection with ultraviolet light, and chlorination for
disinfection of pathogens. Wastewater from the treatment process would be conveyed to
an existing wastewater treatment plant (New York City Department of Environmental
Protection, 2004). Plans for the plant, including its size and the exact processes to be
used, changed several times during the course of the controversy.
In making its case against filtration, the Croton Coalition raised questions about
the actual status of water quality in the Croton, about the significance of the standards
being used to evaluate water quality, and about the accuracy of predictions about future
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water quality. For now, we note that none of these issues were clear-cut. This complex
subject will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 3 in relation to conflicts over the
interpretation of scientific data, and the role of science more generally, in the process of
policy-making regarding the management of the Croton watershed.
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Illustration 4
Map of the Northwest Bronx
Showing Jerome Park Reservoir and the Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park
The two sites considered for the Croton Water Treatment Plant
Open Accessible Space Information System
www.oasisnyc.net
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New York City’s Policy on Filtration for the Croton Water Supply
– Should the Croton be Filtered?
Before we turn to the position taken by the Croton Coalition, we will review the
background of the New York City’s policy on filtration in the Croton. As we have seen,
the controversy about filtration was set off by changes in federal water quality laws in the
1980’s. The Croton Coalition was formed in 1997, however New York City had
considered filtration for the Croton supply since at least 1900. Around that year land was
set aside at Jerome Park Reservoir in the northwest Bronx for a filtration plant. This land
was later released for other public uses when New York City adopted chlorination instead
of filtration. Plans for filtration were revived at several points, including in the 1970’s.
In 1986 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was passed by the US Congress,
and in 1989 the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) came into effect. This rule
required that all large cities using surface water must filter their supplies by June 1993.
The New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH) was delegated primary authority
for enforcement of these regulations in the State (referred to as “primacy”). As a result of
lobbying by New York and other cities, an exception was made possible for supplies
judged to be well-protected (Cronin & Kennedy, 1997). The regulations set a very high
bar for protection, stating that “The public waters system must demonstrate through
ownership and/or written agreements with landowners within the watershed that it can
control all human activities which may have an adverse impact on the microbiological
quality of the source water” (SDWA Title 40 141.71). For an exception to be granted, a
city was supposed to apply for a waiver by 1991. The SWTR prompted construction of
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many filtration plants across the United States. Only a handful of cities attempted to
obtain a waiver from the US EPA.
New York City applied for and received such a waiver, known as a “filtration
avoidance determination” or FAD, for the Catskill and Delaware supplies. New York
City did not apply for a waiver for the Croton system. As we shall see, the reasons for
omitting the Croton included a calculation that the Croton supply would not meet the
requirements for a waiver as established by the US EPA, and that an application for such
a waiver would undermine New York City’s case in seeking a waiver for the Catskill and
Delaware supplies. On October 30, 1992, New York City signed a stipulation with the
NYS DOH in which it committed to build a filtration plant. US EPA approved this
stipulation with a letter from EPA Region II Administrator Constantine Sidamon-Eristoff
in January 1993.
Although New York City had agreed to build the filtration plant by signing the
stipulation in 1992, the emergence of opposition in the neighborhoods around Jerome
Park Reservoir caused unexpected delays. This opposition brought progress on the
filtration plant to a halt in 1996 when Mayor Giuliani responded to the community
pressure to reconsider the siting of the plant. The opponents of the filtration plant
questioned New York City’s process for deciding to filter. They wanted to know when
this decision had been made and who had made it. When they discovered that New York
City had not applied for a waiver for the Croton supply, they wanted to know why it had
not. Karen Argenti, a leader of the opposition to the siting of the filtration plant in
Jerome Park Reservoir and a founder of the Croton Coalition, described what had
happened as a deception. The DEP was meeting with the community around Jerome
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Park Reservoir in 1991-1992, and then in 1993 called a scoping meeting to establish the
issues to be addressed in the environmental impact statement for the filtration plant:
“They deceived us, because they should have told us about signing the consent decree in
1992. When they told us, it was already a year later and it was too late to object to it…”
(K. Argenti, interview, May 6, 2004).
According to Michael Principe, Deputy Commissioner of the NYC DEP, the
decision not to apply for a waiver was made because the NYC DEP was already
committed to building a filtration plant for the Croton supply (M. Principe, interview,
September 1, 2005). Al Appleton, who was the NYC DEP commissioner at that time,
told me that he considered trying to avoid filtration for the Croton. He said that “the
choice became either filtering Croton and knowing we would get good water, or trying to
avoid filtering Croton, spending at least as much money and having political blood all
over the landscape, and then maybe winding up having to filter it anyway” (A. Appleton,
interview, June 28, 2005). The decision not to apply for a waiver was made within the
New York City administration, without public notice or opportunity for comment. Later,
when New York City blamed the US EPA for the need to filter the Croton the activists
questioned the entire process. It looked to them as if the entire decision was made in a
series of agreements between the New York City, New York State, and Federal
governments concluded behind closed doors. Some of the Croton activists called the
decision-making process a conspiracy - a deal made long before the 1991 deadline.
Frank Eadie, one of the Croton Coalition founders, believed that it had been made in the
1980’s during the Koch Administration. He suspected that the two environmental
organizations most prominently involved in advocacy for New York City’s water supply,
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the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Riverkeeper (headed by Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr.) might have been involved in the decision:
That decision was probably made 20 years ago. Probably under the Koch
administration. Do you know Frank…one of Koch’s DEP ommissioners…
McArdle? I suspect it was made under him. Which was in the mid-80’s.
McArdle to this day shows up at almost every hearing on Croton filtration, and
says something like “its not really clear the Croton really needs to be filtered, but
since EPA says it has to be, it should be filtered in the Bronx.” And he actually
represents at these meetings, an organization of building contractors and
construction unions, a coalition. Basically he represents the industry. So I
suspect he has made a lot of money off of Croton filtration over all these years.
His involvement and the way he speaks about it seems fairly clear there was a
deal made back in the 80’s, and I wouldn’t be too surprised if Kennedy and
NRDC was actually involved at that point in making that decision. For sure it was
in effect by ‘91 because that’s when the big study of filtration, as opposed to
filtration avoidance, for both Cat Del and Croton were done - studies which have
never been made public. These were on whether filtration was necessary. (F.
Eadie, interview, March 12, 2004)
This is issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Obviously the view of the NYC DEP was different. According to former DEP
Commissioner Appleton, who served under Mayor Dinkins (1990-93), New York City
was most concerned about avoiding the high cost of filtration for the Catskill and
Delaware watersheds, source of 90% of New York City’s water under normal conditions.
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Filtration was considered a necessary public health measure, and anyone that proposed
watershed protection as a substitute for filtration was called hopelessly naïve because
protection would depend on controlling land use. Within New York City it was
considered unlikely that the US EPA would accept the City’s proposal to avoid filtration
for any part of the watershed. Given that the Croton watershed was so much more
developed than the Catskill and Delaware watersheds, if New York City had sought a
filtration avoidance determination for the Croton it would have appeared as if the City
was ignoring the facts and seeking to avoid filtration even at the cost of risks to public
health. New York City fully expected to filter the Croton, and in signing the stipulation
with the NYS DOH it was merely trying to gain more time in which to do so. As
Appleton said:
Nowadays watershed protection seems obvious, it seems like apple pie and
motherhood. But 15 years ago watershed protection was kind of the goofy little
nice cuddly academic idea. The kind that if only we could do it that would be
great, but that’s not the real world. There were a few who felt very strongly that
there was no living force on the planet that could control land use. And there
were also many people that felt that all water systems should be filtered, just as a
backup. So it was an enormous uphill battle…we were considered naïve…and
that’s isolating, and a very politically deadly tactic. (A. Appleton, interview, June
28, 2005)
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The New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement - The
Croton Watershed in the Context of the Entire Water System
In order to obtain and retain the filtration avoidance determination (FAD) for the
Catskill and Delaware watersheds under the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) of
1989, New York City had to demonstrate to the US EPA that it was serious about
watershed protection. Thus began a process that eventually resulted in the New York
City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of 1997. The Croton Coalition was
formed partly in response to the completion of the MOA, and the programs instituted
under the MOA would have significant implications for the future of the Croton
watershed. New York City’s decision to avoid filtration, and the programs that it
instituted under the MOA, were widely acclaimed as examples of recognition by
government of the value of ecosystem services and the benefits of employing ecological
economics (Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998; Daily, 2002; Wilson, 2002; Mas, 2004; Postel,
2005a; Postel, 2005b; and also see Sagoff, 2002 for an alternative view). The MOA
appeared to provide a framework for regional cooperation in an approach to the
watershed that incorporated cutting edge ideas about ecosystem management and
environmental economics.
When the NYC DEP began the process of instituting new watershed protections
that would enable it to avoid filtration, the agency proposed new regulations to control
polluting activities in both the West of Hudson and East of Hudson watersheds.
However, the agency’s actions indicated that it believed that it was not as essential to
provide the same level of protection for the Croton watershed as for the Catskill and
Delaware watersheds. At first New York City showed little interest in obtaining the
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cooperation of the communities in the Croton watershed. In the end the MOA did include
watershed protection programs for the Croton watershed, but these programs were funded
at a much lower level than in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds (A. Bock, interview,
September 2, 2005; Westchester County, 1995). For the Croton Coalition, the treatment
of the Catskill and Delaware watersheds in the MOA served as a standard by which the
Coalition could assess the success of its own efforts to procure similar treatment for the
Croton watershed.

Regulations Announced
The process that led to the New York City Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
began in 1990 following announcement of the federal Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR) and New York State’s announcement that in administering the SWTR it would
require universal filtration for water systems in the State. Both New York City and
environmentalists hoped to avoid filtering the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. New
York City wanted to avoid the cost of $6-8 billion for a filtration plant. The leading
environmental organizations concerned with New York City’s water were eager to use
the opportunity offered by the effort to avoid filtration to further watershed protection.
In 1990, after years of work and with the immediate incentive of the Surface
Water Treatment Rule (SWTR), New York City announced strict new regulations to
protect all three watersheds. The new regulations had implications for land use in the
watershed communities, addressing issues such as buffer zones around water courses, the
siting of buildings and expansion of sewer services. The new regulations were followed
by announcement of an agreement with the US EPA that New York City would purchase
10,000 acres of land in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds as a further water protection
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measure. There was a very negative response from the watershed communities to the
prospect of increased limitations on land use and polluting activities in the watersheds,
and to the prospect of land purchases by New York City, which the communities felt
would affect their economies as well as their autonomy. New York City had to withdraw
the proposed regulations. The towns in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds formed a
Coalition of Watershed Towns to sue New York City. In 1993, and again in 1994, New
York City offered financial compensation to offset the cost of the regulations to the West
of Hudson communities to try to persuade them to accept the new regulations and land
purchases, but these offers were not accepted (Pfeffer & Wagenet, 2003).

East of Hudson and the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement
In the Croton watershed (or East of Hudson), the Westchester and Putnam County
governments took the lead in responding to New York City’s efforts to put the new
watershed regulations into place. The interests of the East of Hudson communities were
somewhat different from those of the communities West of Hudson. Westchester County
in particular was suburban rather than rural, no longer agricultural, and much wealthier.
But the main difference between the East of Hudson and West of Hudson communities
was that New York City was not pursuing a filtration avoidance determination (FAD) for
the East of Hudson watershed. Westchester and Putnam Counties argued that if New
York City was going to build a filtration plant for the Croton supply, they should not be
subject to the same level of regulations as the communities West of Hudson. On the
other hand, they argued, if they were going to have to be governed by the regulations,
they should receive a similar level of compensation as was being offered to the
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communities West of Hudson. In 1995 the Westchester County Executive wrote to the
Director of the New York State Department of Health to complain that New York City
was failing to respond to the County’s efforts to resolve the impasse over the watershed
regulations:
…the County has reviewed this sixth set of revisions (December 1994) to the
proposed New York City Watershed Rules and Regulations. As we have stated
many times before, and in spite of the fact that the Croton system is not part of the
USEPA Avoidance Determination, we support the bulk of these regulations and
believe that improved watershed protection is long overdue. Nonetheless, we
continue to be concerned with key regulatory requirements that unduly affect the
Croton watershed. While more is needed to protect and improve the Croton
supply, the fact that it will be filtered should permit some flexibility in defining
the means to that end. (Andrew P. O’Rourke, County Executive, letter to Michael
Burke Director, NYS DOH, Bureau of Public Water Supply Protection, March 2,
1995)
A Westchester County position paper (Westchester County, 1995) on the
watershed regulations stated that “Westchester believes that 98% of the proposed New
York City watershed regulations are sound and appropriate for the Croton watershed” (p.
1). Westchester County, which coordinated closely with Putnam County throughout the
negotiations, focused on several issues. First, the County sought some flexibility in the
regulations regarding wastewater discharges to be applied in the Croton watershed. Since
filtration was to be implemented along with other measures, the County argued that such
flexibility was warranted. Second, the County proposed that New York City fund a plan
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to divert sewage out of the watershed. Third, the County asked that New York City
implement a program of land acquisitions, despite the Croton watershed not being
included in the filtration avoidance determination. Fourth, that local and county
regulatory agencies should retain their responsibilities for watershed-related functions
and that these responsibilities not be transferred to New York City. And finally, that
Westchester County should receive compensation comparable to what the West of
Hudson communities would be receiving.
According to Aaron Bock, who participated in the negotiations between
Westchester County and New York City as the Supervisor of the Town of Yorktown, the
issue of whether or not the Croton supply would be filtered was never raised as an issue
during this period; “it was just a given.” The main concern of the communities in
Westchester was to preserve their home rule prerogatives, “we wanted to get regulations
that we could live with so that we would be the ones to plan for ourselves about growth
or no growth.” According to Bock, the question of whether filtration was needed was
not raised in his community until the New York City Department of Environmental
Protection proposed to site the filtration plant in Yorktown in late 1996 – a year after the
negotiations had been concluded but prior to the final completion of the New York City
Watershed MOA in 1997 (A. Bock, interview, September 2, 2005).

Results of the Negotiations
Little progress was made in resolving the differences between New York City and
the watershed communities between 1990 and 1994. In 1995 Governor Pataki offered to
mediate between New York City and the watershed towns. The negotiations were a
cooperative, although not a public process, which in the end enabled New York City to
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institute the long-delayed new watershed regulations and to institute programs to protect
water quality. These programs included septic system rehabilitations, sewage plant
upgrades, land acquisitions, farm and forestry management programs, etc. The programs
established under the New York City Watershed MOA included many innovative and
positive features, including incentives for the communities in all three watersheds to
cooperate with New York City on watershed protection. These incentives included New
York City’s agreement not to use its power of eminent domain to acquire land in the
watersheds. The communities in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds received funds
from New York City for economic development projects compatible with watershed
protection. As previously noted, New York City received a great deal of favorable
publicity for this agreement, which has been portrayed as reflecting the value that the
City placed on a sustainable solution to threats to water quality, and recognition that
making financial investments in the preservation of the ecosystem was economically
preferable to destroying it (Cronin & Kennedy, 1997).
The conclusion of the MOA in 1997 was a major turning point for the Croton
watershed, despite the focus of the agreement on the Catskill and Delaware watersheds.
At that time the differences between the plans for the West of Hudson and East of
Hudson watersheds became public. New York City agreed to spend $250 million on land
acquisitions in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds, compared to $11.5 million
(supplemented by $7.5 million by New York State) in the Croton watershed. New York
City would pay for upgrading the sewage treatment plants in the watershed. New York
City also agreed to provide $68 million for water quality investments to Westchester and
Putnam Counties. These funds were to be preserved until the counties decided whether
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to implement a plan to divert sewage outside of the New York City watershed to the
Hudson River. Aaron Bock, Supervisor of the Town of Yorktown and a member of the
group that negotiated with New York City on behalf of Westchester County, told me that
he was the one who had raised the idea of sewage diversion during the negotiations (A.
Bock, interview, September 2, 2005). Diversion was incorporated into the New York
City Watershed MOA and was subsequently opposed by the Croton Coalition and others.
(See Chapter 3.) If the counties did divert sewage outside the New York City watershed,
any funds saved by New York City because it did not have to upgrade the sewage plants
in the Croton would also be provided to the two counties for other watershed-related
projects. The process that led to the signing of the New York City Watershed MOA, and
the reasons for the differences in the treatment of the watersheds, will be explored more
fully below.

Role of New York State and Governor George Pataki
The critical role played by Governor Pataki in the New York City Watershed
MOA negotiations highlighted the influence that New York State has on the management
of New York City’s water system. Under federal legislation, the state is usually given
primacy in enforcement of environmental laws. The state has more influence in
enforcing the Safe Drinking Water Act than in other environmental laws because of the
way in which the provisions regarding primacy were worded (L. Schiffer, interview, June
24, 2005).
In addition to the role played by state government as enforcer of the federal
environmental laws, an important political factor in the management of the New York
City water system is that the watersheds extend far from New York City into many

84
jurisdictions. The particular problem in this case is that authority for the watershed –
crucial for protection – is separate from authority for the water supply and the potential
filtration plant.
According to expert observers, the New York State agencies did not aggressively
enforce water pollution or watershed protection laws in the New York City watershed
despite these considerations, (A. Appleton, interview, June 28, 2005; Cronin & Kennedy,
1999; E. Goldstein, interview, June 20, 2005). The State retreated even further during the
period leading up to the negotiations over the New York City Watershed MOA,
following Governor Pataki’s direction not to aggressively enforce the law (Cronin &
Kennedy, 1997). Although the NYS DOH initiated the lawsuit that forced the NYC DEP
to move ahead on construction of the filtration plant, in general the NYS DOH was
considered to be an ineffective guardian of water quality in New York State. This
problem was briefly brought to public consciousness by a campaign organized by
Riverkeeper to pressure the NYS DEC to enforce regulations regarding the operation of
sewage plants operated in the watershed by New York City. This campaign emphasized
that Croton water contained sewage, an inflammatory but accurate fact that helped to
mobilize grassroots interest in the watershed (Cronin & Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy, 1999).
Several Croton Coalition activists first became involved in advocacy about New York
City’s water as a result of this campaign. Kennedy led the delegation of environmental
organizations that eventually participated in the negotiations for the New York City
Watershed MOA. Five environmental organizations became signers: The Catskill Center
for Conservation and Development, the Hudson Riverkeeper, the Trust for Public Land,
the Open Space Institute and the New York Public Interest Research Group.
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The New York City Watershed MOA did change the situation somewhat, in that
the Governor became directly involved in supporting cooperation between New York
City and the upstate communities. However, as Karen Argenti explained, the division of
responsibility for the watershed among so many different regulatory authorities made
watershed protection difficult to implement. For example, responsibility for the quality
of drinking water fell to the New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH), while
that for the quality of water bodies fell to the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC). And New York City was limited in its ability
to regulate the watershed because the watershed was outside of the City’s jurisdiction,
while New York State’s governor had political incentives to refrain from pressuring the
watershed communities on behalf of the interests of New York City. In Argenti’s view,
the situation was unworkable:
From the government point of view, New York City and NYC DEP have
jurisdiction only over New York City. The person who has the jurisdiction (in the
watershed) is the Governor, but he doesn’t want to harm friends in Westchester
and Putnam…the government is set up wrong because the person responsible for
protecting the watershed has no authority in the watershed….Another problem is
that DOH [New York State Department of Health] only worries about what comes
out of the tap, and the DEC [New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation] only worries about natural resources. DEC has nothing to do with
this. How can you protect the watershed without an active role for the DEC?
That’s the governor’s job. From a purely political point of view, the scenario is
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set up to fail or to give whoever decides a good excuse. (K. Argenti, interview,
May 6, 2004)
In an effort to address this problem, the New York City Watershed MOA included
provisions for the creation of the position of the Watershed Inspector General in the
attorney general’s office. According to Cronin and Kennedy’s (1997) account of the
negotiations, Kennedy demanded the inclusion of this provision as a condition for
Riverkeeper to approve the agreement. This office had wide latitude to monitor and
enforce the provisions of the MOA. James Tierney, the head of this office, was widely
respected by all sides. Tierney described the problematic regulatory framework in these
terms:
The people at the NYS DOH say we do safe water, not clean water. The people
who govern quality and the people that govern pollutants are separate…all these
townships have home rule over land use…so there is nothing you could call
regionalization except for the DEP watershed regulations. I am the person that
has to pull things together. For example, in Brewster they are building a new
sewage treatment plant and they are short of $30 million. We need to find the
money and it could be from anywhere. Who will pull this together as it breaks
into recriminations and nasty lawsuits? There’s nothing institutionally except
me… (J. Tierney, interview, January, 7, 2004)

Croton Coalition View of the New York City Watershed MOA
When the Croton Coalition was formed in 1997 the New York City Watershed
MOA had recently been completed. The Coalition activists were deeply concerned about
the implications of the agreement for their efforts to avoid filtration for the Croton

87
watershed. In seeking to understand how the Croton watershed had been left out of the
filtration avoidance determination (FAD), and how the Croton watershed was
shortchanged in terms of investments in watershed protection, the Croton Coalition
activists felt that the Croton watershed had been betrayed. In their view the NYC DEP
was beholden to development interests that preferred filtration to increased regulation of
land use in the watershed. Furthermore, the NYC DEP had also treated the Croton
watershed as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the US EPA over the filtration
avoidance determination. The activists also charged that the Westchester and Putnam
County governments had acquiesced to the NYC DEP and completely failed to advocate
for aggressive watershed protection which was in their own best interest.
The Croton Coalition activists were convinced that the NYC DEP had little
interest in watershed protection, and had only pursued filtration avoidance for the West of
Hudson watersheds because the cost of building a filtration plant was unacceptable.
Their view was based on the common perception of the NYC DEP as an agency whose
direction was set by engineers and whose priority was the massive construction projects
for which it was famous, rather than watershed protection (A. Appleton, interview, June
28, 2005). The founding of the Croton Coalition coincided with a period, during the
administration of Mayor Rudolf Giuliani, in which the NYC DEP’s lack of commitment
to watershed protection and notable mismanagement drew increased public attention.
Beginning in 1997, Riverkeeper, one of the two environmental organizations that were
most involved in monitoring the New York City water system, published a series of
damning reports detailing the NYC DEP’s scandalous mismanagement. These reports
charged that the NYC DEP had shown no willingness to protect the watershed from
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development, capitulating to developers on many issues. They also described the lack of
institutional commitment to enforcement within the NYC DEP, and how the NYC DEP’s
own watershed police were harassed by the agency’s leaders if they tried to carry out
their responsibilities (Kennedy, 1999; Kennedy, Sullivan & Postman, 1999). In 2000,
Riverkeeper submitted a freedom of information request that resulted in the NYC DEP’s
acknowledgement of the existence of major leaks in the Delaware Aqueduct, and in 2002
a court monitor was appointed to supervise the agency’s clean-up of mercury and PCB
(polychlorinated biphenyls) spills that it had concealed (Kennedy, Odefey, Wegner &
Yaggi, 2000; Weiser, 2004).
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Illustration 5
“Sleeping DEP”
Cartoon by Enrique Dura appeared in Our Water Our Future
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition Newsletter, Issue 25
January-February, 2005.
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The Croton Coalition activists felt that the Westchester and Putnam governments
had “given away the store” in the New York City Watershed MOA. Although, as we
have seen, the Westchester and Putnam County representatives that participated in the
negotiations believed that filtration for the Croton was not a subject open to negotiation,
the Croton Coalition activists questioned this. The Croton Coalition activists accused the
Counties of accepting that the Croton water supply would be filtered and not protected at
the same aggressive level as the West of Hudson watersheds. The Croton Coalition
activists attributed the Westchester and Putnam governments’ capitulation to exaggerated
concerns about home rule and desire for unfettered growth. Marian Rose, president of
the Croton Coalition, described the attitude of the politicians East of Hudson as
uninterested in increased watershed protection, even if that meant foregoing the financial
incentives New York City was offering in exchange for cooperation:
There was a lot of resentment of the DEP in the East of Hudson (EOH)
communities. ‘We don’t want DEP here was the attitude.’ Putnam County
instituted a lawsuit to try to keep the DEP’s regulations out. I was on the
wetlands commission of my town at the time, and I tried to say that we should
collaborate with the DEP. But no one was interested in that. …in the EOH we got
only $10 million dollars for land purchases, compared to the $250 million New
York City gave for land in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. Maybe the
representatives of the towns EOH were interested in development and didn’t want
the land bought up. …the supervisors of the towns, they want to control the land.
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They don’t want DEP to buy it. They want control of their fiefdoms and they
want to help their friends the developers. (M. Rose, interview, July, 7, 2005)
The influential role of real estate developers and the construction industry, and the
priority given to growth in local politics is well-documented (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
In the Croton watershed, developers had made clear their opposition to increased
regulation of land use for the purpose of watershed protection. Forty-five Putnam County
developers sued New York City over the proposed new watershed regulations (Kolbert,
1998). The president of the Construction Industry Council of Westchester and Hudson
Valley, responded to an article by Gudrun Lelash of the Federated Conservationists of
Westchester County and Marian Rose, then of the Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club,
writing that,
Those seeking to avoid filtration also fail to mention the cost associated with
restrictive land use regulations imposed by New York City to protect watershed
lands. Hundreds of land owners in Putnam and Westchester have initiated legal
actions, charging that the regulations have constituted a taking of land because
they cannot develop their properties…Public need is not being served by LeLash
and Rose who debate filtration in a weakly veiled attempt to stop all
developmental progress in Westchester and Putnam communities…(Pepe, 1998).
In the experience of the Croton Coalition activists, real estate developers had a
great deal of political influence in the watershed counties, obtained through their status as
major campaign contributors. Paul Moskowitz, a Croton Coalition board member who
ran for office in Yorktown, described the close relationship between the real estate
industry and government in Westchester County:
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But it turned out for instance that on the issue of diversion – another complex
issue dealing with the watershed – that Savin Engineers – the company that did
the report on diversion for Westchester county – is a big contributor to Andy
Spano the county executive. So there is a link there. In the Town of Yorktown
the chair of the Democratic Party, Joe Apicella, is executive vice president of
Cappelli Enterprises. Cappelli is the largest developer in Westchester County. So
this is out and out blatant. The chair of the party is vice president of the
developers. So you couldn’t have a more direct connection than that. Except for
the donations made to the Yorktown Democratic Party by developers. This is
how they fund their campaign. (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004)
In addition, the small town governments throughout the watershed were not equipped to
implement watershed protection measures that might entail challenging the plans of real
estate developers. They were afraid to object to the plans of developers because the
developers had far more resources than the towns, and could expend those resources on
court fights. As Marian Rose described,
You need a very good reason to oppose developers. The minute you say no, you
get sued under Article 78 – that you’re acting capriciously. The towns are
terrified of getting sued. The towns have poor lawyers and the developers have
expensive lawyers. I said no to a developer once when I was on the wetlands
commission for my town and it was in the newspaper. (M. Rose, interview,
November 30, 2001)
The Croton Coalition activists repeatedly pointed out the connections between the
real estate industry in the watershed communities and in New York City, and how the

93
network of ties between the real estate development industry and the government
extended beyond individual towns and counties. The people seeking to develop land in
the watershed had political influence in New York City, and with the Governor as well.
As one Croton Coalition board member explained:
NYC DEP has devoted millions to buying land WOH because they want to keep
it undeveloped. They’re not spending much money EOH because Westchester and
Putnam politicians want this space developed and they don’t want the City
interfering. So it doesn’t take a mathematical genius to see what is happening.
The county administrations are trying to protect the real estate development
community so they can take this vacant land and put more people…
There are some very powerful people in Westchester County. Why does
Donald Trump want to put golf courses in Westchester County? These people talk
to each other and the negotiations between politicians here and in New York
prevailed. And the City had to figure out how to protect the water and still
accommodate Westchester’s politicians. Hence filtration. (O. Sandler, interview,
February 6, 2004)
The Croton Coalition activists pointed out that the influence of the developers was
not just an unfortunate feature of the political system, but that there was corruption
involved as well. One Croton Coalition board member described how Jim Roberts, a
respected engineer employed by the NYC DEP, was pressured not to participate in
enforcement of the watershed protection regulations:
I can’t prove a bit of it and I don’t have the resources to look into it, nor would I
want to. I wouldn’t want to be the person to do that story. I do know that when
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Jim Roberts, the engineer, started going to meetings and talking about things to
save the watershed, he was approached by a contractor and offered bribes, and he
also got threatened. They threatened him and his wife. These were mostly
construction guys though. I don’t think any unions were involved in that. But he
received a lot of threats. He had to make sure that when he was meeting with the
contractor that he always had a witness, and sometimes Ivanka (his wife) went
with him. This is in her book [Roberts, 2003]. It’s fascinating. Sometimes she
went along as his secretary - he said “this is my assistant”. So there would always
be another person there. Otherwise they could offer a bribe and he wouldn’t have
any witness to back him up. At one point he was told that he was worth about
$450,000. All the contractors got together and decided they would give him
$450,000 if he would leave them alone. (Croton Coalition board member,
interview, March 25, 2004)
Westchester and Putnam Counties were given greater discretion over the monies
they received in the New York City Watershed MOA than were the WOH communities.
For example, while New York City was to implement sewage treatment plant upgrades in
the West of Hudson communities, Westchester and Putnam counties were given the funds
for this purpose and provided with some flexibility in their use. Oreon Sandler, an
engineer and a Croton Coalition board member described the different treatment of the
EOH and WOH watersheds as a result of the differing interests in the two areas, and the
level of political influence of developers: “….political forces here said you give us the
money and we’ll solve it…whereas everywhere else in the watershed New York City
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went in and upgraded the plants. Prior to all of this New York City had studied it, they
know all the wastewater treatment plants” (O. Sandler, interview, February 6, 2004).
Aaron Bock, the Supervisor of the Town of Yorktown and participant in the
negotiations on behalf of Westchester County, agreed that the watershed communities
wanted to ensure that they controlled land use. But he also pointed out to me that initially
New York City did not offer the communities in the Croton watershed any funds at all
because the Croton supply was to be filtered. The need for filtration of the Croton supply
was never in question during these negotiations, and the construction of a filtration plant
was presented as a given. The group negotiating on behalf of Westchester County was
pleased to extract what they perceived as a significant amount of funding from New York
City (A. Bock, interview, September 2, 2005).

Croton Watershed Used by New York City Department of
Environmental Protection as a Bargaining Chip
As we have seen, the Croton Coalition felt betrayed by more than just the
Westchester and Putnam local and county governments that they believed had failed to
advocate on behalf of the Croton watershed. They believed that New York City had used
the Croton watershed as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the US EPA over the
filtration avoidance determination (FAD) and with the parties to the New York City
Watershed MOA in those negotiations. While the NYC DEP may have agreed with the
US EPA that filtration was needed in the Croton, it seems that the Croton activists were
correct in accusing the NYC DEP of using its commitment to filtration for the Croton to
bolster its credibility with the US EPA. According to former Commissioner Appleton,
New York City’s commitment to move forward on the Croton filtration plant helped the
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City convince the US EPA to accept the New York City Watershed MOA. Lagging on
filtration for the Croton could have undermined New York City’s position in negotiations
with the US EPA that it was committed to assuring water quality and would do whatever
was needed, including building a filtration plant if it was truly necessary.
Commissioner Appleton’s claim is bolstered by evidence that the US EPA was
leaning toward requiring the City to filter the water from the Catskill and Delaware
watersheds. The US EPA granted the FAD for the Catskill and Delaware water supplies
reluctantly, despite the recommendation of a scientific panel appointed to advise the
agency on the matter. The panel recommended that the FAD not be granted (Okun,
Craun, Edzwald, Gilbert & Rose, 1997). Apparently the US EPA was not convinced that
New York City would be able to protect the Catskill and Delaware watersheds
sufficiently to maintain the FAD. Because of these concerns the US EPA retained
primacy over the Catskill and Delaware watersheds until 2007, indicating that the federal
agency would have a direct role in monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of the
FAD (Federal Register, July 31, 1997). In contrast, primacy over the Croton and all of
the rest of New York State was given to the NYS DOH.
The US EPA allowed only a handful of large cities to avoid filtration. Within the
US EPA the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) was viewed as unambiguous and the
“EPA systematically went after all of the systems that were out of compliance. It was not
a high discretion issue…although there is always discretion in whether to sue, there was
no question about a system the size of New York’s. It was a time when water systems
were having trouble, it was a high priority issue” (L. Schiffer, interview, June 24, 2005).
Only one other city with a water system comparable to New York received a FAD. That
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city was Boston, and I was told by a government official involved in enforcement of the
SWTR that the view within the US EPA was that Boston had avoided filtration only
because an EPA official made an unauthorized commitment that the FAD would be
granted and this commitment was upheld in court (L. Schiffer, interview, June 24, 2005).
To add to the list of betrayals, the Croton Coalition activists were also
disappointed by some of their erstwhile allies in the environmental movement. Robert
Kennedy Jr., founder of Riverkeeper and one of the most active and confrontational
voices on behalf of watershed protection in the New York region, participated in the final
round of negotiations over the New York City Watershed MOA. Most of the people that
I interviewed claimed that the question of filtration for the Croton was never discussed in
the negotiations. Cathleen Breen, watershed director for NYPIRG, and Marc Yaggi of
Riverkeeper were both hired to monitor implementation of the MOA. They were
surprised to learn that filtration for the Croton was an issue. NYPIRG and Riverkeeper
were both signers of the MOA, although neither of these staff members actually took part
in the negotiations (C. Breen, interview, January 31, 2006). On the other hand, Karen
Argenti reported that at a public discussion of the New York City Watershed MOA,
Robert Kennedy Jr. said that there was a side agreement that required the State and
Federal government to prosecute New York City if the City failed to go forward with the
filtration plant (Affadavit of K. Argenti, July 21, 1997). Whether or not there was any
kind of official agreement about this, the policy positions taken by Riverkeeper and
NRDC, the two environmental organizations that were most active on watershed issues,
were a profound disappointment to the Croton Coalition activists. The relationship
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between these organizations and the Croton Coalition will be explored in greater detail in
Chapter 4.

Effect of the New York City Watershed MOA
While the Croton Coalition activists felt that the Croton had been massively
shortchanged in the New York City Watershed MOA, on balance the existence of the
New York City Watershed MOA was probably positive for the activists’ position. It kept
the possibility of filtration avoidance alive. Without the New York City Watershed MOA
it would have been much more difficult to argue that the Croton should be an exception
to the federal law requiring filtration. After all, only a handful of cities had received any
relief from this regulatory obligation. Because of the MOA, the resources being devoted
to protection in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds were significant. The Croton
Coalition activists coul and did argue that the Croton deserved the same. Still, the
contrast between the treatment of the West of Hudson watersheds and the Croton
watershed had multiple effects. While New York City’s investment in the Catskill and
Delaware watersheds demonstrated what was possible, it also confirmed for the activists
that the City had “given up” on the Croton. In the words of the Croton Coalition activists,
the Croton was the “sacrificial lamb.”

The Croton Coalition’s Environmental Argument Against
Filtration
In contrast to the position taken by the NYC DEP and New York City
administration, and supported by the Westchester and Putnam County administrations,
the Croton Coalition opposed the construction of a filtration plant for the Croton water
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supply. Although the Coalition gave many reasons for its opposition, some of which
might be considered tactical, implicit in its objections was a coherent environmental
argument against the plant. In this section I will describe this argument and explain how
it reflects both the growing complexity of environmental problems and our growing
understanding of how to deal with these problems.
The Croton Coalition’s argument against building the filtration plant reframed the
issue of filtration. Until the Coalition’s entry into the policy controversy, the policy
question had been about how to comply with the federal regulations about water
treatment and where to site the facility. The Croton Coalition’s question was different,
their question was about a significant decision that would influence New York City and
its environment for generations to come. It was about the preservation of critical
ecosystem services supplied by the watershed that could not be replaced. They pointed
out that the decisions that were being made were about the relationship of millions of
people to vaguely understood, complex natural processes. These decisions might have
repercussions for many generations. The Coalition’s conception of the issue of filtration
placed the issue in the context of the global unresolved urban water crisis. Although the
Croton Coalition activists did not use this term, in this research I contextualize the
environmental significance of the filtration issue as a challenge to accepted public policy
that might trigger the implementation of the precautionary principle.
The heart of the Croton Coalition’s argument was that filtration should not be
considered a benign addition to the operation of the water system. Rather, filtration
should be viewed as a misguided attempt to fix one problem by creating another one.
Instead of fixing the problem of pollution or preventing the problem from worsening,
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filtration remediates pollution after the fact. The Croton Coalition argued that methods
could be used to prevent pollution of the water supply that would eliminate the need for
filtration. These included “best management practices” to limit stormwater flows into
streams and reservoirs, limitations on development, and preservation of open space. In
addition, septic systems and sewage treatment plants could be upgraded. Furthermore,
the Croton Coalition argued that relying on filtration to protect the quality of the water
supply was a risky strategy. Technology can be unreliable, as was demonstrated by the
well-known failure of a filtration plant in Milwaukee (Foss-Mollan, 2001). Uncertainty
about the future also should be taken into account. Current technology choices might not
be appropriate for future needs.
The Croton Coalition also emphasized the size and complexity of the water
system. Water quality is influenced by many factors, including both physical and social
factors. It was uncertain what the effects of the introduction of filtration might be. There
was a chance that filtration might worsen the problem it was supposed to solve. Notably,
filtration might encourage additional development in the watershed.
Finally, the Croton Coalition argued that choosing filtration over protection of the
watershed would unfairly penalize the poor and powerless both in this generation and
future generations. Building the filtration plant would impose unfair burdens on people
in the neighborhood of the plant, in New York City, and elsewhere. In the neighborhood,
parkland would be eliminated and there would be health impacts from both construction
and operation of the plant. In New York City, the burden of paying for the plant would
fall most heavily on the poor. The plant would also create new pollution in the form of
emissions from trucks and the need to dispose of waste from the filtration process.
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Construction of the plant might severely limit the choices of future generations if the
watershed were to become more severely degraded.
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Illustration 6
“Faucets”
Cartoon by Enrique Dura that appeared in Our Water Our Future
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition Newsletter, Issue 20
March-April, 2004
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Filtration and the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle was originally developed as a framework for the
consideration of the risks of policies in cases where there is considerable scientific
uncertainty. As a legal concept, the precautionary principle developed from the principle
in German law of “vorsorgeprinzip,” which translates as ‘forecaring” or “foresight
principle.” It began to appear in international agreements in the 1970’s in relation to
pollution of the oceans. Notably, it was included in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development following the Rio De Janeiro United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992 (Cooney, 2004). The framework of the
precautionary principle has been applied to decisionmaking about the release of
chemicals and genetically modified organisms into the environment. These issues have
raised concerns about widespread impacts, unknown interactions with other substances
and irreversible harm. There are many different statements of the precautionary
principle. For our purpose, it may be summarized as,
…in general terms, the precautionary approach involves a shift in emphasis in
governance of environmental risk, from reacting to clearly defined problems as
they arise, to recognition of uncertainty and ignorance, anticipation of harm,
prevention of problems, taking cautious action, and monitoring of potential
impacts. (Cooney, 2003)
According to conventional opinion, the policy of filtering water would not seem
to be characterized by a level of uncertainty and risk that would justify the application of
the precautionary principle. Filtration is a way to reduce risk and protect human health
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by removing pollutants from water. The technology utilized is not complicated, although
it is expensive, has been used extensively and is localized. Although risks may be
involved, they are relatively well understood. Even if filtration were not implemented,
simple prevention of pollution might be an adequate policy response to threats to water
quality.
However, the Croton Coalition’s argument suggested that this surface appraisal of
filtration was inadequate. The question of filtration should have triggered consideration
of precaution because the question was not merely whether or not to build a filtration
plant, but how to maintain the viability of the water supply for millions of people. There
was a potential for serious and irreversible harm if the watershed was further degraded.
And the complexity of interactions between the many physical and social factors raised
the possibility of many unknown risks and uncertainties.
In such cases the precautionary principle provides some guidelines for examining and
responding to policy questions. Although the precautionary principle is intuitive in the
sense that it is about taking the prudent course of action and behaving in a way that is
consistent with our moral obligation to refrain from harming others, there is much more
to it (Jasanoff, 2003). Jordan & O’Riordan (1999) introduce the major themes of work
about the precautionary principle as:
•

“A willingness to take action in advance of formal justification of proof;

•

Proportionality of response;

•

A preparedness to provide ecological space and margins for error;

•

A recognition of the well-being interests of non-human entities;

•

A shift in the onus of proof onto those who propose change;
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•

A greater concern for intergenerational impacts on future generations; and

•

A recognition of the need to address ecological debts.” (p. 24)

The Croton Coalition argued that preserving the watershed was a better way to insure
clean water than filtration. This approach is central to the implementation of the
precautionary principle which advises focusing our efforts at the ecosystem level. The
sustainability of ecosystems depends on management for their preservation at the highest
possible level, rather than on management for individual resources. Aligning
management of natural resources with natural processes has the benefit of simplification
and builds in resilience. Management of the landscape enables the watershed to function
and provide clean water. Focusing on the water itself, rather than the watershed, is less
effective and more expensive. Furthermore, given the complexity of ecosystems, we
should not assume that we can accurately judge when the limit has been reached on their
assimilative capacities. Protection of the ecosystem of the Croton watershed provides
“ecological space and a margin for error” (Jordan & O’Riordan, 1999, p26) that will not
be present if it becomes degraded (Allen, Tainter & Hoekstra, 2003). In fact, it bears
noting that there is frequently greater certainty about the outcome of preventive solutions
than about the risks of an environmental intervention (Tickner, 1999).
As the Croton Coalition argued, management of water quality by management of the
land has the potential to create positive feedback loops and positive unintended
consequences. One of the natural resource areas in which the precautionary principle
has been applied is in fisheries management. Boyce Thorne-Miller (2003) describes how
in fisheries management, management for one particular species is not particularly
effective, and ecologists are now turning to the establishment of marine protected areas.
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Focusing on the ecosystem, and protecting an entire marine habitat leads to unexpected
positive interactions and long term benefits. One of the founding members of the Croton
Coalition expressed a similar idea:
…the world cannot exist, civilization cannot exist much longer if we keep on
doing business in the same way. And if we can take a natural process to
accomplish an industrial process, the benefit from that is enormous. And it’s in
air, water, energy, right down the line. You know, someone said this, maybe
Karen or Marian, we have a filtration system, designed by God and it’s better than
theirs. Also there’s something called positive feedback. Whenever you create a
circular natural system you create positive feedback. When you have a
mechanical, engineered system all the feedbacks are negative. You’re using
energy, power, waste and you’re getting nothing back except the clean water. It
just doesn’t work. If we continue to opt for those kind of solutions, then
civilization is lost. It really is. Civilization as we know it is on the edge. It may
be too late anyway. But we have to come up with systems that give us positive
feedbacks, not negative. And using natural filtration is the ultimate positive
feedback system. And using chemical filtration is the ultimate negative. (J.
Klotz, interview, February 13, 2004)
The role of technology in the management of water quality in the Croton
watershed was a central issue for the Coalition. Centralized technology is generally
favored in conventional approaches to water management of all kinds. The precautionary
principle is not about automatically rejecting technology, and in fact supports innovation
in technology, but it does advocate that technology be viewed with caution for a variety
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of reasons. Allen, Tainter and Hoekstra (2003) suggest that in managing ecosystems the
industrial model is to apply energy to natural resources systems. This may result in
greater production but also increases complexity, causes undesirable side effects and
diminishing returns. Technology of information that helps managers to understand the
resource system and helps them to direct efforts may be helpful, but not “hard technology
of big industrial engines.” There is a tendency of technological systems to be selfperpetuating, and to preclude better options, that seems clearly to be a factor in the
management of water (Gee & Stirling, 2003; Jasanoff, 2003).
The Croton Coalition’s concern for future generations reflected another important
theme of the precautionary principle. The most obvious intergenerational impact of the
filtration plant is that the cost of the plant will be borne by future water ratepayers. But
the Coalition activists pointed out that there might be other intergenerational impacts of
even greater significance. If the construction of the plants were to lead to further
degradation of water and the capacity of the watershed to provide clean water were to
decline, the options of future generations would be much more limited. Future
generations might be unable to pay the increased costs to obtain clean water, or might be
unable to obtain an acceptable level of water quality at any cost.
Implementation of a precautionary approach requires that the onus be on the
proponent of change, that there be a large scope for decisionmaking, and consideration of
a wide variety of alternatives. This is exactly what the Croton Coalition argued was
lacking in consideration of the filtration issue. If the narrow question of where to build
the filtration plant was the question under consideration, the possibility of protection of
the watershed as an alternative would not be seriously examined. The Croton Coalition
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wanted to broaden the question to one of how best to insure the availability of clean
water.
The most common criticism of the precautionary principle is that it represents a
quixotic attempt to avoid all risk by doing nothing. This is a misleading argument.
Prevention of damage is not doing nothing, rather it is the most that can be done. As the
Coalition argued, prevention is a critical step in preservation of the watershed’s capacity
to provide a crucial resource. And beyond prevention, the precautionary principle
requires that pro-active steps be taken to protect the environment and human health
(Jordan and O’Riordan, 1999). Stirling and Tickner (2004) advise that in implementing
the precautionary principle as a guide in risk assessment, “Alternatives assessment is to
identify opportunities to prevent an activity from adversely affecting environment and
health. A secondary goal is to drive innovation towards more environmentally friendly
and sustainable technologies, products and practices” (p. 191).
For precaution to be taken seriously as an option, it is of critical importance that
the public is given every opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
(O’Brien, 1999; Raffensperger & Montague, 2004). A broad range of options are more
likely to be considered when a variety of people are able to suggest alternatives, and are
able to consider attractive alternatives to conventional solutions. As we shall see, the
Croton Coalition’s participation in the controversy brought the local knowledge of
members of the public to bear upon the question of whether filtration was needed. The
Coalition activists suggested, contrary to the prevailing understanding in the NYC DEP
and the US EPA, that political will could be mobilized to support watershed protection in
the Croton watershed communities. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Coalition
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also utilized a network of people with local knowledge to identify opportunities to
improve water quality using methods other than filtration. However, in this case the
public was not provided with significant opportunities for participation at an early stage
when an open process of alternatives assessment is most useful (Stirling & Tickner,
2004). They began to advocate for alternatives at a point when the range of options that
the NYC DEP would consider for protecting water quality had already been determined.

The Hard Path and the Soft Path for Water
The Croton Coalition’s arguments against filtration also challenged the prevailing
approach to the management of water. Filtration reflects the traditional paradigm for
“meeting water related needs.” Borrowing a term from Amory Lovins (1977) work on
energy, Peter Gleick (2002) has called this paradigm the hard path. The hard path “relies
almost exclusively on centralized infrastructure and decision-making: dams and
reservoirs, pipelines and treatment plants, water departments and agencies. The hard path
delivers water, mostly of potable quality, and takes away wastewater” (p. 1). Scholars
have described how the elements of the hard path have influenced the development of
various aspects of water management, including development of water supplies,
management of water distribution, and wastewater management. There are many
examples of how the hard path has resulted in unintended consequences that are now
recognized as major problems. These include the construction of large dams and the
adoption of water carriage sewerage systems.
In contrast, Gleick has identified six elements that characterize the soft path for water.
Gleick’s paradigm constitutes a useful summary of concerns that environmentalists have
identified in our current approach to water management. Just as the precautionary
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principle helps to highlight what makes opposing filtration an environmentally significant
position, the soft path highlights how the Coalition’s position represents a radical change
in our relationship to water as a natural resource. The elements of the soft path provide a
useful framework for understanding why filtration may not be the best solution to the
problem of pollution in the Croton watershed. Although the Coalition activists were not
aware of Gleick’s formulation, their arguments against filtration draw on many of the
same ideas that Gleick has incorporated into his framework. The six elements of the soft
path may be summarized as:
1. Making meeting the water related needs of water users most efficiently the
priority, rather than making a profit by delivering more and more water.
2. Utilizing the potential to supply water of varying qualities for different purposes,
rather than the simplicity of supplying water of one quality.
3. Implementing decentralized solutions rather than assuming that centralized
solutions are always preferable.
4. Engaging water users, not only or primarily engineers, in decision-making and
implementation.
5. Recognizing that ecosystem health is a valuable water service. Water that
remains in the environment, not only water that is extracted, is productive.
6. When considering the economics of water projects, taking into account the many
interactions between water uses and between water and other resources. (Gleick,
2002, p. 3-6)
The proposed construction of a filtration plant for the Croton water supply was a
classic example of a hard path solution. First and foremost it was an investment in a very
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large centralized, expensive facility that would take many years to plan and construct. It
also represented a technical fix, as described by Rogers (1996):
In essence a technical fix is the response to a crisis brought about by failure or
misuse of technology, which is then “fixed” by some other application of the
same, or different, technology…Federal and other agencies responsible for water
supply and management have historically relied upon technical fixes. In response
to increased demands for water and water-based services the agencies proposed
bigger and better facilities – more dams, larger canals, higher levees, deeper
channels, more and bigger locks on the rivers, and more and more complicated
water treatment plants – all heavily subsidized by federal and local taxes. The
environmental viewpoint is that systemic fixes would be a better response, such as
source reduction of wastes or demand management by rationing or pricing. These
would reduce the need for increasingly complex and expensive technical
solutions. (pp. 101-102)
Decentralized solutions that were proposed by the Croton Coalition and others included
“best management practices” (BMPs) to reduce stormwater impacts, new pipes, and
sewer system upgrades. These kinds of approaches integrate prevention of pollution with
treatment by natural processes. Paul and Julie Mankiewicz (1998), scientists that advised
opponents of the filtration plant, described the potential for strategies that would harness
the filtering capacity of soils in the Croton watershed, “Landscape based treatment
installations which can be replicated throughout the watershed will provide decentralized,
redundant, robust and lower cost water quality protection. They should also yield higher
water quality. This tool kit includes: terraces, gabions, coupling wetlands with upland
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soils, stream bank stabilization, in-stream aeration, and infiltration hollows and basins”
(p. 59). These kinds of approaches are known as “green infrastructure.” Paul
Moskowitz, a Croton Coalition board member and a physicist, articulated this argument
specifically against the filtration plant:
In terms of the filtration plant it’s a lot more difficult because you have 3 agencies
that you are fighting; NYC DEP, NYS DEC and USEPA. And they are all
together a concerted bureaucratic action to foist a quick solution to a much more
complex problem. As a physicist, scientist and working engineer I have been
employed as a scientist for well over 30 years by various different governments
and private industry. It’s all in the details. You realize that smaller distributed
solutions are much better than vast single engineering projects. Those
Vast projects never deliver all that they promise. They are much more likely to
fail than many small projects to correct any problem. They sound better, and
therefore governments and private industry will often go for a quick, vast, not
inexpensive, easily very expensive solution, that doesn’t work. And the same is
true for building a filtration plant or the whole diversion issue in Yorktown,
Westchester, New Castle and Yonkers. It’s the same thing. Do you want this very
expensive grandiose plan which in the end won’t solve the problem, or do you
want to put in the effort to correct the problem more at its source? (P. Moskowitz,
interview, April 4, 2004)
The cost of filtration as opposed to watershed protection was a major concern of
the Croton Coalition, reflecting the more comprehensive approach to the economics of
water advocated as an element of the “soft path.” In the case of filtration, the elements
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of ecosystem health and secondary economic benefits are closely related to the element
of decentralization. While construction of a filtration plant would result only in supplies
of clean water for water users in New York City, implementation of decentralized
solutions to the problem could also safeguard the health of people in the watershed that
use well water, preserve water bodies for recreational use, provide open space, etc. The
secondary benefits that would result from the protection of the natural infrastructure must
be added to the amount saved in not constructing the filtration plant.

Conclusion
This chapter has set the scene for the entry of the Croton Coalition into the policy
controversy about filtration. As we have seen, New York City had long expected that the
Croton supply would require filtration. Yet, as new supplies came on line and water
quality in the Croton watershed remained high during most of the year, New York City
put off construction of a filtration plant. Federal regulators decided that filtration should
be a universal precaution employed by urban water systems, and their new regulations
prompted New York City to resume planning for the filtration plant in the 1980’s. These
entrenched assumptions about filtration were carried by New York City’s water
managers, federal regulators and environmentalists into the negotiations for the New
York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement. The need for filtration for the Croton
supply was not questioned during these negotiations. Although Westchester and Putnam
Counties’ administrations did extract some funding from New York City to enhance
protection of the Croton watershed, the amount of funding was much less than that
promised to the West of Hudson communities where filtration was to be avoided.
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Thus, when the Croton Coalition was formed, the policy to move ahead on
filtration for the Croton watershed was firmly established. The Croton Coalition
challenged this policy by questioning the bedrock assumption that filtration was
necessary and desirable. The Croton Coalition situated the policy question about
filtration for the Croton water supply in the context of the environmental crisis. The
activists of the Coalition drew attention to the deep dependence of urban residents on the
ecosystem services provided by the Croton watershed. They reframed a question about
compliance with regulations and siting of a treatment plant, into one about the
sustainability of the water supply and the relationship between public health and
ecosystem health.
Although today most Americans accept the basic principles of environmentalism,
the Croton Coalition struggled to communicate its objection to filtration – a technology
that is usually perceived as a solution to a problem. The filtration issue, like other
environmental problems, was characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and dependence
on the specificities of the biophysical and social setting. The definition of the problem
and potential solutions were limited by the defining discourse. The two concepts
examined here, the precautionary principle and the soft path for water, provide
frameworks for the examination of filtration that can lead to the surfacing of alternative
solutions. These alternatives represent a radical departure from conventional approaches
to the management of water that have yet to become generally accepted.
The Croton Coalition’s position challenged the conventional ideas about water
management. A factor in regulatory opposition was the fear that allowing New York
City to evade filtration would encourage others and undermine the drive toward universal

115
filtration of water supplies. But as New York City was committing to filter the Croton,
the limitations of filtration as a response to water pollution were already becoming clear.
As Rogers (1996) explains in his examination of water policy in the United States:
…taking into account the entire system is a simple scientific imperative when one
is dealing with complex dynamic systems. We have ignored it for many years in
the water pollution business, for example when we chose to focus on the
technology for controlling sources of water pollution rather than focusing on the
ambient environment and asking what would be the best way of achieving a
desired level of quality. We now find ourselves, many years and many billions of
dollars later, still faced with major water pollution problems due to diffuse
sources of pollution (non-point sources). (p. 83-84)
The next chapter relays the story of the Croton Coalition, how it made its case in
opposition to filtration, and the obstacles it faced.
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Chapter 3: The Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition
- Grassroots Voices and Agency
Introduction
In 1996, Karen Argenti, a neighborhood activist who lived next to the Jerome
Park Reservoir in the Bronx, initiated the organization of a coalition to advocate for a
“dual track” policy for the Croton watershed. This policy, to try to avoid filtration by
instituting watershed protection while also moving forward on plans for a filtration plant,
would mirror the policy that New York City was pursuing for the Catskill and Delaware
watersheds. Argenti’s aim was to enlist people in the watershed in this effort to
demonstrate to the policy-makers in New York City and the EPA that the watershed
communities had the political will to take the actions necessary to implement an effective
watershed protection program.
As we have seen, at the time of the Croton Coalition’s establishment, New York
City was already firmly committed to construction of a filtration plant for the Croton
water supply. Officially, the policy of enhanced watershed protection was being applied
in the Croton as well as in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds. But in reality, efforts to
protect the Croton watershed were significantly less aggressive compared to what was
being put in place in the other watersheds as a result of the New York City Watershed
Memorandum of Agreement. The imminent decision about the siting of the Croton
filtration plant was the focus for activists who formed the Croton Coalition.
This chapter, in which the experience of the Croton Coalition is examined, forms
the core of this research and dissertation. The Croton Coalition’s experiences in the
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controversy over filtration provided a view from the ground-up of the powerful political
and economic forces that shaped the relationship between people and nature in New York
City. In this research I focus on the Coalition’s efforts to confront the diminishing public
oversight of the water system, the close connection between the development of water
resources and real estate development, and the influence of special interests such as the
construction industry. By concentrating on the efforts of the Coalition, rather than on
these forces themselves, I hoped to reveal the obstacles to opposition as well as the
potential for agency on the part of people who choose to challenge such forces.
In this account I focus on a series of turning points in the controversy in which the
Croton Coalition was involved. By recounting the story of what happened at each
turning point, I provide a chronological account of the controversy from the point of view
of the Coalition. At the same time, these turning points also provide me with
opportunities to explore issues related to the political ecology of the New York City
water system, the obstacles to the consideration and implementation of environmentally
sound policies, and the role of grassroots activism in this process. This is not an
exhaustive account of the controversy, as will become clear. There are other
organizations that were involved, and I emphasize turning points of relevance to the
Croton Coalition.
The rich story of the Croton Coalition could provide material for several studies
of related questions of significant interest. For example, the Coalition was an example of
a growing phenomenon of grassroots environmental coalitions that differentiated
themselves from the organizational style and tactics of national, professionalized
environmental organizations (Schlossberg, 1999). The characteristics and activities of
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the leaders of the Coalition could provide the material for a fascinating study of
grassroots activists (Glazer & Glazer, 1998). Questions of inter-personal conflict and
management style within grassroots organizations were also raised by the history of the
Coalition. However, this account focuses on the issues of power and agency of
grassroots activists that are central both to my research, and to political ecology.
The first turning point, which I refer to as “Joining Forces,” is the formation of
the Croton Coalition. There were two main groups in the Coalition, the activists
representing Bronx organizations and those representing organizations in the watershed
communities. The activists in both groups initially became involved because of issues
that concerned their local communities. For Bronx groups the primary motivation was
opposing the siting of the filtration plant in their neighborhoods. The spur to action for
activists from the watershed communities was more varied. Although there were some
activists, such as those from Yorktown, who became involved when a site in their
community was proposed for the filtration plant, the motivation for most of the activists
from the watershed communities was related to curtailing development in their
communities by calling for watershed protection. These local concerns played an
important part in how the Coalition evolved over time. Focusing on the formation of the
Coalition will allow me to explore the issue of the regional scale of the watershed and the
Coalition’s attempt to match that scale. The obstacles presented to democratic
participation and environmentally sound management resulting from this scale will also
be explored.
The second turning point that I will examine is the selection of the Mosholu site
in Van Cortlandt Park for the filtration plant, and the Croton Coalition’s response. I have
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titled this section, “A Hoodwinked Neighborhood.” As has been noted, New York City
considered numerous sites for the Croton filtration plant. Jerome Park Reservoir was
eliminated from consideration due to community opposition. The selection of the
Mosholu site was perceived by the members of the Croton Coalition, and many residents
of the neighborhood adjacent to the site, as an example of environmental injustice.
Construction of the filtration plant at this site entailed encroachment on parkland, and
negative effects on air quality from blasting and truck traffic. Neighborhood residents
already suffered from a high rate of asthma.
At this point in my account I will pause to examine the Croton Coalition’s
ongoing activities on behalf of watershed protection, undertaken “Inch by Inch.” The
Coalition was involved in such varied activities as mapping sites of problematic
stormwater overflows, opposing construction of new roads and homes, and fighting
proposals for diversion of sewage from treatment plants that discharged into the
watershed. These activities raise questions about the comparative worth of tactics at
different geographical and time scales as methods to achieve environmental progress.
The third turning point, titled “Diverging Interests,” is the Croton Coalition’s
success in stopping the NYC DEP from testing a treatment for the water supply that was
proposed as an alternative to filtration. The NYC DEP proposed to test this treatment,
which involved adding aluminum sulfate as a coagulant to the water as it flowed from the
Muscoot reservoir to the Croton reservoir, without a complete environmental review.
Although this process might have been an alternative to filtration, it posed risks for the
ecosystem of the reservoir which is a living lake. Although the Coalition claimed the
defeat of this proposal as a victory, it caused a rift between the Bronx groups and the
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watershed groups. This incident reveals a common dilemma in responding to
environmental problems that are complex and interrelated. While the Croton Coalition
tried to change the terms of the debate about filtration to emphasize prevention, the
regulatory system’s emphasis on treatment led to a situation in which the interests of
different groups within the Coalition were in conflict. This incident, which I interpret as
presaging the later dissolution of the Coalition, highlights the difficulties involved in
maintaining a regional alliance.
The fourth turning point, “The Walkout,” is the dissolution of the bonds between
the Bronx and watershed contingents. Most of the Coalition member groups from the
Bronx left the Coalition after the president, Marian Rose, began to advocate for another
alternative treatment for the water supply. This treatment, using chlorine dioxide, would
have required the use of facilities in the Jerome Park Reservoir. This move alienated the
leader of the Bronx groups, Karen Argenti, who led the groups out of the Coalition.
Around the same time that the Bronx and watershed contingents went their
separate ways, the opponents of the filtration plant obtained a court ruling that halted the
planning for the plant at the Mosholu site. The court required New York City to obtain
special legislation from the New York State Legislature allowing use of the Mosholu site.
At first it seemed that the City might not be able to obtain this legislation, however in the
end the legislature did pass the necessary bill. The fifth turning point, “Divide and
Conquer,” is the political struggle over this legislation.
I argue that an important factor in determining the Coalition’s room for maneuver
was that while there were constant battles over specific projects, including the plant itself,
there was no real forum for addressing the larger issues of protection and management of

121
the watershed as a whole. This turning point, “Divide and Conquer,” sheds light on the
engagement of the Coalition in the political process, as well as the challenges raised by
the process to the maintenance of a unified position by the Coalition.

First Turning Point - Joining Forces
Karen Argenti initiated the organization of what became the Croton Watershed
Clean Water Coalition in 1996. Argenti became involved in the filtration issue because
she was a politically active resident in the neighborhood surrounding Jerome Park
Reservoir in the Bronx. New York City pursued a plan to build a filtration plant at the
Jerome Park Reservoir in the 1980s. This plan was shelved, and then revived in a
different form in about 1991. In 1996, as a result of opposition in the neighborhood of
the site, planning for the plant was temporarily suspended. Mayor Giuliani agreed to
reopen the siting process and consider alternative locations for the plant.
While the NYC DEP worked on identifying alternative sites, Argenti had one year
to attempt to derail the plans for the plant. While hopeful that the City would at least
choose an alternate site, Argenti was pursuing multiple strategies. Information provided
by the NYC DEP and consultations with scientists had led her to believe that the waters
of the Croton watershed might be clean enough to justify delaying construction of the
plant, or perhaps to avoid construction of the plant altogether. Aware that one argument
for filtration was that there was “no political will” to protect water quality in the
watershed communities, Argenti thought that it might be possible to undermine this
argument by organizing people in the watershed to demonstrate that there was a
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commitment to watershed protection. If the watershed could be protected, there would be
no need for a plant.
After we finished organizing Jerome Park – we had meetings with thousands of
people and scared the political officials…Giuliani decided to look at the siting and
gave us a year. He did move it out of Jerome Park, but it wasn’t guaranteed, so
we had a year. The next step was, ‘let’s decide whether we need the plant. I
knew they had said that they didn’t have the political will in Westchester and
Putnam, so I said ‘I’ll get those people together. I’ll organize Westchester and
Putnam.’ I thought they were talking about the people. Of course really they were
talking about this higher level of politics. (K. Argenti, interview, May 6, 2004)
Argenti was well prepared to take on this challenge. She had served as
chairperson of Community Board 7 and had worked for both a state senator and for the
Democratic Party. As she told me, “I understood how to organize. I was on the other
side and knew how it worked” (K. Argenti, interview, December, 2000). She was a
founding member of The Friends of Jerome Park Reservoir and of the Jerome Park
Conservancy. Argenti approached John Klotz of the Sierra Club for help. Klotz
introduced her to Frank Eadie, chair of the Sierra Club New York City Group watershed
committee, and a meeting was organized that took place at the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) headquarters. Frank Eadie, believing that Westchester County
was crucial to the protection effort, recruited Marian Rose, a Sierra Club member and an
experienced environmental activist in Westchester, to participate. Marian Rose hosted the
founding meeting of the Croton Coalition in her home in Bedford.
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In defining the scope of the Coalition’s activities, the decision was made to focus
only on the Croton, rather than on both the East of Hudson and West of Hudson systems.
The group from the Bronx was motivated first and foremost by the need to avert
construction of the filtration plant - and the plant was needed because the Croton supply
had to be filtered. In addition, the participants agreed that many other organizations were
now focusing on the West of Hudson watershed as a result of the New York City
Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), signed in 1997. In particular, several
well-established organizations with considerable resources, such as the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and Riverkeeper, were monitoring the implementation of the
New York City Watershed MOA. The new coalition would focus on the Croton
exclusively (F. Eadie, March 12, 2004).
The Croton Coalition also had to decide on its policy on the construction of the
filtration plant. The Coalition adopted the policy of advocating for a “dual track”
approach on the part of New York City. Their stand was that filtration might not be
necessary, so the City should proceed as if it could be avoided by pursuing watershed
protection, while at the same time satisfying the US EPA by continuing to plan for a
filtration plant. In this way New York City would be prepared in the event that the
filtration plant was eventually needed. This stance quickly garnered support from
organizations that had been involved in opposing the plant at the Jerome Park Reservoir,
from Sierra Club groups and a few other watershed organizations. The first brochure
[undated]of the Croton Coalition listed 25 organizations, one third watershed
organizations and two thirds New York City organizations (of whom five were Sierra
Club chapters and groups), representing 100,000 members, as supporters of the Coalition.
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To understand how the Croton Coalition’s membership and policies evolved it is
important to understand the different backgrounds and motivations of the people from the
organizations from the Bronx and those from the watershed communities. The Croton
Coalition was an alliance among people approaching the filtration issue with different
concerns and from different perspectives. It is necessary to go back in time before the
founding of the Croton Coalition to understand their different perspectives.
When the Croton Coalition was formed, the core of the Bronx contingent was
organizations from Argenti’s neighborhood surrounding the Jerome Park Reservoir. The
Jerome Park Reservoir was completed in 1906 as a distributing reservoir for the Bronx.
It is the terminus of the New Croton Aqueduct, where it connects to the distribution
system. The New Croton Aqueduct is the oldest of New York City’s three major
aqueducts. The Jerome Park Reservoir is still in use today. The Reservoir had been
proposed as the site for a filtration plant as far back as 1905. Land was set aside at the
site for the purpose of constructing the filtration plant along with a covered reservoir for
finished (treated) water. (The fact that only half of the planned reservoir was ever
constructed is obvious with a glance at a map of the area.) Eventually the unused half of
the reservoir site became the home of several educational institutions, including the
Bronx High School of Science, John F. Kennedy High School and Lehman College
(Galusha, 1999). Plans for a filtration plant at the Jerome Park Reservoir were revived
several times after 1970, and in the 1980’s New York City built a pilot filtration plant.
This construction project involved blasting, much of which took place at night to avoid
disturbing classes at the schools nearby, that raised the residents’ sensitivity to any future
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construction proposals. Around 1991 New York City began to make plans to construct a
filtration plant in response to new federal regulations requiring filtration.
The Friends of the Jerome Park Reservoir spearheaded opposition to the proposed
filtration plant following a 1993 scoping hearing for the environmental impact statement
for the project. (Scoping is the procedure for determining what will be covered in the
environmental impact statement.) In 1994 the Jerome Park activists persuaded the NYC
DEP to hire a consultant for a community advisory committee. The meetings of the
Community Advisory Council (CAC) were very important because the participants
gained access to information about the water system which previously was not available
to the public. They also met with scientists and educated themselves about water quality
(K. Argenti, interview, May 6, 2004). The priority of the groups from the neighborhood
surrounding the Reservoir was that no plant be built at Jerome Park Reservoir, and that
the Reservoir should become a park. In the course of their investigations, they discovered
that the Kingsbridge neighborhood next to the Reservoir, and perhaps the Reservoir itself,
was designed by Frederick Law Olmstead. They unsuccessfully sought landmark status
for the Reservoir (Moss, 1998b), although they did eventually succeed in having the
Reservoir named to the State and National Registers of Historic Places (“Reservoir
Named,” 2001).
The organizations in the neighborhoods surrounding Jerome Park Reservoir held
community meetings, organized rallies, lobbied government officials, and in 1995 hired
an attorney and threatened legal action. My sources in the Bronx all agreed that the
neighborhood around the Reservoir was particularly well-positioned to mount the
campaign against the siting of the filtration plant because of the type of housing and
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institutions located there. “It was a unique community. A bunch of co-op complexes in
which each building is organized. We were threatened in property values. It was easy to
get to everybody through the neighborhood association, co-ops, etc. We could pick it up
and sew it together. They [the DEP] were shocked” (K. Argenti, interview, December,
2000). The co-op buildings of the Amalgamated Houses are located on and near the
Reservoir. The educational institutions had many resources as well as 25,000 (according
to Argenti) students that could be tapped for the campaign. In 1995, 5,000 students came
out to circle the reservoir in a protest rally. Some credit the influential teachers’ union
and alumni association of Bronx High School of Science for forestalling the plant (P.
Sawyer, interview, December 10, 2004). In the face of sustained opposition, the NYC
DEP backed off from their plans for that site (K. Argenti, personal communication,
December 12, 2000).
In addition to the Jerome Park organizations, other New York City organizations
that had joined the Jerome Park campaign eventually became part of the Croton
Coalition. Several nearby neighborhoods had organizations that were part of the
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), which is active in ten
neighborhoods. The Mosholu South Community Coalition and the Bedford Park
Organizing Project were two that were active. There were also several people who had
been involved in water supply issues prior to the negotiation of the New York City
Watershed MOA, such as David Ferguson who brought in the Housing Development
Fund Cooperative Coalition, and Carl Schwartz representing the Friends of Clearwater
(Carl Schwartz, personal conversation, December 9, 2004).
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In the watershed, the original core of the active members of the Croton Coalition
came either from the Sierra Club or from Yorktown. In late 1996, when the NYC DEP
proposed a site in Yorktown for the filtration plant, Paul Moskowitz was president of his
neighborhood’s community association in Huntersville, an area of Yorktown adjacent to
the New Croton Reservoir. Moskowitz and others in Yorktown organized a group called
Friends of the Croton Watershed. Of the nine watershed organizations that were original
members of the Croton Coalition, three were from Yorktown and four were from the
Sierra Club. The remaining two were the Central Westchester and Scarsdale Audubon
clubs. Moskowitz describes how his community became involved for reasons similar to
those of the community around Jerome Park Reservoir:
We formed our own local group to oppose the building of the filtration plant in
the town of Yorktown. And it’s for many of the same reasons that the people at
every other site have opposed building a filtration plant. There are the problems of
traffic, noise, pollution. In addition we have our Turkey Mountain Park, which is
on the North side of the reservoir which overlooks their site and of course if you
have a park and a mountain, the thing about the mountain are the views [which
would have been ruined]… (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004)
However, beyond the opposition to particular sites, the Croton Coalition activists
quickly began to become involved in the issue of watershed protection. As Argenti had
envisioned, the Coalition activists demonstrated that there were people in the watershed
who were motivated to protect it. Early on it became apparent that there were many
people in the watershed communities who could be mobilized to protect the watershed
because this agenda dovetailed with other local concerns. As Paul Moskowitz put it,
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“When you are involved in local politics, it means environmental politics. Because that is
what you are fighting for, the environment in which you live…community politics is
environmental politics” (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004). As the Croton
Coalition grew, it engaged people who were involved specifically in water issues, such as
protection of the Great Swamp (headwaters of the Croton River), threats to the Kensico
Reservoir from the Westchester Airport, and sewage issues, but also people who realized
that over-development in general could be put in the larger context of the watershed.
Ann Fanizzi, a board member from Putnam County, described herself in these terms:
At the CWCWC meeting I was totally bored, they were talking about milligrams
and milliliters, it seemed impossible to understand. I love science, originally
wanted to be a nurse, but this stormwater seemed like minutiae. But I came to see
the light and how integral it all is to my work – the role the watershed plays – I
was going after developers but this gave me a larger context – an ethical context.
I tried to get more involved – mostly listened to get to know the vocabulary – this
physics and chemistry is not my thing. But I admired Marian and the others in
CWCWC so much. I saw the centrality of the plan to protect the watershed and
the connection to my plan to protect open space. (A. Fanizzi, interview, January
1, 2004)
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Illustration 7
Ann Fanizzi
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition board member
December 7, 2005
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Illustration 8
Paul Moskowitz
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition board member
December 7, 2005
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The Croton Coalition pursued the two agendas of stopping the construction of the
filtration plant and increasing the level of watershed protection simultaneously. In the
spring of 1997, shortly after the formation of the Croton Coalition, the US EPA and NYS
DOH filed a lawsuit against New York City to force it to comply with the Surface Water
Treatment Rule and build the filtration plant. The Coalition asked for standing to
intervene in the suit. The Coalition argued that the stipulation signed by New York City,
in which it committed itself to build the Croton filtration plant, should not be legally
binding because the City had not complied with requirements for public participation in
this decision. John Klotz, an attorney and Sierra Club leader, was hired to represent the
Coalition in this litigation. The suit went on for three years, but was not successful.
At the same time, the Croton Coalition was opposing development in the
watershed that could influence water quality. The first Coalition newsletter, published in
fall of 1997, included articles about opposition to a multiplex cinema to be built in the
northern Westchester town of Southeast, a subdivision in Hunter Brook, and widening of
Route 120 and Route 22 by the Kensico Reservoir. The newsletter also included a list of
36 proposed development projects in the Croton watershed. The articles emphasized that
New York City residents, representing the Coalition, joined local residents in objecting to
these developments at planning board meetings about these matters (CWCWC, 1997).
In analyzing the significance of the formation of the Croton Coalition, I have
found it helpful to introduce the concept of scale as used by critical geographers. These
scholars have suggested that understanding how scale is produced can help to illuminate
processes of the production and manipulation of nature (see Chapter 1 and Bakker, 1999;
Silvern, 1999; Herod, 1997; McGuirk, 1997; Smith, 1992). In establishing the Croton
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Coalition, the participants were redefining the scale at which the filtration plant was
significant, engaging in a process of arbitration and struggle to create new scales of
landscape and politics associated with the New York City watersheds. Most obviously,
the founders of the Croton Coalition were rejecting the definition of the problem as one
of a single neighborhood where the filtration plant was to be located. By redefining the
problem as a regional problem, they were “jumping scale” to mobilize additional
resources to assist in the struggle.
The struggle over filtration of the Croton water supply reveals how the definition
of scale is a reciprocal and mutually constituted process carried out through attempts to
use scale as a tool in accomplishing various political objectives. Examining these
attempts, on the part of both the Croton Coalition and the NYC DEP, may help us to
understand the conflict over filtration. Both sides defined and redefined the conflict at
various scales that, at different junctures, both narrowed and expanded the bounds of the
conflict.
The background to this conflict was the history of New York City’s creation of
the “New York City Watershed,” an entity which did not exist prior to human
intervention. In a 150-year process, New York City developed a new hydrological scale
by combining water from the Croton, Catskill and Delaware watersheds in a “superwatershed” to supply nine million people. On the level of physical/material practice, the
waters from the Catskill and Delaware watersheds are actually mixed in the Kensico
Reservoir, located in the Croton watershed, before being to delivered to New York City.
New York City’s wastewater is then discharged into the Hudson, East River and Atlantic
Ocean far from where the water was extracted. Most recently, in the New York City
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Watershed Memorandum of Agreement, the City had reinforced the notion of the
watershed as a unified landscape by applying uniform regulations. The paradox is that
although in this context, the filtration of the Croton supply appeared as a mere footnote in
the bigger story at a higher scale, by applying the policy of filtration to the Croton
watershed, New York City was also differentiating the Croton watershed.
The Croton Coalition’s stand was similarly paradoxical. On the one hand, the
Croton Coalition’s focus on the Croton watershed and its particular characteristics can be
understood as a call for knowledge and understanding of the individual watershed at a
local, intimate level. It is reminiscent of the ideas of bioregionalism, which calls for
political boundaries and decision-making to reflect the bounds of ecosystems such as
watersheds (Dryzek, 1997; Nelson & Weschler, 2001; Sale, 1985 also see Kemmis, 1990
on the importance of place to environmental politics). In advocating for watershed
protection in the Croton, the Croton Coalition was arguing that the Croton watershed
should be evaluated on its own terms – not according to one-size-fits-all regulations or
according to the political calculations involved in avoidance of filtration for the Catskill
and Delaware watersheds. However, at the same time, the Croton Coalition was asking
that the same policy that was applied to the other watersheds be applied to the Croton.
I would argue that the most significant aspect of the Croton Coalition’s foray into
the politics of scale was their articulation of a vision of the Croton watershed as a unit of
significance to the public. It is not surprising that they encountered difficulties in
defining exactly what this meant in terms of both boundaries and policies. All
ecosystems are nested one within the other, and the boundaries of watersheds are
frequently contested (Rhoades, 2000; Ruhl, 2000). What is important is that the Croton
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Coalition defined the Croton watershed as a place of common habitation that merited the
common concern of citizens in the communities where the water was extracted and in
New York City where it was used.

Second Turning Point –A Hoodwinked Neighborhood
After Mayor Giuliani agreed to reopen the siting process for the filtration plant in
early 1996, seventeen sites in the Bronx and Westchester were proposed by NYC DEP,
and seven were chosen for inclusion in the plant’s environmental impact statement. The
new list contained several sites in Van Cortlandt Park. In May, 1998, at the end of the
comment period for the scope of work for the environmental impact statement, the NYC
DEP added an eighth site to the list. This was the Mosholu Golf Course site, which was
in Van Cortlandt Park and very close to the Jerome Park Reservoir. The residents of
Norwood, the closest neighborhood to the site, were thus taken by surprise when they
learned that the plant might be built in their immediate neighborhood (Moss, 1998a).
On December 1, 1998 the DEP announced that it had selected the Mosholu site
for the plant. The selection of the Mosholu site changed the dynamics of the controversy
significantly. When I made my first visit to the neighborhood, I found it very surprising
that the selection of the new site could have made such a big difference in the politics of
the controversy. Both the Mosholu site and another site under consideration known as
Shandler Field were actually very close to Jerome Park Reservoir. But because of the
micro-geographies of the Bronx and the effect of Van Cortlandt Park, each site was in a
different neighborhood.
Norwood was a low income primarily minority community located in Bronx
Community District 7. This district had a total population of 128,500 in 1990; 65,000 of
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whom were of Hispanic origin and 22,000 of whom were Black. Between 1980 and 1990
the Hispanic population increased by almost 67% (New York City Department of City
Planning, online). In a Norwood News article, City Councilwoman June Eisland,
described the neighborhood as “primarily populated by working class and predominately
minority residents, who together with a major teaching hospital, have struggled for years
to attain stability in the housing stock, business district and quality of life” (Moss,
1998c). State Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz, an opponent of the filtration plant, told me,
…I think there was a deliberate decision made by the city to withdraw the plan
from the Jerome Park Reservoir and ultimately to go into the southeast corner of
Van Cortlandt Park because they believed they’d have a greater chance of
overcoming the opposition in that neighborhood. And to me that’s where the
issue of environmental racism comes in, because in some people’s mind they
thought it was a minority community that would be harder to organize, and they
were right on both counts. The Amalgamated (near the Jerome Park Reservoir)
has a long-standing tradition of political activism, and it’s also a concentrated
bloc…in Norwood you had a more transient population, many that did not speak
English as their first language… I said that we can’t allow them to divide and
conquer and that has been the strategy of the DEP for many years (J. Dinowitz,
interview, July 25, 2005).
Opponents of the plant also emphasized that the area immediately adjacent to the
proposed plant was occupied by a particularly vulnerable population. According to Fay
Muir, a community activist and a Croton Coalition board member, the neighborhood as a
whole had demographics not that different from those around the Jerome Park Reservoir,
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but the area closest to the site known as Knox Gates was an area of small apartment
buildings of low-income and primarily Spanish-speaking residents (F. Muir, interview,
December 4, 2000). After the new site was announced, Ann Marie Garti, one of the
leaders of the opposition to the siting of the plant in Jerome Park Reservoir, was quoted
in the New York Times about the selection of the new site. She said, “I feel guilty, I feel
bad. These are like the poorest people in the City. It’s that kind of poverty. I should be
happy and I’m not” (Martin, 1998).
Although the residents of Norwood may not have been very organized or
influential, the selection of a site within Van Cortlandt Park did provide new options for
opposition to the plant. The selection energized allies from the community of people
concerned with the protection of New York City parks, especially the Friends of Van
Cortlandt Park. This organization, with a base of supporters in the more affluent and
politically influential neighborhood of Riverdale had some resources with which to
oppose the plant.
Park advocates raised the possibility that the Mosholu site could be opposed on
the basis that New York State law required an act of the state legislature for parkland to
be used for another purpose. A NYC DEP spokesman told the Norwood News that the
agency had determined that legislation was not necessary, arguing that the plant would be
underground and the roof of the plant would be returned to park use as part of the golf
course (Moss, 1999). However raising this legal issue, referred to as “alienation,” was
identified as the most promising avenue for stopping the project. Once this issue was
raised, many of the opponents of the plant were certain that they would prevail. As the
Norwood News reported, [Assemblyman Jeffrey “Dinowitz predicts the proposal’s
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certain demise. Though park alienation bills routinely sail through the legislature on the
last day of each legislative session (the assemblyman says he is one of the few that
reflexively votes against all of them) Dinowitz predicts his colleagues in the Assembly
will follow his lead since Van Cortlandt Park is in his district” (Moss, 1999).
Meanwhile, it began to appear that the most likely strategy for derailing plans for
the plant to be built in Van Cortlandt Park was to force New York City to try to obtain
alienation legislation. The Croton Coalition board wanted to file a lawsuit on this basis,
but as a matter of legal strategy feared that it might be viewed as pursuing contradictory
aims to its earlier lawsuit questioning the need for filtration altogether. Consequently in
October 1999 the Croton Coalition along with other community organizations in
supported the formation of a new community group, Norwood Community Action, for
the sole purpose of suing New York City. This suit was combined with a suit brought by
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, and was joined by the State of New York under the
direction of Elliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General. Spitzer agreed that New
York City should have sought the approval of the legislature for the alienation of
parkland.
Throughout this period, while the legal process was underway, the Croton
Coalition supported efforts to raise awareness and mobilize support for their position
against filtration. David Ferguson, a leader of the Croton Coalition from New York City,
developed comic books in English and Spanish that were distributed in Norwood. The
Croton Coalition produced a video, “The Fight for the Croton Watershed: Protection vs.
Filtration” (Rose Films Inc, 1999), and hired an architectural renderer to create an
illustration of how the filtration plant would appear from street level. (The NYC DEP
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illustrations depicted the plant from the air, minimizing the height of the wall as it would
appear from the street.) The Coalition simultaneously opposed the siting of the plant in
Van Cortlandt Park, while trying to keep the idea of non-filtration alive as a policy
alternative. On June 6, 1999 the Coalition issued a report on the high cost of filtration
and its potential impact on water rates. The Coalition also worked with the Sierra Club to
obtain support from Hillary Rodham Clinton, then running for the United States Senate,
for its position against filtration (Friedman, The Riverdale Press, August 3, 2000). In
February 2001, hoping for a hearing from the new federal administration, the Coalition
sent a letter to US EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman asking the US EPA to
reconsider the consent decree under which the City was required to move ahead on
building the filtration plant.
On February 8, 2001, the suits brought to force New York City to seek alienation
legislation permitting use of the Mosholu site were successful. NYC DEP had to seek
legislation permitting use of the park site for the filtration plant. The opponents of the
filtration plant celebrated this decision as a significant victory. Realizing that it would be
impossible to meet the deadlines, New York City negotiated a supplement to the consent
decree on December 12, 2001 obligating itself to evaluate two additional sites for the
filtration plant while it pursued legislative approval for the Mosholu site. One, the
Harlem River site, was in the Bronx. The second, the Eastview site in Mt. Pleasant, was
in Westchester County.
As we have seen, the selection of the Mosholu site for the filtration plant brought
the issue of environmental justice into the controversy. Neither the filtration controversy
nor the Croton Coalition’s campaign fit neatly into the environmental justice framework.
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I explore the question of environmental justice here because this framework helps to
illuminate certain aspects of the controversy. I also suggest that the influence of ideas
from the environmental justice movement can be discerned in the Croton Coalition’s
positions.
Over the course of the controversy several different arguments were advanced by
the Croton Coalition under the general heading of environmental justice. First of all the
Croton Coalition drew on the most common understanding of environmental justice –
that that there is a pattern of discrimination in the siting of noxious facilities and
displacement of environmental burdens on the poor and racial minorities. On a most
basic level, the Mosholu site seems to have been selected in part because the people in
the Norwood neighborhood were perceived to be less powerful than those in the vicinity
of Jerome Park Reservoir. As we have seen, many activists were convinced that the
NYC DEP had made the political calculation that the community around the site would
not be able to organize sufficiently to prevent the building of the filtration plant. Of
course other factors involved as well, such as the site’s proximity to the Jerome Park
Reservoir which is the terminus of the New Croton Aqueduct.
Many environmental justice struggles have been occasioned by the presence or
potential for siting of toxic waste disposal facilities and concerns about their influence on
the health of local residents. In Norwood, concerns focused on predictions that
construction would cause an increase in asthma in the neighborhood. The Bronx already
had very high rates of asthma due in part to the presence of many highways and bus
depots. The dust and pollution from trucks during construction of the filtration plant was
expected to exacerbate the symptoms in the many afflicted children in the area (Moss,
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1998c). In addition, the plant would deprive the neighborhood of use of a nearby area of
parkland. Van Cortlandt Park was already criss-crossed with highways which both
limited access to many areas of the park and contributed to air pollution. The
construction of the filtration plant would further diminish access for residents of
Norwood. An article in the Norwood News captured the sentiment of the neighborhood
with respect to the park with the title, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: City Has Disrupted Park
Many Times Before” (Corey, 1999). Opponents of the plant also argued that the plant
would cause economic hardship, and that residents would flee the neighborhood. In
Muir’s words,
Our concerns are that they will be blasting through bedrock over 23 acres, down
80 feet. They say it will be a minimum of 18 months and they will crush rock on
site. There will be no peace in the neighborhood. Hordes of rats that live in the
park will flow out. It will be unlivable because of the dust. Asthma rates are
already terrible. After it’s built it will be a massive expanse of grass. In a drought
what will that look like? …. I doubt they’ll use water for that! It will be 30 feet
up. Right now we can walk in and take a walk. Who will climb up that thing?
We will lose the trees. We won’t see what’s left – we’ll just see the mound. We
don’t have access to the rest of the park because it is cut through by three
highways. We can’t get to the other side from our neighborhood. This little area
is all we have of the park. We have a playground there…after it is built there
won’t be much of a neighborhood left, but just an active industrial area in the
park. How can we send children there with the trucks? For us it’s pretty bad.
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Not much will be left. Everyone will move out. (F. Muir, interview December 4,
2000)
These concerns raise issues of both distributional and procedural inequity as
discussed in Chapter 1: Distributional inequity because the community was already
overburdened with more than its share of noxious facilities, and procedural inequity
because the procedures in place for making the decision provided little opportunity for
the community to influence the decision (Faber, 1998a). The community was surprised
by selection of the site and did not have time to organize sufficiently to avert the transfer
of the plant from the nearby Jerome Park Reservoir. This problem was exacerbated by
the fact that the NYC DEP did not provide opportunities for public participation in
Norwood as extensive as those that they had provided when the plant was proposed for
Jerome Park Reservoir.
The opponents of the plant in the Croton Coalition and in the neighborhood faced
an uphill battle in making these arguments about the plant. Paul Sawyer, the director of
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, told me that when he raised the issue of environmental
justice with politicians, they told him that it was not an environmental justice issue
because it was neither about health nor about jobs – just about a park (P. Sawyer,
December 6, 2004). Perhaps because what was proposed was a water treatment plant, it
was not obvious why such a facility would be unhealthy. The Croton Coalition pointed
out that construction would be very polluting, and operation would involve transport of
chemicals and discharge of wastes, but this did not seem to garner much attention beyond
the immediate neighborhood. The issue of the alienation of land in Van Cortlandt Park
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attracted some support from organizations of other parks, but many people did not see the
alienation of parkland as an environmental justice issue.
The filtration plant did not quite fit into the common understanding of a noxious
facility, but perhaps equally problematic was that most of the activists of the Croton
Coalition were white and many were from Westchester and Putnam Counties, especially
after the Bronx groups left the Coalition. The environmental justice movement is defined
in large part in terms of its constituency. While some have extended the boundaries to
include people oppressed because of class and other identities, the environmental justice
movement has been commonly defined by the racial identity of its participants and as a
response to environmental racism. While I would argue that white residents of a
relatively wealthy upstate community can be environmental justice activists, it is
important to note the emphasis that the environmental justice movement places on social
location as a factor in how people conceive of the environment. The movement’s
activists and scholars point out that people in a sub-altern social location experience and
frame problems differently from those whose social location provides them with
protection from environmental injuries (Pulido, 1996). Thus examining the constituency
of the Croton Coalition, and how different board members approached the filtration
controversy, may be useful in understanding how the Coalition framed the controversy as
an environmental justice issue.
Within the Croton Coalition two activists, Fay Muir and David Ferguson, were
particularly involved in making arguments about the environmental injustice of the plant.
Both of these activists had been involved in organizing in low-income communities and
coalitions prior to their participation in the filtration issue. They both remained active in
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the Croton Coalition after most of the New York City-based groups from the Bronx left
the Coalition in 2001. Although, as low-income urban residents, Muir and Ferguson
were in the minority within the Croton Coalition’s leadership, they were very much
present and respected participants. It may be because of their involvement that the
Coalition did focus on the environmental justice aspect of the filtration controversy. At
the same time, the fact that most of the Coalition activists hailed from the watershed
communities may explain why environmental justice remained a less prominent argument
in the Coalition’s campaign.
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Illustration 9
Fay Muir and Marian Rose
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition

Fay Muir was the only Croton Coalition board member of color, and the only one
who actually resided in Norwood. Muir was an immigrant to New York City from
Jamaica. She fled Flatbush, in Brooklyn, for the Bronx because she was worried about
her child’s safety, and raised him as a single parent while working for Montefiore
Hospital which is located in Norwood. Muir became involved in community organizing
through the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC). She was
facing being laid off from her job when she decided to retire, whereupon she became very
involved in the filtration issue. As she said in 2000 when she was one of the plaintiffs in
the Norwood Community Action suit, “I have been involved for six years, I’ve learned so
much and met so many wonderful people. I can’t imagine what my life would be like
without this. This took over. Now I have a one-track mind. Being downsized was a
blessing. I would not have been able to do this on this scale. I’m very grateful that I’m
able to do it.” Muir’s assessment of the thinking of the NYC DEP in siting the plant at
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the Mosholu site was succinct. She felt that the NYC DEP had chosen the site because
they had no respect for the residents of her neighborhood, she summarized the thinking of
the DEP as: “Who cares about poor minorities anyway? Just put them in a program, and
90% are probably cheating! That’s what they say” (F. Muir, personal communication,
December 4, 2000).
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Illustration 10
David Ferguson
Croton Clean Water Coalition Board Member
December 7, 2005
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David Ferguson was an activist with the Housing Development Fund Cooperative
Coalition (HDFC Coalition), an organization that represented residents in limited equity
cooperative buildings. These buildings became cooperatives as part of a New York City
program created to address landlord abandonment of low-income housing in the late 70’s
and early 80’s. Ferguson was a poet and playwright who had earned his living before
retirement as a house-painter, and served as the part-time superintendent of his building.
As a tenant leader and eventually owner of a coop in a building in Chelsea, Ferguson was
very concerned about the rising water rates in New York City. He had become a
passionate activist addressing water issues as a representative of the HDFC Coalition. In
addition to representing the HDFC Coalition in the Croton Coalition, Ferguson was the
most prolific writer on behalf of the Coalition, and the editor of the newsletter. He also
made several videos about the Croton controversy, drawing on the 600 videotapes that he
recorded at meetings and hearings.
As an activist on behalf of the residents of low-income housing across New York
City, Ferguson originally became involved in water issues around 1994. He argued that
filtration was an environmental justice issue because construction of the plant would lead
to increased water rates and thereby place a disproportionate burden on low income New
York City residents. As David Ferguson explained, “low income people are subsidizing
developers to clean up their dirt” (D. Ferguson, interview, November 26, 2000). This
issue was raised in the first brochure of the Croton Coalition around 1997, and I suspect
that it reflected Ferguson’s understanding of the relationship between water and housing
issues (see HDFC Coalition, 2000). In 1999 the Croton Coalition commissioned
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Anthony Blackburn (1999), an economist, to produce an analysis of how the cost of
filtration would influence low-income housing in New York City, finding that under the
current rate system, rising rates as a result of filtration could reduce the net operating
income of buildings with lower-income tenants and possibly force such owners into
default on tax and mortgage obligations, thus undermining the preservation of affordable
housing. His analysis also showed that rising rates would have the effect of redistributing
net operating income from lower-income to higher-income buildings. This approach,
although not directly about livelihood, reflected an intersection of environmental and
economic concerns that is characteristic of the environmental justice movement (Pulido,
1996).
In addition to making arguments that drew on an environmental justice
framework, the Coalition was organized in a manner that is characteristic of the
environmental justice movement – that is as a coalition of organizations and leaders with
varied interests and perspectives (Schlosberg, 1999). The Coalition’s position that only
avoidance of filtration could protect both New York City and watershed residents was a
position that underlies much environmental justice organizing. A fundamental issue in
environmental justice is the struggle to redefine conflicts over pollution, changing them
from locational conflicts, understood at the scale of the neighborhood, to societal
challenges at a broader scale (Williams, 1999). It is typical for environmental justice
struggles to begin with protests in a single neighborhood and then grow to encompass
additional communities (McGurty, 2000; Camacho, 1998; Greenberg, 2000). This is
what happened in the filtration controversy. The NYC DEP framed the issue as choosing
one site for the filtration plant. The community around the Jerome Park Reservoir
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originally saw this as a neighborhood issue. And then the Croton Coalition reframed the
issue as a regional one that could be resolved by eliminating the need for the filtration
plant. As many environmental justice coalitions have discovered, proposing to solve the
problem of pollution through prevention makes it possible to avoid pitting one
neighborhood against another.
The concept of environmental justice is helpful in defining the Croton Coalition’s
opposition to filtration. This multi-dimensional struggle resisted classification. In many
ways, it fit the mold of an environmental justice struggle. As a response to the siting of a
noxious facility in a poor community of color, it was about fairness, and thus fit squarely
into the concerns of the environmental justice movement. On the other hand, the Croton
Coalition did not emerge from a sub-altern community. The activists of the Coalition
were varied in their identities, and not primarily defined by subaltern or racial identity.
They only partially subscribed to an environmental justice agenda. For example, unlike
many movements for environmental justice, the Croton Coalition did not explicitly
challenge the political framework within which the decisions about filtration were being
made (Pulido, 1996; Faber, 1998b; Gould, Schnaiberg & Weinberg, 1996).
The influence of the environmental justice movement on the Croton Coalition
may be seen in more subtle ways, such as the way that the Coalition conceived of
filtration as an environmental problem. A central idea of the environmental justice
movement is the idea that the environment is “where we live, work and play” (DiChiro,
1996). As a struggle about both protecting nature and protecting people, and doing so in
both urban and watershed communities, the Coalition’s efforts around the filtration
controversy may be understood as part of the environmental justice movement’s
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expanded definition of environmentalism. The Coalition is intriguing precisely because it
brought together people with different perspectives and different problems around one
solution: Prevent the problem.

Inch by Inch - Protecting the Watershed
Parallel to the effort to stop the siting of the filtration plant, the Croton Coalition
was working on protection of the watershed. The Coalition became a key resource for
other groups in the watershed concerned about development. At critical turning points
these other groups were able to call on the Coalition’s board members, and their troops in
the member groups, to write letters, make phone calls to the offices of local officials, or
show up at hearings. Paul Moskowitz, vice president, describes the Croton Coalition’s
role in this way:
We have played an organizational role, getting the separate groups together so
that we could act together. Most of this has concerned action at public hearings,
but also very local issues. That is, any development in the watershed affects the
whole system. So in the past, for instance the people in Huntersville have had
issues. And it has just been us against the whole government bureaucracy. Now,
when local groups have issues with development, we have an organization which
spans four counties and we can get experts and people together to help out in local
affairs…and also to take legal action if necessary… (P. Moskowitz, interview,
April 4, 2004)
Several of the board members were identified with particular development issues.
For example, Ann Fanizzi was a former New York City school teacher who moved to
Putnam County. She was the chair of the Putnam Open Space Coalition, an organization
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she started in order to oppose the sale of a large parcel, Tilley Foster Farms, to
developers. This 240 acre horse farm had a stream leading to the Middle Branch
Reservoir running through the property (Fanizzi, 2003). Fanizzi became involved in
politics in Carmel (a town in Putnam County), particularly in the Green Party and in a
proposal to create a bond fund to preserve open space. The relationship between the
Croton Coalition and her campaign was typical of many of the other campaigns in which
the Coalition board members were involved:
Coincidentally I saw an ad in the New York Times Hudson Valley real estate
section that said ‘for sale – Tilley Foster.’ By this time I had been introduced to
Putnam. I went to every meeting. I saw right off what this meant. The farm
across from me that had belonged to the same family had become a golf
course….I called the Open Space Institute and the Trust for Public Land and said,
‘you’ve got to help me’. And they said, ‘who are you?’ So I started thinking of an
organization and got that underway.
[Later on…] I was already in the Croton Coalition and I talked about it at
a meeting. I said to them ‘it’s on the Middle Branch [reservoir]!’ And they got it.
…Bondi [the Putnam county executive] decided this was an issue and he was
going to save Tilley and sure enough he did. He made a deal with the DEP. He
had the East of Hudson money [as a result of the MOA]. DEP was a reluctant
bridegroom…he had to work a great deal to get it. DEP thought the money was
not for land acquisition because the Croton was going to be filtered…
Simultaneously the [Putnam Open Space] Coalition became aware we had
to influence land use. We looked at large scale development proposed for
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Southeast and Carmel. I went back to the Croton Coalition and said, ‘you must be
involved in all these, they all influence the reservoirs.’ Marian, bless her, started
coming to planning board meetings, making scientifically based comments. We
would have needed to hire experts without her. (A. Fanizzi, interview, January
29, 2004)
According to the Croton Coalition board members, Marian Rose, president of the
Croton Coalition was a unique resource for people seeking an orientation to the political
and regulatory process and the interpretation of technical information. Rose was a PhD
scientist, politically active locally, and leader in the Sierra Club. She became the person
to go to for any development threat in the watershed. She provided technical assistance,
advice and access to a network of people that could provide assistance and be counted on
to show up and speak at public meetings. Another board member, Oreon Sandler,
described Marian’s influence,
“…Marian is not involved in other issues... And most people throughout New
York City, or at least Westchester, if you have a question about the watershed you
go to Marian…She is well respected in the political community too, and in the
development community. I sat in her house one night when she had a seminar on
‘Can Environmentalists Get Along with Developers?’ And she had every
developer of substance in the County – 50 or 60 people… And when Marian says
she wants to do something, the state sends representatives. There was an assistant
to the Governor. She has made a major impact on understanding this natural
resource in the State, not just the County. (O. Sandler, interview, February 6,
2004)
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Paul Moskowitz, the Croton Coalition vice president was involved in opposing
the French Hill golf course proposed for Yorktown. This was one of a series of golf
courses proposed in the Croton watershed by the Trump Organization (Moskowitz,
2002b). The proposed French Hill Golf Course would have sent runoff into the Croton
reservoir (Moskowitz, 2002a). According to Moskowitz, this project was a good
example of the complex and often corrupt political situation opponents of development
faced. According to Moskowitz, after Trump realized that the site did not have adequate
water, he made a deal with the Westchester County Executive to provide water for the
golf course from a nearby lake located in a New York State park. The Croton Coalition
was able to use its connections to build a network of organizations that could offer
support to activists in Yorktown:
What Trump did is make a deal with Westchester County Executive Andy Spano.
Near the site is Mohanset Lake in FDR state park. A state park! But the County
has a contract with the State which allows them to draw water from the lake to
water their own golf course. What Spano agreed to – or at least his deputy Larry
Schwartz – was to supply the Trump golf course with water from a New York
State Park. Clearly in our eyes an illegal action.
So what we did is we combined local opposition with opposition and
technical analysis from the Attorney General, and all the conservation groups
from Westchester county and beyond, including the Sierra Club. This put a lot of
pressure on the Town Board of Yorktown not to approve the plans for the golf
course without proper environmental analysis. So the Croton Watershed Coalition
was very influential. Without them I wouldn’t have had this window into all the

154
other environmental groups in the whole region and we might have failed. So this
is an example of how small groups of people when organized together can have
an influence on events… (P. Moskowitz, April 4, 2004)
The Croton Coalition also took on the task of monitoring the Westchester Airport
and opposing the airport’s expansion. The water from the Catskill and Delaware water
supplies passed through the Kensico Reservoir on its way to New York City. Although
the water in the Kensico was from the West of Hudson watersheds, the Reservoir was
located in the Croton watershed. Since the West of Hudson watersheds supplied up to
90% of New York City’s water, the NYC DEP and others claimed that protection of this
Reservoir was of utmost importance. The Kensico was threatened by its proximity to the
Westchester Airport, which was only 250 yards away from the Reservoir at some points.
This was the second largest corporate airport in the United States. (See Ayres, 2001 for
introduction to environmental problems of airports.)
Karen Schultz, a Croton Coalition board member, became involved in this issue
because she lived near the Kensico Reservoir in the town of Harrison. Schultz served as
chairperson of the Airport Committee of the Sierra Club’s Atlantic Chapter. Numerous
specific issues that Schultz worked on included clearing of land in the buffer zone around
the Reservoir, detection and treatment of groundwater polluted by leakage from
underground storage tanks and airport operations, contamination of Blind Brook by
stormwater from the airport, and a proposed de-icing facility that would have had the
capacity to service three times the airport’s current capacity. (A somewhat smaller
facility was actually built.) Meanwhile the airport’s operations continued to expand as
the number of flights and passengers increased, due to growth in private corporate travel
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and commuter flights. With more small planes based at the airport, there were more takeoffs and landings and increased pollution per passenger (similar to the increased pollution
caused by the use of private cars in comparison to mass transportation).
According to Schultz, like the cause of protecting the watershed, the campaign to
contain Westchester Airport and to limit its’ negative influence on the Kensico Reservoir,
was challenged by the complexity of the political context. Federal, state, county and city
governments all had a role in regulating the airport. The Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA) goal at this time was to double or triple capacities of airports
near metropolitan areas. The Airports Expansion Act (AIR 21) became law on April 5,
2000, budgeting $40 billion for airport expansion over three years. Under FAA
regulations airports were exempt from many pollution reporting requirements imposed on
other kinds of facilities (Skolnick, 2000). Schultz mounted a major effort to persuade the
Westchester County Board of Legislatures to petition the federal government to grant the
Westchester Airport an exemption from requirements to expand. A resolution to this
effect was passed in 2003 (K. Schultz interview, December 16, 2004).
In describing her involvement in the campaign to limit the airport’s impact on the
Kensico Reservoir, Schultz said to me, “The regulatory agencies are sleeping or even
allowing pollution. I feel like a gerbil running in circles. I don’t know if it is making any
difference” (K. Schultz, interview, December 16, 2004). The Croton Coalition supported
this ongoing struggle to stop the expansion of the airport and to limit the threat of
pollution to the water supply (Schultz, 2002, 2003).
While fighting each of these battles one by one, the Croton Coalition also sought
to develop strategies that would address watershed protection more systematically. My
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research leads me to place three efforts of the Croton Coalition into this category: The
Coalition provided funding for a comprehensive study by Trout Unlimited of sites where
stormwater pollution problems could be remediated; the Coalition proposed a critical
resource waters designation for the Croton Watershed that would provide additional
protection for wetlands; and finally, the Coalition proposed its own management plan for
the watershed.
The Trout Unlimited study was a response to the problem of stormwater pollution
of the reservoirs. Although inadequate sewage treatment was a concern in the Croton
watershed, both government agencies and environmentalists agreed that stormwater was
the major problem. Stormwater conveys phosphorus into the reservoirs, which promotes
the growth of algae, leading to high levels of organic carbon in the water. In addition to
causing eutrophication of reservoirs, high levels of carbon lead to the use of more
chlorine than is desirable, potentially causing high levels of carcinogenic disinfectant
byproducts (Tierney, 2003). Because the Croton Coalition position was that filtration
would not be needed if pollution could be prevented, dealing with the stormwater
problem was key to success. In 2000, after the New York State Department of
Transportation showed some interest in this issue, the Coalition funded a study conducted
by Trout Unlimited that identified hundreds of sites where remediation could prevent
stormwater from entering streams and reservoirs (CWCWC, Newsletter 6, NovemberDecember, 2001). The Croton Coalition advocated for implementation of the
recommendations included in this report over a period of several years. The New York
State Department of Transportation undertook some of the improvements suggested in
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the report. But the Coalition was disappointed that NYC DEP did not show any interest
in this effort (M. Rose, personal communication, May 6, 2005).
One successful strategy adopted by the Croton Coalition in May, 2000 was that
the East of Hudson watershed be designated as “critical resource waters.” This
designation provides extra protection to water bodies. Certain activities proposed for
these waters that are regulated by the Army Corps of Engineers are subject to additional
review. These activities, such as dredging and filling in wetlands, are then reviewed
individually rather than under the nationwide permit program. The Coalition organized a
campaign to persuade Governor Pataki to grant the East of Hudson watershed this
designation, which he did in December, 2001. On May 23, 2002 this proposal received
final approval from the New York District of the Army Corps of Engineers. The
Coalition then offered to recruit volunteers to help with enforcement. Coalition
volunteers were trained to monitor water quality in streams and provide the data they
collected to the NYS DEC (Feller, 2002).
In an effort to influence the responsible government agencies to address the issue
of watershed protection in a comprehensive fashion, the Croton Coalition developed an
Action Plan for Protecting the Croton Watershed in 2002. The Coalition revised the plan
in 2003, and expanded it into the Croton Watershed Management Plan in 2004. The
Management Plan included recommendations for action on land acquisitions, stormwater
runoff, wetlands preservation, wetlands mitigation, forests, groundwater and stream
contamination, waterfowl management, wastewater treatment plants and infrastructure.
The Coalition solicited organizations to support the plan, and as of May of 2004 had
garnered support from fifteen organizations (“A Management Plan,” 2004).
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Illustration 11
Cover of Our Water, Our Future
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition newsletter, Issue 20
March-April, 2004
Describing the Coalition’s Management Plan for the Croton Watershed
With cartoon by Enrique Dura.
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Sewage diversion was another major issue related to the protection of the
watershed in which the Croton Coalition was involved. The Croton Coalition opposed
plans to divert the sewage from all 38 of Putnam County’s sewage plants to a regional
plant in Peekskill where treated sewage would be released into the Hudson River. In
Westchester the Coalition opposed a similar proposal to divert sewage from the two
largest plants in the County (Yorktown and New Castle) to the Hudson. The benefit of
these proposals was that if implemented, diversion would remove poorly treated
wastewater from entering New York City’s water supply. The City was expected to pay
much of the cost of these plans (Worth, New York Times, August 27, 2000). The money
would come from funds that were given to Westchester and Putnam as a result of the
New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement. The counties were given this
money to help them improve water quality. The Coalition argued that sewage diversion,
like the construction of a filtration plant, would permit more development that would
harm water quality. Diversion would also divert funds that could be used to address the
other, more important, source of water pollution in the watershed, which was stormwater
runoff from paved surfaces. The Coalition’s position was that instead of diversion, the
wastewater treatment plants should be upgraded to tertiary or micro-filtration, as was
being done in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds (Sandler, 2003).
Marian Rose invited Oreon Sandler, president of the Federated Conservationists
of Westchester County, to join the Croton Coalition board because of his activism on the
issue of diversion. Sandler was an engineer. Before coming to Westchester, he had
worked for the US EPA in the air quality division and was active as a volunteer on
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transportation issues. At the time he became active in the Croton Coalition, Sandler
managed Section 8 housing for one of the towns in Westchester, a job that gave him time
to be involved in community affairs. Sandler and Rose agreed that filtration and sewage
diversion were related. Removing sewage from the watershed could change the
hydrology of the area by removing large quantities of water from streams. But more
importantly, building large sewer pipes would make development much easier for towns
and developers. Sandler explained the incentive for the towns quite clearly:
If you take a lot of sewage out of the watershed, you may dry up some of the
wetlands, streams and aquifers. And from my experience, upgrading the sewage
treatment plants was the better approach to having clean effluent than diverting to
plants on the Hudson River, because I don’t trust the plants on the Hudson… So I
was promoting non-diversion of sewage. She [Marian Rose] kept asking me to
join the board because it is an element that pertains to filtration…
Let me explain that. Many people feel sewage diversion, which had been
going on for decades, may be having some regional benefit. But it was basically
designed to encourage development. And now that the southern end of the county
is pretty well developed, by having sewage piped out it would allow developers to
have more development in the northern end. In political circles they deny this is
for development, but most of us fear this development that the pipe would
provide. So if you can prevent this development, you are protecting the
watershed. So that is the relationship between diversion and the watershed. (O.
Sandler, interview, February 6, 2004)
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Although the towns could make the same amount of development possible by
building sewage plants, Sandler explained,
Well, what municipality wants to do that? If you are running a municipality, and
have the option to get increased growth without having to pay for that service,
you’d be in favor of it. And most supervisors are in favor of it because it allows
them to increase revenues without providing the increased service. They still
have to provide water – well they may not because (the new developments) may
use wells. Still, they need to provide schools, lights, etc.. But if they don’t have to
provide any sewage management it helps the builders build houses for less money
than if they had to put in a septic.
Sure, the homeowner does (have to pay for the sewage diversion), but not
the municipality. Buyer beware. The fact that you have a sewage bill every year
is not unusual, and if you have a septic you have to maintain that too. And I’m not
sure how it would come out compared to paying the county for sewage versus
septic. I suspect it’s similar. It’s not a shock to the homeowner, but it sure is a
benefit to the municipality or town. (O. Sandler, interview, February 6, 2004)
Proponents of diversion, including James Tierney, the New York City Watershed
Inspector General, argued that the growth inducement effect of diversion could be limited
by instituting strict controls over land use (J. Tierney, interview, January 7, 2004).
In 2003 the Croton Coalition proposed that Westchester County commission a
study of diversion and form a citizens advisory committee to study the issue. In 2004,
Westchester County was planning to set up the citizens advisory committee and Marian
Rose was expected to serve as co-chair of the committee. The establishment of the
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citizens advisory committee was stalled as a result of opposition in the City of Peekskill,
where the sewage diverted from the watershed was to be treated in an enlarged sewage
treatment plant. Opponents in Peekskill argued that diverting sewage to Peekskill would
constitute an environmental injustice. Unlike most of Westchester and Putnam Counties,
Peekskill had a significant poor and minority population (Claxton, 2001).
The members of the Croton Coalition were proud of what they had achieved in
terms of limiting harmful development in the watershed by becoming involved in the
local decision-making processes around land use. At the Croton Coalition’s annual
meeting on December 9, 2004, Marian Rose claimed that no major development project
actively opposed by the Croton Coalition had been approved. Coalition board members
took pride in the change in attitudes taking place in the watershed communities, where
the level of opposition to new development was increasing. James Tierney, the New
York City Watershed Inspector General, credited the Croton Coalition with having a real
influence,
They have had a bigger impact than they realized. Environmental conservation in
Westchester and Putnam is terrific. People really care about the
environment…what the community looks like. Pesticides. Traffic is
fundamental. The Democrats and Republicans are both for this. There is a
longstanding conservation movement that grew out of the battle for the Hudson
River. Groups like CWCWC, Riverkeeper, Scenic Hudson, and Clearwater
created a critical mass of environmentalists that doesn’t exist in too many places.
So a lot of things have been tried there first. The CWCWC serves to press new
issues. They are more aggressive environmentalists. They are the first to raise an
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issue. They are sophisticated, have money, use the press, and they are smart.
They are a necessary component, because it’s hard to do it without local citizen
buy-in. The [filtration] plant ultimately ground itself through the process, but on
increasing protection they have had a big role. They have been getting people
doing environmental reviews addressing stormwater. They are an effective
lobbying group. (J. Tierney, interview, January 7, 2004)
On the other hand, the Croton Coalition members felt that they still had not been
able to influence the attitude of the NYC DEP and thus address the watershed-wide issue
of a comprehensive protection effort. The NYC DEP continued to move ahead on the
planning for the filtration plant. While New York City claimed to be committed to
watershed protection, its DEP was barely making progress on purchasing land according
to the Coalition’s Croton Watershed Management Plan (2004). Neither were Westchester
and Putnam Counties moving ahead on upgrading their wastewater treatment plants, nor
was the stormwater problem being addressed. (For an overview of NYC DEP’s progress
in implementing the provisions of the New York City Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement, see New York State Department of Health & New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, 2002.)
In this section, we have seen how the Croton Coalition activists responded to the
ongoing threats to the watershed that contributed to the degradation of water quality. The
Coalition had many successes in addressing the incremental threats posed by increasing
sewer capacity, construction of new buildings and roads, and expansion of the airport and
development. As scholarship about the environmental movement and on citizen
participation has noted, these kinds of distributed threats to the environment are often
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most effectively addressed at the local level. In recent years, pressure to place more
responsibility for environmental regulation at the local level has come from both
environmentalists and their opponents in industry. Both agree that regulation emanating
from the federal level often fails to achieve its goals and sometimes exacerbates conflict.
Collaborative environmental management efforts such as watershed partnerships are one
response that has received federal government support (McCloskey, 1992; Dunlap &
Mertig, 1992). And more generally, citizen participation is often more effective at local
scales. As Fiorino (1996) concludes, “It is almost a truism in the study of democratic
participation that the likelihood of effective participation declines as the control over a
decision moves further away from those affected, and as the scale and scope of the
decision broadens” (p. 209).
While the prospects for success may be slim, the Croton Coalition’s experiences
clearly demonstrate that to achieve its goals, simultaneous action at a variety of scales
was needed. To achieve its objectives, the Croton Coalition had to influence decisionmaking at the national level because of the involvement of the US EPA. The EPA’s
mandates regarding water quality and filtration set the parameters within which the NYC
DEP and local governments were operating. Although there were ostensibly
opportunities for public participation in the EPA’s decisionmaking process, in practice
the Croton Coalition found that it had little opportunity to exert influence at this scale.

Third Turning Point – Diverging Interests (the Alum Proposal)
As we have seen, in 1996 Mayor Rudolf Giuliani agreed to reopen the siting
process for the filtration plant, and to consider alternative sites in addition to the Jerome
Park Reservoir. While the NYC DEP developed a new list of sites, it also undertook
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some other efforts to respond to the demands of the opponents of the filtration plant. The
NYC DEP hired the Joint Venture of Metcalf & Eddy and Hazen and Sawyer, the same
Joint Venture that was planning the filtration plant, to complete a study of filtration
alternatives. The NYC DEP also announced the formation of a Croton Citizen Advisory
Committee (Croton CAC), although it delayed actually convening it. The Croton CAC
was first announced in January, 1996, canceled by the Mayor in April 1996, and finally
convened in April 1997 (Grover, 1997; Harper, 1996). This committee eventually
included Bronx activists who had been involved in opposing the siting of the filtration
plant at the Jerome Park Reservoir, as well as people from Westchester.
In November, 1997 the Joint Venture completed the report on filtration
alternatives. It proposed an alternative treatment plan for the Croton water supply that
could possibly make a filtration plant unnecessary. This plan consisted of alternative
end-of-the-pipe treatments that would eliminate the need for construction of one large
centralized filtration plant (Freud, 2003; NYC DEP, 2002b). In 1998 the Joint Venture’s
report was reviewed on behalf of the Croton Citizens Advisory Committee by a
consultant paid for by the NYC DEP. The consultant raised a number of concerns about
the report. These concerns included that the Joint Venture’s modeling of the causes of
water quality degradation was inadequate, in large part because of NYC DEP’s
inadequate collection of data about the Croton watershed. The consultant told the
members of the Croton CAC that he believed that the NYC DEP did not have a single
staff member with significant knowledge about watershed protection (F.X. Browne, Inc
& Environmental Research and Consulting Inc., videotape of meeting of October 22,
1998).
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The most important component of the alternative treatment plan proposed in the
Joint Venture’s report consisted of adding aluminum sulfate, commonly referred to as
alum, to the water at the Muscoot Dam as it entered the Croton Reservoir. The alum
would collect organic carbons and settle in the Reservoir, potentially reducing the amount
of chlorine needed to treat the water. The Joint Venture report concluded that this
component of the treatment plan would have the most significant effect on water quality.
The NYC DEP needed regulatory permission from the NYS DEC to test this treatment
for two years. On October 20, 1999 the DEP made a negative declaration that in
accordance with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQR) and CEQR (the
equivalent city requirement) the project was “not anticipated to have any potential
significant adverse effects on the quality of the environment,” and therefore that no
environmental impact statement would be required. The NYC DEP sought approval
from the NYS DEC on this basis. The Croton Coalition opposed the granting of a permit
without a SEQR review, which the NYC DEP alleged was not needed because the test
would not have any negative effect on the environment. Ultimately the NYS DEC did
not allow the test to proceed without a SEQR review, so the NYC DEP never went ahead
with the test. Rose, the president of the Croton Coalition, called this one of the
Coalition’s few real victories, but it caused conflict within the Coalition, and may have
been the beginning of the end of the alliance between the Bronx contingent and the
watershed contingent. I will discuss this conflict in some detail both because it proved to
be an important turning point for the Coalition and also because it highlights the
complexities involved in balancing the Coalition members’ various priorities.
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Conflict erupted within the Croton Coalition because Marian Rose, president of
the Coalition, thought that the environmental review should be required. Its founder,
Karen Argenti, argued that this requirement would derail the search for an alternative
treatment plan. She and her supporters in the Bronx felt that the alum treatment should
be tested. If the test was successful, it might avert the need for a filtration plant to be
constructed in the Bronx. On June 30, 1999, Argenti, along with several other Bronx
activists, sent a letter to the NYS DEC expressing their support for the proposal and
urging that the NYS DEC grant the necessary permit (Letter to Marc Moran, Regional
Director of DEC Region 3 from Tina Argenti, Karen Argenti, Dart Westphal, Jane
Sokolow and Paul Mankiewicz). Days later, on July 7, 1999, Marian Rose sent a letter to
the NYS DEC, signed by several CWCWC board members, urging that the NYS DEC
not grant the permit without a full SEQR review. This letter asserted that the NYC
DEP’s analysis of the project had major scientific shortcomings. Specifically the letter
alleged that alum treatment could be dangerous to the ecosystem of the Croton Reservoir
and that if the NYC DEP were to begin applying alum, the Croton Reservoir would be
downgraded according to New York State law and actually be opened to further
degradation, since source waters for untreated water systems are subject to stricter
controls than source waters of treated water systems (Letter to Marc Moran, Regional
Director, NYS DEC Region 3, from CWCWC on July 7, 1999). In November, Rose
made a statement to the Westchester County Board of Legislators in which she said,
Such a massive dose of alum on a continuous basis, over a two-year period, has
never previously been applied to any reservoir in the New York City system.
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The DEP has appointed itself lead agency for this experiment, which it terms a
‘pilot project,’and has issued a declaration of no significant environmental impact,
i.e. a negative declaration.
If this project does not warrant a positive declaration and a full
environmental review under SEQR, then, we ask, what project would?
A January, 1999 review of the project by a consultant, hired and paid for
by DEP, Dr. Frank Browne, concluded that the JV [Joint Venture of Hazen and
Sawyer, Metcalf & Eddy] had not properly evaluated the benefits of watershed
management, and that the experimental data on which they based the feasibility of
their alum experiment were unreliable.
These are but a small sample of the multitude of unanswered questions
that can only be addressed in a full SEQR review. Furthermore, this review
would force the DEP to take the requisite ‘hard look’ at other solutions which,
possibly, could have less of an environmental impact. The DEP should be
managing its watershed and protecting the reservoirs, rather than pouring in more
pollutants in an attempt to mitigate the pollution that it should have prevented in
the first place. (Rose, Statement to the Westchester County Board of Legislators
regarding the Alum Addition Project 9CEQR #99DEP(31) November 29, 1999)
The alum proposal highlighted the differences between the Croton Coalition
board members from the watershed communities and those from the Bronx. The activists
from the watershed communities were very concerned about what they perceived as a
risky experiment that could destroy a living lake. Alum is commonly used in water
treatment as a coagulant to remove small particles of sediment. However the activists
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were concerned about the possible effects on biota once the alum settled on the bottom of
the reservoir. The activists were aware of a previous use of alum by the NYC DEP which
had been challenged by environmentalists. The NYC DEP had used alum in connection
with pumping from the Hudson River during droughts, and the alum settled as sludge on
the bottom of the reservoir (“New York City Faulted,” November 13, 1990). Looking
back on the disagreement within the Coalition over alum several years later, Rose said,
Only Jerome Park was for it. Every environmental group was against it. And the
Westchester County Board of Legislators came out against it. We told the DEC
[Department of Environmental Conservation] not to give the DEP a SPDES [State
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit for it. It was the only proposal
that the DEP ever made to treat the water so that they wouldn’t need a plant. But
it was still not protection. Jerome Park was always against what we wanted. The
alum would have destroyed the biology of the reservoir. There was not an iota of
evidence that it would work. The DEC stopped them in the end. It was a big
effort, but one of our biggest successes. (M. Rose, personal conversation, April
27, 2005)
Argenti, on the other hand, saw the Coalition’s opposition to the alum project as a
critical missed opportunity to avoid filtration. She felt the Coalition’s position was a
betrayal of her community. In discussing the difference in the perspectives of the two
groups, she said,
…they still have the same position as the upstaters share – which is that New
York City should pay, pay, pay, and there is no responsibility that people up there
should have. So when the time came…they were going to put alum in the

170
reservoir…that would have proved the water was clean enough because alum
would have taken out the turbidity and it would have been clean. And they
wouldn’t let that happen because they didn’t want their ecology or community to
be interrupted whatsoever. And that was also the CWCWC. So they took a
position on that, against the people in the Bronx who wanted it… (K.Argenti,
interview, May 6, 2004)
Argenti’s position was that the alum would not harm the reservoir. Given that this was
an issue where the science was in question, Rose’s position (which was adopted by the
Croton Coalition) was more easily defensible since it was not a rejection of the proposal,
but merely a demand for a full environmental review. But Argenti’s concern about the
strategic implications of demanding further review by the NYC DEP proved correct. It is
unclear how much influence was wielded by the Croton Coalition and other grassroots
organizations on this decision, but once the environmental review became necessary the
NYC DEP declined to pursue the project. However whatever the outcome, the proposal
had divided the activists. They had been able to come together to advocate a policy of
pollution prevention, and no filtration plant anywhere. This proposal was another form
of treatment of pollution after the fact, and it pitted one community against another just as
much as a filtration plant would have done. The conflict over alum presaged the
dissolution of the Coalition over another proposal for an alternative water treatment,
chlorine dioxide.
The conflict over alum raises issues of how conflicts over science and technology
entered into the filtration controversy. Debates over science are a feature of
environmental controversies that has drawn significant attention (Fischer, 2003; Nelkin,
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1984). As in this case, many environmental problems entail unknown or hard to predict
risks. They involve the complex interaction of social and physical factors, and include
normative questions. As has been pointed out by Nelkin (1984), although technical
arguments often become the focus of controversy, they may create further uncertainty
and usually do not change anyone’s mind. Nelkin has found that the outcome of
technical controversies usually depend on dramatic events or political changes.
Grassroots environmental organizations in the anti-toxics and environmental justice
movements have been influential in bringing attention to the limitations of science in
informing policy decisions and fostering new scientific approaches (Tesh, 2000; also see
Rodriguez, 1999 regarding the outcome of siting controversies in New York City).
Despite growing understanding that science alone cannot provide answers to most
environmental policy questions, science continues to provide the terrain of conflict. In
this case, both the NYC DEP and the Croton Coalition referred to science as a source of
authority. For example, Michael Principe, Director of the Bureau of Water Supply, told
me: “What we were looking for was…let’s be objective and look at the science. Not to
use it to leverage an anti-development agenda. When you look at the science it makes a
lot of sense. It’s not at the cost of watershed protection…” (M. Principe, interview,
September 1, 2005). In response, the Croton Coalition activists made extraordinary
efforts to procure data and scientific expertise to support their positions, including hiring
expert consultants and preparing position papers.
The Croton Coalition bolstered its arguments against filtration with its own
interpretations of the facts cited by the NYC DEP to make its case for filtration. A quick
review of a few of the facts contested by the Croton Coalition demonstrates how deeply
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the Coalition activists became involved in the politics of science. For example, the NYC
DEP claimed that water quality in the Croton watershed had deteriorated, and cited the
fact that the system had to be shut down frequently. The Croton Coalition filed a request
under the Freedom of Information Act and determined that the system had been shut
down on occasion, but not because of source water pollution (M. Rose, interview,
November 30, 2001). Similarly, the Croton Coalition disagreed with the NYC DEP
about the significance of the threat of cryptosporidium and giardia in the Croton water
supply. The institution of the Surface Water Treatment Rule was motivated by concern
about these protozoan pathogens (Smith, 2004; Levine, lecture, October 14, 2004), and
the NYC DEP frequently reiterated that filtration was necessary because of this threat.
The Croton Coalition pointed out that the NYC DEP’s own data indicated that there were
lower amounts of these pathogens in the Croton watershed than in the Catskill and
Delaware watersheds, and furthermore, the Croton Coalition pointed out that filtration is
not particularly effective in eliminating them.
One scientific argument that the Croton Coalition found particularly infuriating
was about disinfectant byproducts. The NYC DEP claimed that the water from the
Croton supply would have had to be filtered even if the watershed was pristine, with no
development at all. The NYC DEP’s claim was that the Croton water supply was
naturally rich in organic carbon. This carbon promoted the growth of algae leading to
eutrophication in the summer months. Without filtration, the water in these reservoirs
was not suitable for use. More importantly, the interaction of the carbon with the
chlorine used to disinfect the water resulted in disinfectant by-products (Freud, 2003).
While the Croton Coalition accepted that the disinfectant by-products might be cause for
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concern, the Coalition proposed an alternative interpretation of the facts and an
alternative solution. Although some of the carbon was unavoidable, problematic levels
were the result of pollution carried into the reservoirs by stormwater runoff. The
Coalition argued that the solution was prevention rather than treatment. Reducing the
runoff – a basic watershed protection strategy – could reduce the need for chlorine,
eliminate the by-product problem, and make filtration unnecessary (O. Sandler,
interview, February 6, 2004).
The Croton Coalition’s position was informed by a suspicion of technology that
has been characterized by Beck (1992) as a reaction to the “risk society.” The Coalition
activists were generally not a radical group with a broader societal critique, and never
extended their activities to other issues beyond the Croton watershed. However, their
arguments about filtration drew on ideas developed in the grassroots environmental
movement (Fischer, 2003). Although they were not against the use of all technology,
they referred to the filtration plant as a “chemical filtration plant” to emphasize that the
NYC DEP was building a much bigger, more elaborate, and more dangerous facility than
necessary. The Coalition’s comic books, developed by David Ferguson, depicted the
plant as a kind of witches’ den where poisonous potions would be brewed. Whether this
use of language was strategic, or actually reflected deep-seated attitudes toward
technology, the Coalition activists were attempting to tap into feelings about technology
that are a factor in public attitudes (Tesh, 2000).
The conflicts over science in which the Croton Coalition engaged were typical of
conflicts that emerge in environmental controversies. Fischer (2003) has described how
grassroots activists use a different kind of reasoning that depends on cultural context and
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local knowledge to reach their conclusions about scientific and technical questions. In
the conflict over filtration the NYC DEP emphasized the need to conform to the federal
and state regulations that require an end-of-pipe technical fix to ensure water quality. As
we have seen, the Croton Coalition took many more factors into account. These included
desire to avoid unintended local impacts of filtration such as the siting of the plant and
increased development in the watershed, intimate knowledge of the local geography,
distrust of the regulatory authorities, and confidence in the ability of local communities to
mobilize to protect the watershed by changing land use patterns.
Ultimately, the crux of the issue was a question that science could not resolve –
the question of what would happen in the future. The US EPA and NYC DEP’s position
was that water quality would likely deteriorate due to population growth in the watershed.
This was the position that underlay the Surface Water Treatment Rule, which required a
city to show that it had complete control of its watershed in order to avoid filtration. The
Croton Coalition, on the other hand, argued that people could change their ways. With
vigilance from the NYC DEP and mobilization by citizens in the watershed communities,
pollution prevention could achieve the same goals as filtration. Was the Croton
Coalition’s view naïve and quixotic, or prescient?
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Illustration 12
Depicting the proposed Croton Water Treatment Plant from
The Monster from the DEP
Comic book published by the Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition, 2002
Story by David Ferguson, illustrations by Alice Meyer Wallace
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Fourth Turning Point – The Walkout
In early 2001 most of the representatives of the organizations from the Bronx
walked out of a Croton Coalition board meeting. The organizations that they represented
resigned from the Coalition. As I have mentioned, the alliance between the Bronx
organizations and the organizations from the watershed communities had already been
strained by the difference of opinion over alum. The two sides had also disagreed about
sewage diversion. The Bronx organizations had supported diversion, seeing it as one
component of an alternative strategy to protect water quality, while Marian Rose and her
allies on the Croton Coalition board opposed it (M. Rose, interview, November 30,
2001). According to Argenti, the issue over which the alliance eventually fell apart was
Rose’s advocacy for treatment of the Croton water supply with chlorine dioxide (K.
Argenti, interview, May 6, 2004).
In 1999 Jim Roberts, a NYC DEP engineer working in the Croton watershed, had
begun to promote the idea of using chlorine dioxide as an alternative to filtration.
Chlorine dioxide was used widely in Europe and did not have the same problems as
chlorine in regard to the creation of trihalomethanes, a type of disinfectant byproduct.
Roberts was very helpful early in the Coalition’s history, and Marian Rose took up the
idea of promoting chlorine dioxide at his suggestion. On June 28, 1999, Roberts sent a
letter describing his proposal to the New York City Council, Alan Hevesi (New York
City Comptroller), Mark Green (New York City Public Advocate), Robert Kennedy Jr.
and the Croton Coalition.
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Roberts’ proposal for chlorine dioxide treatment caused a crisis in the Croton
Coalition because this proposal required the use of facilities in Jerome Park Reservoir..
In a multi-step process, a chemical (possibly alum) used in conjunction with the chlorine
dioxide would be added to the water to serve as a coagulant. The resulting floc would
settle out of the water in the Jerome Park Reservoir. This was completely unacceptable
to the Bronx contingent because part of the procedure would take place at the Jerome
Park Reservoir, and they considered Rose’s advocacy of it a betrayal. Frank Eadie, the
Sierra Club leader who introduced Rose and Argenti, explained the Bronx view:
Marian has misrepresented what chlorine dioxide involves because as well as a
disinfectant, it is also a precipitant…At Jerome Park the Reservoir would be used
as a settling basin for the clumps to settle out on the bottom… Then they would
have to be cleaned out, water would flow out, you clean out sludge and it would
probably be - dependent on whether it’s determined to be toxic - disposed of in
the sewer system or trucked out and to a landfill.
So either way there would be a lot going on at Jerome Park with major
trucking, industrial processes. Not a pleasant place to have a park and relaxing
view over the Reservoir. So that’s what’s involved. It’s not just disinfection, even
though Marian and her friends say it’s a disinfectant like chlorine. That’s not the
case. And it’s obviously a major slap at Karen [Argenti], who lives right on the
Reservoir, and all of the active people who have over the years been fighting for
the Reservoir as a public place… (F. Eadie, interview, March 12, 2004).
Although chlorine dioxide was the final straw, there were tensions in the Croton
Coalition from the beginning. One area of disagreement was the Coalition’s tactics in
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opposing filtration. When the Coalition was initially established, they decided to
advocate for “dual track,” i.e., the same policy being implemented in the West of Hudson
watersheds. This policy was that New York City should plan for filtration while doing its
best to avoid the need for filtration by protecting the watershed. But Argenti felt that the
Coalition was opposing any planning for a possible plant, and emphasizing its complete
opposition to filtration. Argenti thought this was a tactical mistake, because it would be
difficult to convince New York City to take the risk of discontinuing the planning. But to
the Bronx contingent, when the Croton Coalition took up chlorine dioxide as an
alternative to filtration, it was the same as arguing for a filtration plant in Jerome Park –
the exact thing they were most concerned about.
Originally they had two positions. We were trying to get dual track. This was like
a holding mechanism. While making plans for the plant, start making plans to
protect the watershed. And when you get to a point where you can’t go back, stop
and evaluate if you have done enough work to protect the watershed. That’s what
they did in Cat-Del and so we asked for the same. And CWCWC took a vote on
it, and then forgot about it. And Marian decided it wasn’t effective. They’re not
being realistic. If you’re going to negotiate, you’ve got to have something to
negotiate with. And then, the real reason the people from the Bronx left, was they
were advocating putting in chlorine dioxide. That would be just another
mechanism to build a filtration plant. And they were putting it in Jerome Park
reservoir. That’s where 50,000 people live! They decided and that was it.
You’re not going to put a filtration plant in my neighborhood! (K.Argenti,
interview, May 6, 2004).
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Of course the watershed activists saw dual track in a different light. For at least
some of them, dual track meant compromising and accepting the inevitability of the
construction of a filtration plant. Paul Moskowitz, the leader from Yorktown, said,
I was very disappointed in Karen Argenti and her associates who left the
Coalition because what they wanted was what they called dual track. And that
meant let’s pick a site for the plant which is not in the Bronx, which is in
Westchester. So that is specifically NIMBY [not in my backyard] and that is their
strategy, a bad one and morally incorrect. It’s indefensible to say to say build it in
somebody else’s backyard, if it’s a bad thing you have to oppose it wherever it is
and that is what we have done consistently. We have gotten the DEP to abandon
plans to build in Yonkers, Yorktown, Jerome Park, Greenburg, and Mt. Pleasant
along Sawmill Parkway. They have constantly had to pick new sites, because
every site they picked, they have had fierce local and regional opposition. And I
think Karen Argenti and her crowd’s strategy of just protecting their piece of turf
in the Bronx is not a good strategy because then you lose regional support. But
you have to talk to her. She may tell you a different story – of course she will. She
is the prime mover behind the Bronx factions which are dedicated now to
convincing the DEP to build this in Westchester County. I don’t think that’s
going to happen (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004).
The spectre of NIMBYism haunted the break-up between the two sides.
Moskowitz defended the watershed contingent, and accused the Bronx contingent of
NIMBYism. In return, Argenti argued that the people from the watershed contingent
were protecting their own interests. In discussing the proposal to treat the water in the

180
Croton Reservoir with alum, she accused the watershed contingent of protecting their
backyard at the expense of hers:
Except for who polluted the water? I didn’t do it. That’s why I’m talking about
responsibility. You polluted it, and I’m going to clean it up in my backyard? So
it’s not a matter of my backyard or theirs, but it’s a matter of who polluted the
water. Who’s the one that built the houses? They want New York City to clean
their water, site the plant, and do everything. And that’s because New York City
has this big bonding facility. We have a lot more people. But the fact of the matter
is we have a lot more people that are poor and we should not be bearing the
burden of cleaning the region’s water. Those people up there need to accept some
of the problems. It’s not a question of my neighborhood or their neighborhood.
It’s their dirty water. It was clean when it started out. You go up to the Great
Swamp and it’s clean (K. Argenti, interview, May 6, 2004).
Along with Argenti, among the active people that left the Croton Coalition over the issue
of advocating for chlorine dioxide were John Klotz and Frank Eadie, original founding
members and Sierra Club leaders. After their departure from the Coalition many of the
Bronx groups seemed to lose interest in advocating for a policy of avoiding filtration.
According to Fay Muir, who lived in Norwood and remained in touch with developments
in the Bronx although she sided with the watershed contingent, the Bronx organizations
that pulled out of the Coalition focused on opposing the siting of the filtration plant
anywhere in the Bronx (F. Muir, interview, December 4, 2001).
The Croton Coalition went on to consult with experts on chlorine dioxide
treatments, and James Roberts completed a report for the Croton Coalition on the
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technology in May, 2003. However, I came across no evidence that the Coalition’s ideas
about chlorine dioxide as an alternative to filtration of the Croton supply were ever
considered by the NYC DEP. This was probably because by the time the Coalition
started to advocate for it, the NYC DEP was firmly committed to the filtration plant and
was focused on obtaining the needed legislation to site the plant at the Mosholu Golf
Course. The issue of alternatives was not reopened during the period of this research,
although there is always the possibility that it will be revisited in the future.
Another factor in the breakdown of the alliance between the watershed groups and
the Bronx groups was a clash of personalities between Rose and Argenti. These two
strong leaders each exerted a great deal of influence on the network of groups on their
side of the divide. However, they were not able to forge a working relationship. One of
the board members described what happened as a breakdown in communication between
the two leaders:
She (Argenti) got fed up, and Marian got less and less sensitive to the problems of
the Bronx, and what it would mean to have a filtration plant built in the Bronx.
And the communications broke down between Karen and Marian. And basically
the history of the CWCWC has been a matter of who was willing to work with
Marian and who wasn’t. That’s the story, and as a result it’s become more and
more a Westchester-focused organization…
Rose was elected president of the Croton Coalition at the first meeting, and her influence
was further enhanced by the financial support she was able to contribute. While the
board members that remained in the Croton Coalition told me that they admired Rose’s
knowledge and leadership, and described her as supportive and seeking consensus, those
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that ended up leaving described her as uncompromising and expecting complete loyalty.
She in turn, described Argenti and her allies as wanting an unreasonable amount of
control over the Coalition.
The idea for the Coalition was Argenti’s, and she brought a whole network of
groups with her that had become allies through the campaign to keep the filtration plant
out of Jerome Park Reservoir. Board members described her to me as the person
everyone listened to in the Bronx on the issue of filtration. At the same time she was
known for “having her own ideas on every issue.” Argenti in turn found the activists from
the watershed communities, whom she tended to refer to as “the environmentalists,”
inflexible and lacking in political savvy. In terms of style, the two were very different.
Argenti was confrontational, while Rose exerted control from behind the scenes. Rose
gained control of the Coalition when the board turned down some of Argenti’s ideas and
she became frustrated enough to quit the Coalition. After she led the Bronx organizations
out of the Coalition, she organized a new coalition in the Bronx to continue the fight
against the filtration plant.
Following the resignation of the Bronx organizations, the character of the Croton
Coalition changed. Although some New York City organizations remained inside the
Coalition, the growth was in the watershed communities. The Croton Coalition started
with 25 member organizations and, despite the loss of the Bronx organizations, by 2004 it
had grown to 40 members. Although the board members from the watershed
communities continued to view the Croton Coalition as an organization representing
citizens of both New York City and the watershed communities, it was clear that the
balance shifted to the watershed.
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Beyond the implications of the dissolution of the alliance for the Croton
Coalition’s political aims, the dissolution raises important questions about the potential of
similar efforts. The idea of a regional coalition seemed so promising, suggesting the
possibility that addressing the problem of water quality at a regional and watershed-wide
scale could resolve conflicts that were not able to be resolved at the local scale. The
experience of the Croton Coalition reminds us that such efforts face many obstacles.
One obstacle faced by the Croton Coalition was charges of NIMBYism As we
have seen, the Croton Coalition activists themselves attributed their internal conflicts to
NIMBYism. Each side accused the other of selfishness and of failing to adequately
appreciate the other’s point of view. They each accused the other side of using the
Coalition merely to gain support for the issues important to their own community. In
remarks to the media, the NYC DEP Commissioner also used the NIMBY term,
characterizing the opposition to the filtration plant as based on NIMBYism (Mulvihill,
2003; DePalma, 2004).
According to Freudenburg and Pastor (1992), early research into the NIMBY
phenomenon can be grouped according to three viewpoints that variously explain
NIMBYism as resulting from public irrationality, selfishness or prudence. They call for
research “turning instead to understanding the broader system that creates victims (and
victimization) in the first place” (p. 51). Taking up this challenge, Burningham (2000)
calls on scholars to distinguish between the use of the term NIMBY as a tactic, and the
motivations of participants in locational conflicts. She points out that, “The attribution of
motives is a key strategy employed by people involved in disputes about local land use”
(p. 5). This is what happened in the filtration controversy, in which the NYC DEP, and
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the two contingents in the Croton Coalition all used the language of NIMBY to try to
discredit their opponents as selfish.
However, Freudenburg and Pastor find that activists in such conflicts may gain
some rewards, but their activity is more accurately described as the “polar opposite” of
selfishness. As in similar cases, the Croton Coalition activists made tremendous
sacrifices to carry on their activities and suffered from hostile attacks by others.
Freudenburg and Pastor suggest that the activists in these kinds of conflicts may be
motivated by “rational selfishness,” and that their activities serve to benefit society as a
whole pp. 48-50). It is also worth noting that a sense of connection to place is an
important motivation for people to protect the environment. The Croton Coalition, with
its ambitious aims to protect the entire Croton watershed, would never have been formed
without this motivation. Political action on behalf of the environment usually begins
when people sense that their environment is threatened at the local scale (Szasz, 1994).
From this beginning, consciousness of the connections between problems of the local
environment and problems at a broader scale can be developed, as happened when Karen
Argenti recognized the connection between the threat to the Jerome Park Reservoir that
was literally on her doorstep and the entire Croton watershed.
In analyzing the significance of accusations of NIMBYism, Burningham also
notes that activists are frequently caught between the need to defend their position as
unselfish (not NIMBY), while at the same time the protection of their own private
interests is the only claim they can make under the legal system. Thus the legal context
forces them into a political position from which they must then defend themselves from
charges of NIMBYism. Similarly enlarging our point of view on NIMBYism, Lake
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(1993) has explained that charges of NIMBYism resulting from locational conflict are
merely symptoms. The deeper problem is the avoidance of fundamental environmental
problems that should be dealt with at the source, and whose negative consequences are
deliberately shifted from capital to communities. The Croton Coalition, which was
formed expressly to reveal the significance of the fundamental problem of pollution and
to propose the solution of prevention, is a good example of the dynamic described by
Lake.
More concretely, the Croton Coalition’s range of options was limited by existing
political opportunities. The Coalition entered the political arena when the filtration plant
was already planned and sited. The Coalition activists were placed in a reactive mode
and they had to take positions within boundaries set by NYC DEP. The two issues of
alum and chlorine dioxide seem like mirror images. One would have impinged on the
watershed communities and one on the Bronx neighborhood. Neither side seemed to see
the other as having a legitimate objection to their position. The challenge to maintaining a
regional perspective was compounded by the fact that political participation in small,
local settings is usually more possible and more effective (Sirianni & Friedland, 2001).
So the member organizations in the watershed communities were able to make more
headway in their communities, while New York City remained resistant to influence on
the policy of watershed protection.
It would be easy to blame personalities for the demise of the alliance. In addition
to the personal styles of the leaders, different orientations based on class and professional
backgrounds probably added to the tensions within the Croton Coalition. Movements
that have social change goals may make more of an effort to deal with these issues

186
directly, viewing the maintenance of the organization and alliance as central to success
(Schlosberg, 1999). Within the Croton Coalition the focus was on the goals and little
attention was paid to building the organization. As a small grassroots citizens’
organization, the Coalition was always on the defensive. Every step was viewed as
having high stakes, choices were limited by the alternatives presented through the policy
process, and the feeling was that there were limited resources to pursue multiple
strategies. The Croton Coalition was unable to overcome all of these great obstacles to
the maintenance of the alliance between the Bronx organizations and the watershed
community organizations.

Fifth Turning Point – Divide and Conquer
Successful litigation by opponents of the filtration plant succeeded in slowing the
momentum of the project on February 8, 2001. On that date the New York State Court of
Appeals decided that construction of the plant at the Mosholu site would require
authorization by the New York State legislature, in the form of an alienation bill allowing
use of parkland for a non-park purpose. Opponents of the plant were optimistic that this
decision would actually derail the plans for the plant at the Mosholu site.
In response to the court’s decision, New York City renegotiated the consent
decree and committed itself to have a plan for construction of a plant at some site by
April 30, 2003. New York City identified two new sites, Eastview and Harlem River,
and began preparing environmental impact statements for these sites. The opponents of
the plant were kept busy for the next two years with the associated hearings at each stage
of the environmental impact statement (EIS) process, while also trying to keep public
interest alive in the Bronx.
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However, as the April, 2003 deadline neared, it became clear that New York City
was focusing on the Mosholu Golf Course site and would try to obtain approval for the
alienation of the parkland. A major obstacle to New York City’s plan was the need for
the support of the Bronx delegations in the City Council and in the New York State
legislature. However, the tradition in the New York State Assembly was that an
alienation bill would only be passed with the support of the member representing the
affected district. Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz, representing the district, was
adamantly opposed to the plant. The Norwood News reported that, in accordance with
tradition, Dinowitz had been assured by Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver that the
alienation bill would not be passed over his objections (Moss, 2000).
On March 20, 2003, in order to circumvent Dinowitz and put pressure on the
Assembly Speaker, Commissioner Christopher Ward of the NYC DEP convened a
meeting with six members of the Bronx Assembly delegation, led by Jose Rivera, at the
Bronx Democratic Party Headquarters. At this meeting Ward apparently offered this
group a financial incentive to support the alienation legislation despite Dinowitz’s
opposition and Assembly tradition. $43 million in mitigation funds for the Bronx had
been discussed prior to this meeting, a standard practice to compensate the surrounding
community for bearing the burden of construction for a public facility. Ward implied that
there would be more money coming. Eventually $243 million was offered, to be directed
toward improvements for parks in the Bronx, to ameliorate the impact of the filtration
plant (Moss, 2003a; Ryan, 2003).
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The offer of over $200 million dollars set off a scramble among the politicians to
determine who would actually get to disburse these funds. Reports of the negotiations
taking place in Albany about who would have the authority to allocate these funds
reinforced the impression that this was a case of pork barrel politics. Governor Pataki
reportedly wanted funds to be allocated to a state park in the Bronx (Roberto Clemente
State Park), and also refused to sign until Mayor Bloomberg agreed that the
Bronx Borough President Carrion would participate in the distribution. The funds would
be part of the expenditures for the filtration plant, financed by revenue bonds issued by
the New York City Water Finance Authority. As such, the funds were outside the regular
New York City budget. This was an extra pot of money available as a result of the
construction of the filtration plant (Kappstatter, 2003; Johnson & McKinley, Jr., 2003).
In order for the New York State legislature to consider the alienation legislation, a
home rule message by the New York City Council requesting such action was required.
This resolution was passed in June, 2003 by a vote of 44 in favor and 4 opposed (Moss,
2003b). Once Council Speaker Gifford Miller called for a leadership vote, requiring
party members to vote as instructed, there was no chance of defeat of the resolution.
Almost the entire Bronx delegation voted for it. Most of these members answered to Jose
Rivera, the Bronx Democratic Party leader who was supporting the plant. The Croton
Coalition, advocates for New York City parks, and other opponents of the filtration plant
were extremely disappointed with the results.
The vote in the New York State Assembly was much closer. The legislation was
passed on June 20, 2003 at 3:00 am, one of the last actions taken in a legislative session
that was supposed to end on June 19. It passed with a vote of 78-68; just two votes more
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than needed for passage. The New York State Senate also passed the bill. Due to the
negotiations over how the $243 million would be spent, Governor Pataki held off on
signing the legislation. For a few weeks after the passage of the alienation bill, the
opponents of the plant held out hope that Governor Pataki would veto the legislation.
However, on July 22, 2003, the Governor signed the bill after Mayor Bloomberg agreed
to all of his demands (Johnson & McKinley, 2003).
Another year passed while the politicians involved decided how the parks money
would be divvied up. When they finally reached agreement in September 2004 the
results were codified in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Assembly
Speaker Silver, Senate Majority Leader Bruno and Mayor Bloomberg.. The MOU was
approved, and allocation of the funds was ratified by the New York City City Council on
September 28, 2004. Concurrently the NYC DEP prepared a supplemental
environmental impact statement (EIS) comparing the Mosholu site to the other two sites
under consideration. New York City had been claiming that no further EIS was needed,
despite changes in the plans, but Governor Pataki made the EIS another condition for his
signature on the alienation legislation. Although New York City had committed to
completing the environmental review of the three sites before making a decision, the
review process seemed pre-determined. Shortly after committing to complete the EIS,
Mayor Bloomberg was quoted as saying that “the EIS is not gonna stop this” (August 28,
2003 Norwood News). The EIS, although viewed as completely inadequate by the
opponents of the plant – and even dishonest in its attempt to prove that the Mosholu site
would be the least expensive for New York City - did keep everyone busy with additional
hearings. The final EIS was issued on June 30, 2004.
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The offer of the mitigation funds for the Bronx parks was the last straw in terms
of the ability of the opponents of the plant to maintain any kind of united front. John
Klotz, the Sierra Club activist and Croton Coalition’s one-time lawyer, described what
happened:
I thought we had an agreement that we would oppose this in front of the
legislature on the grounds of no factory in a park. Very easy, straightforward
message. But the people close to Marian, including the Sierra Club conservation
chair, insisted on arguing no filtration, so we don’t have to build and put it in a
park. Which was a totally ineffective argument at that time. We did not have the
scientific basis that we could go to the legislature and convince them that we were
right. So our goal was to prevent it from being in the park. That should have been
our goal. Its like football. You gotta go 100 yards. You don’t throw a hundred
yard pass every play… (J. Klotz, interview, February 13, 2004).
Paul Sawyer, the director of the Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, was exasperated
by the inability of the opponents of the plant to maintain a unified front. He explained,
The Friends of Van Cortlandt Park say not to put it in the park. The CWCWC
[Croton Coalition] says it does not need to be built. So we would be with the
press, and we would talk about parks. The CWCWC would say that the water is
clean and the problem is the pipes. We would agree that they wouldn’t say that,
and they would say it anyway… There was a New Yorkers for Parks meeting at
the Borough President’s office and Ann Marie Garti (of the Jerome Park
Conservancy) was there. I told Ann Marie, ‘it’s not about filtration. If you bring
it up, it will be divisive.’ And she agreed. Then she made a speech about the
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plant. We all agreed it shouldn’t be built. But why not deeply divided us. And
some people are on both sides! (P. Sawyer, interview, December 10, 2004)
Advocates for the parks were very divided, as New York City seems to have
intended, by the prospect of over $200 million dollars in capital funding for Bronx parks.
The 2003 capital budget for all New York City parks was only $180 million (City of New
York, 2003). Although the Friends of Van Cortlandt Park was continuing to oppose the
plans for the plant, other parks organizations broke ranks. The New York City Parks
Department was enthusiastic about the prospect of the funding, and encouraged
organizations affiliated with parks in the Bronx to support the filtration plant. At a City
Council hearing that I attended on September 15, 2004, I sat next to a representative from
a friends organization that supported one park in the Bronx. She had received a call from
the New York City Parks Department asking her to come to the hearing and support
approval of the Memorandum of Understanding about the mitigation funds. She had no
idea that the funds were related to alienation of land in Van Cortlandt Park. At a Croton
Coalition meeting held in Norwood, Paul Sawyer, director of the Friends of Van
Cortlandt Park said, “…they (residents and parks groups) say it’s a done deal. Park
groups are already working on how to spend the $243 million from the DEP. We need to
get people to understand that it’s a much broader issue” (Croton Coalition, minutes of
meeting, September 17, 2003). The funds were all the more tempting since the Bronx
parks had been receiving a declining level of capital funding, while the funding for parks
in the other boroughs had increased. The reason for this discrepancy was reportedly
because Bronx Borough President Ferrer had not been getting along with Mayor Giuliani
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(P. Sawyer, interview, December 10, 2004). Whatever the reason, the large capital
investment represented by the mitigation funds was a great temptation.
The watershed contingent in the Croton Coalition continued to insist that the plant
should not be built either at the Mosholu Golf Course site in the Bronx, or at the Eastview
site in Westchester. Meanwhile, even before the alienation bill was actually passed by
the New York State legislature, many of the opponents of the plant in the Bronx had
come to the conclusion that the plant was going to be built at one site or another, and they
were speaking out in favor of selection of the Eastview site. A Croton Coalition board
member described this as the consensus in the Bronx in March 2004. The Eastview site
was on a parcel of land already owned by the NYC DEP and isolated from residential
areas. Opponents of the Mosholu Golf Course site referred to the Eastview site as an
“industrial water park,” in order to convey that it was an appropriate place to put the
filtration plant. The problem with the site, from New York City’s point of view, was
two-fold. First, the City would need to pay taxes on the plant because it was outside of
New York City, and second the construction project would be outside the territory of the
New York City construction unions. John Klotz, one of the founders of the Croton
Coalition, supported the choice of the Eastview site in an editorial:
We have benefited from the legacy of those who did think in long-range terms in
creating the city’s park system generations ago. Similarly, the city’s water supply
system is a marvel of our ancestors’ foresight – unique in its expanse,
effectiveness and durability. Shall we now fritter away these legacies?
There is one site that makes eminent sense for all generations: the
Eastview site in Westchester. It is already properly zoned, and more importantly,
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it will not have an adverse impact on park land or nearby residents. Yet because
of political power plays by city-based unions and the Bronx Democratic machine,
the city has sought to downplay the viability of this site and has disingenuously
inflated the cost of its use (Klotz, 2003).
As the EIS process wound down, the Bronx opponents of the plant focused on
Eastview. In February, 2004 a Norwood News editorial encouraged neighborhood
residents to come to a hearing on the EIS and advocate for New York City to choose the
Eastview site. The editorial, titled “Filtration Crossroads,” (2004) followed an article
entitled, “Plant Foes United: ‘Build it in Eastview’.” The article stated: “Though some
local activists argued in the past that the facility was completely unnecessary and worked
together with Westchester and other environmental activists for filtration avoidance,
virtually all opponents of building the plant in the Bronx are now united in the belief that
getting the city, which is under court order to filter the Croton, to pursue that option is
impossible” (Moss, 2004).
In July, 2004, following completion of the Supplemental EIS on the Mosholu site,
New York City announced the selection of the Mosholu site for the second time.
Although the construction of the plant was beginning to seem inevitable, Marian Rose
wrote in an email sent to the Croton Coalition’s supporters shortly after the City’s
decision was announced, “Remember - It's not yet a done deal!” (M. Rose, personal
communication, July, 19, 2004). Four new lawsuits were filed, including one by the
Croton Coalition. At the same time the NYC DEP moved quickly to begin work at the
Mosholu Golf Course site in December, 2004.
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Conclusion
The most significant achievement of the Croton Coalition was the mobilization of
activists in the watershed to protect water quality. As the founders of the Coalition
intended, the Coalition did demonstrate that there was political will in the watershed
communities to undertake this effort. John Klotz, a founder who left the Croton Coalition
and was disappointed by the direction it took, still credited the Coalition with this
accomplishment:
Although we may have to beat this thing in pieces, on the other hand, this is
something where CWCWC and Marian deserve an enormous amount of credit, to
this day, has been the mobilization of people in the watershed themselves. And
the most potent political aspect of this is that people in the watershed have come
to realize that protecting the watershed is the best way for them to preserve their
lifestyle. And that is an important factor. (J. Klotz, interview, February 13,
2004)
Another important aspect of the Coalition’s legacy was a vision of the watershed
as a political entity; a vision put into practice by a network of activists serving as
watchdogs in the watershed. One of the Croton Coalition activists called what they had
accomplished a “citizens dual track.” Ironically, the Coalition’s efforts helped to make
this NYC DEP policy, of protecting the watershed while planning for filtration, more of a
reality. In spite of this incremental success, the Coalition never received the response
that it would have liked to receive from the NYC DEP.
It is reasonable to ask why the Croton Coalition did not have a similar impact on
the level of awareness in New York City of the importance of protecting the watershed.
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Most obviously, the goals of the Coalition were initially focused on mobilizing the
watershed communities. And of course, the New York City groups left the Croton
Coalition quite early on. Most significantly, neither the activists from the watershed
communities nor the New York City activists viewed the Coalition as a vehicle for
mobilizing people in the City. While new organizations in the watershed continued to
join the Coalition, the New York City contingent’s reach never extended much beyond
the northwest Bronx.
The dissolution of the alliance between the organizations from New York City
and those in the watershed was a significant disappointment to the Croton Coalition. The
first Coalition newsletter concluded with the statement: “Requirements of clean water do
not separate but join us” (CWCWC, 1997). Leveraging political influence by joining
together activists in the watershed and in New York City was one of the principal
motivations of the founders of the Croton Coalition. The specific issues over which the
alliance broke apart were discussed above. Before moving on, I think that it is important
to mention the deeper reasons for the dissolution of the Coalition because they point to
the challenging context within which the Coalition operated.
As we have seen, both the Croton Coalition activists and their opponents used the
language of NIMBY to explain both the motivations for the establishment of the
Coalition and the reasons for its demise. And in fact, differences over priorities and
tactics stemming from different perspectives did play a role in the dissolution of the
alliance. However, the formation and history of the Coalition also reveal the unfolding of
an awareness of connection between local concerns and concerns about the watershed as
a whole. The activists saw their efforts as an example of NIABY (not in anyone’s
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backyard) overcoming NIMBY, and stressed how a desire to protect their own
community eventually opened their eyes to the threats to the watershed and the water
supply. In fact, the issue of clean water is both a local and a regional issue, and must be
addressed simultaneously at varying scales. The tension between goals at these different
scales was played out in the policy positions that the Coalition took and the difficulties
that the Coalition faced in trying to balance the different concerns of each group.
Specifically, the Coalition struggled with balancing the local and immediate need of the
Bronx contingent to avert the siting of the filtration plant, with the conviction of the
watershed groups that a filtration plant in any location would compromise their goals for
watershed protection.
Regarding the specific issue of the filtration plant, the Croton Coalition played a
part in the wider effort to stop the plant primarily through a strategy of delay. As Paul
Moskowitz, a Coalition board member explained, “One environmental strategy is the
longer you can keep them from doing something bad, or wrong, the better you are.
Because once they do it, it is all over. So the longer you can keep them the more chance
another solution will present itself” (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004). The
Coalition’s lawsuit on alienation was combined with suits brought by other organizations,
and did succeed in delaying the construction of the plant for several years. However, it is
not clear that it was the Coalition’s efforts that made the difference. The Coalition
continued to struggle to attract media attention for its argument. The New York Times
supported the construction of the plant as a “win-win” for New York City and the Bronx
(“Forward on Filtration,” 2003). As of 2004, the plant was under construction. While
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the Croton Coalition and other groups were still attempting to stop the plant by legal
means, the Coalition had not succeeded in forestalling construction of the plant.
The Croton Coalition’s history, the policy positions it took, the tactics it adopted,
and its internal development, are revealing of the nature of urban environmental
challenges. In trying to preserve the watershed, a critical natural resource, the Coalition
was forced to address a series of interconnected issues to do with open space in the
suburbs, urban parks, transportation and wastewater treatment. Questions of
environmental justice in an inner city neighborhood, and between it and other locations,
issues affecting the quality of life in suburban areas, and issues of infrastructure were
intertwined with more “traditional” environmental issues of the preservation of natural
areas and ecosystems.
Given the different people and range of issues involved, perhaps it was inevitable
that the Croton Coalition was unable to satisfy all of its members. As it engaged in the
political process, the Coalition found itself trying to reconcile contradictory policies, such
as advocacy of alternative technologies like water treatment with alum or chlorine
dioxide, with its stated policy of prevention instead of more treatment. The policy that
brought the members together, and had the possibility of satisfying all, was the most
radical one – prevention of the need for filtration. But maintaining a pure position was
impossible in the face of the need to respond to immediate threats, including a virtual
bribe by the New York City administration. Every compromise alienated one or another
constituency. So the Coalition faced a classic problem of coalition politics, the need to
balance seeking the achievable with the ideal.
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The Croton Coalition took the lead in advocating for a radical rethinking of how
New York City protects water quality. It faced numerous obstacles, including the
significant obstacle of poor timing. As we have seen, the Coalition was formed after the
policy of filtration for the Croton had been decided within the New York City
administration. This policy was reinforced when the New York City Memorandum of
Agreement was negotiated, and a site the filtration plant had already been selected.
Although the opposition to the siting in Jerome Park Reservoir prompted the New York
City administration to reconsider alternatives to filtration, there is no evidence that there
was any political will in the New York City government to seriously pursue an alternative
policy. In the next chapter I will situate the Croton Coalition within the environmental
movement, and explore how and why the Coalition’s stance contrasted with that of other
organizations involved in advocacy around the New York City water system.
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Chapter 4: The Croton Coalition’s Role in the Filtration
Controversy
In those days the status of the Croton was that everybody agreed that it needed to
be filtered. And in fact Kennedy and NRDC, I guess those were the big players at
that point, used the Croton as an example of what was wrong with the way the
City was managing the watershed and it was a bad example of what can go wrong
if you don’t take care of a watershed, and the need therefore to get serious about
managing the Cat-Del [watersheds]. …So I assumed like everybody else that if
Kennedy said it was so, Eric Goldstein said it was so, the City and State and Feds
said it was so, it must be. We didn’t focus very much on the Croton in those days
[prior to formation of CWCWC]. (F. Eadie, interview, March 12, 2004)

Introduction
The Croton Coalition played a unique role in the controversy over filtration as the
principal and most active organization to take a policy position against filtration for the
Croton water supply. In Chapter 2 I argued that the Coalition’s position reflected the
growing pervasiveness of environmental ideas in American society, and more specifically
what has come to be known as the precautionary principle. We have seen that the
Coalition’s position against filtration was also strategic, necessitated by the need to adopt
a position that would prevent the siting of a filtration plant in any community in the
Bronx as well as protect the watershed communities from unwanted development.
Although I have argued that the Croton Coalition’s position reflected an
environmental perspective, the most prominent environmental organizations involved in
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advocacy about the New York City water system did not take this position. Obviously,
the Croton Coalition was formed specifically to advocate for alternatives to filtration.
However, other organizations were also concerned with some of the same issues as the
Croton Coalition, and had been involved in watershed issues before the Coalition was
formed. Why did none of them take up this issue? Their lack of involvement left a
vacuum, which the formation of the Croton Coalition filled. This chapter answers this
question by locating the Croton Coalition in the environmental movement and by
contrasting the Croton Coalition’s role in the filtration controversy with that of the
environmental organizations most involved in monitoring and advocating for the New
York City water supply system.
In Chapter 2 I argued that the Croton Coalition played a unique role because it
was a grassroots organization, free to take a relatively radical position, as well as because
its constituency was from both New York City and the watershed communities. In this
chapter I elaborate this argument and illustrate it by contrast with the other environmental
organizations. I will describe the relationships between the Croton Coalition and these
organizations because they help us to understand the unique position of the Croton
Coalition in the filtration controversy.
The Croton Coalition was an example of a grassroots, place-based oppositional
organization with an environmental agenda. As such it was part of an explosion of
thousands of such organizations that emerged in communities across the country in the
late 1970’s and continued in the following decades. These included organizations
prompted by such things as newly discovered toxic landfills, opposition to siting of
incinerators and their threat of future pollution, environmental racism, and advocacy for
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protection of local water bodies and watersheds (Hays, 1987; Freudenberg & Steinsapir,
1992; Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002).
New issues and new definitions of environmentalism emerged from these
organizations, which had in common that they were place-based and recognized the
limitations of the national environmental organizations’ dependence on the
environmental policy system. These organizations expanded the range of issues
considered in the environmental movement to urban problems. Beginning with the
problems caused by waste, these movements also developed a critique of the political
economy of capitalism and the contributions of industry, technology, and science to
environmental problems. They contributed the urgency of the voices of victims and
demanded participation in the decision-making process about how to respond to
environmental problems. The Croton Coalition was a manifestation of the kind of placebased activism that characterized the toxics, environmental justice and watershed
movements. As such it was situated within this grassroots sector of the environmental
movement.
The interests and positions of these new, grassroots organizations grew out of
their diverse constituencies. The unique role of the Croton Coalition in the filtration
controversy stemmed from its makeup as a coalition. The diversity of the people in the
Coalition in terms of their communities, backgrounds, race and class seems to have
created the possibility for the Coalition to develop a new position – combining concerns
that are not usually combined - around which they could all unite. The Croton Coalition’s
make-up allowed its leaders to see and articulate the connections between the concerns of
New York City residents and residents of the communities located within the New York
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City watershed. The New York City residents were concerned about the siting of the
plant and the impact of its cost, and the watershed residents were concerned about sprawl
and its impact on both the character of their communities and the quality of their own
water supplies. The Croton Coalition identified the need for watershed protection as
common ground.

National Environmental Organizations
In order to begin examining the contrast between the Croton Coalition’s unique
role in the filtration controversy and that of the significant environmental organizations
involved, I will briefly review the organizational development of the environmental
movement in the United States. Most accounts of the environmental movement in the
United States describe its beginnings in the conservation movement dating to the 1870’s.
These accounts posit the 1960’s as the period in which the movement turned toward
broader environmental approaches. Long-established, national conservation-oriented
organizations such as the Sierra Club, which played a key role in formation of the Croton
Coalition, defined American environmentalism up until the 1960s. They were primarily,
although not exclusively, concerned with preservation of wilderness areas.
During the 1960’s public concern about environmental problems increased. The
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 is often described as a turning point
in terms of public awareness of the problems created by the post-World War II increase
in the production and disposal of synthetic chemicals. The first Earth Day, which took
place in 1970, is identified as a culminating point to this process (Mertig, Dunlap &
Morrison, 2002). According to Hays (1987), “Earth Day was as much a result as a cause.
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That event came after a decade or more of evolution in attitudes and programs without
which it would not have been possible.”
Scholarship presents a picture of the expansion of a more complex environmental
agenda, a more diverse constituency, and the intensification of activism beginning with
the 1970’s (Hays, 1987; Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002). Hays explains that the
“years between 1965 and 1972 constituted the second phase in environmental politics,
when concern for pollution took its place alongside the earlier-arisen interest in naturalenvironment areas” (pp. 52-55). The late 1960’s and 1970’s brought emergence of a
second wave of activist national organizations with different concerns about the
interaction of people and their environments. Among these organizations were the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF,
later known as Environmental Defense).
NRDC was established in 1970 with the assistance of the Ford Foundation as a
public interest law firm focusing on scientific expertise and legal strategies. NRDC was
involved in water issues from the beginning, including litigation under the Clean Water
Act regarding control of toxic water pollutants starting in the 1970s (Gottlieb, 1988;
Hays, 1987). NRDC was one of the two most visible organizations in New York City
focused on the watershed in the period discussed in the current research. EDF was
established in 1967 with similar goals to those of NRDC. EDF’s report regarding toxic
chemicals in the water supply of New Orleans, issued in 1974, is credited with
influencing the United States Congress to pass the Safe Drinking Water Act of that year
(Hays, 1987). EDF, known for its cooperation with the business sector and for
maintaining its distance from grassroots groups, was also involved in local water politics
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in New York City. James Tripp, a prominent EDF staff member, served on the New
York City Water Board which was one of the agencies that oversaw the water system’s
finances (Gottlieb,1993; Dowie,1996).
During the 1980s the membership and resources of both the older and newer
national environmental organizations expanded significantly in response to the Reagan
administration’s attack on the environmental policy achievements of the 1970’s. A group
of the national organizations (National Wildlife Federation, Izaak Walton League,
National Audobon Society, Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, NRDC, EDF,
Environmental Policy Center, Friends of the Earth, National Parks and Conservation
Association) attracted increased media attention, and became identified as the Group of
Ten. These organizations were large national organizations that were involved in
lobbying and litigation focused on the federal government, had national name
recognition, and substantial memberships and budgets (Gottlieb, 1993; Cable & Cable,
1995). While these organizations were soon to become the focus of criticism for their
perceived elitism, national focus, and lack of interest in nurturing grassroots involvement,
it should be noted that they varied considerably in the extent to which they engaged with
local communities. For example, NRDC was always involved in local issues in New
York City. And the Sierra Club was made up of both a professional, nationally focused
office and quite independent local chapters. Conflict between the professionals and
volunteers occured regularly, and open conflict had been known to break out between the
national Sierra Club and the New York City Group (Gottlieb, 1993).
As networking to solve local urban habitat problems expanded in the 1970’s and
the following decades, grassroots activists began to criticize the approach of the large,
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national organizations as reform incrementalism. Elitism, bureaucratization,
professionalization, and compromise as a result of participation in the “environmental
policy system” were identified as characteristics of these organizations (Brulle, 2000;
Cable & Cable, 1995; Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002). These characteristics were
viewed as negative influences that constrained the mainstream organizations from
challenging harmful activities of government and industry. Critics also charged these
organizations with cooptation as a result of the “revolving door” through which their
professional employees moved into government and industry (Dowie, 1996; Gottlieb,
1993; Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002).
As I have previously noted, there were three national environmental organizations
that were significantly involved in the Croton filtration issue. These organizations were
the Sierra Club, NRDC, and Riverkeeper. All three organizations had a history of
involvement in issues affecting the New York City watershed and water supply system
and devoted significant resources to these issues. The Sierra Club and NRDC were
members of the Group of Ten organizations known for their national focus. But in this
case, the Sierra Club’s policies and activities were determined by the Club’s Atlantic
Chapter and New York City Group which were led by volunteers. NRDC was founded
and located in New York City, and had long been involved in issues affecting New York
City’s water. Riverkeeper was a regional organization with a professional staff focused
on the Hudson River watershed. I will describe the relationships between the Croton
Coalition and these organizations because these relationships help us to understand the
unique position of the Croton Coalition in the filtration controversy.
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Sierra Club
The first of these three national environmental organizations was the Sierra Club.
The Sierra Club was an ally of the Croton Coalition and an important source of activists
and resources at the time that the Coalition was formed in 1997. While the Sierra Club
had a large professional staff, and was active on the Washington lobby scene, it was also
a grassroots organization controlled at the local level by volunteers. When the Croton
Coalition was founded it drew heavily from the store of social capital accrued by the
Sierra Club (see Sirianni & Friedland, 2001 on social capital accrued by the
environmental movement). As we have seen, Frank Eadie, a Sierra Club leader, initiated
the process that led to the formation of the Croton Coalition. Eadie introduced Karen
Argenti, who was a leader of the fight against the siting of the filtration plant in Jerome
Park Reservoir, to Marian Rose. Rose, who became the president of the Croton
Coalition, was the conservation chairperson for the Sierra Club’s Atlantic Chapter. The
Sierra Club’s Atlantic Chapter also formally adopted the policy that New York City
should try to avoid filtration for the Croton. Describing the Sierra Club’s policy, Eadie
said, “we were going out on our own” as far as the environmental community was
concerned since no other environmental organization had taken a position on this issue
(F. Eadie, interview, March 12, 2004).
In addition to seasoned and knowledgeable activists, the Sierra Club provided
other resources that helped get the Croton Coalition off the ground. The Sierra Club
provided some initial start-up funds for the Croton Coalition’s legal activities and served
as a conduit for financial contributions. After the Croton Coalition was founded, the
Sierra Club continued to remain active on the issue of filtration. The Sierra Club New
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York City Group even procured some grant funds from the National Sierra Club to
support its campaign against filtration. When the legislation permitting alienation of the
Mosholu Golf Course site was considered in 2003, the Sierra Club’s Atlantic Chapter
provided assistance in lobbying the City Council and the New York State Legislature (F.
Eadie, interview, March 12, 2004; D. Ferguson, interview, December 23, 2005; J.
Stouffer, interview, December 21, 2005).
Although the Sierra Club’s efforts on the Croton filtration issue were local and
volunteer directed, some of the constraints that limited the efforts of the national,
bureaucratized environmental organizations were on the mind of at least one Sierra Club
leader. John Klotz, one of the founders of the Croton Coalition who also took the lead in
the Coalition’s early litigation, felt some ambivalence about opposing filtration because
he felt that it might undermine the Sierra Club’s position on other regulatory issues
related to the protection of the public from pollution:
In any event they (EPA) have these standards. There are issues about some of
them. And the Sierra Club, in my opinion, is in a real bind. We have to recognize
that they are claiming that the byproducts of chlorination can cause cancer and
birth defects. We have a difficult time, in my opinion, and I think the national
club has a difficult time, tying ourselves to the bulldozers on this issue when that
is outstanding. Frank (Eadie) said the standards are unrealistic … and I told
Frank the Sierra Club will never argue for lesser standards. We can’t. If we start
arguing for lesser standards here, it’s like the thread being pulled on a sweater, the
whole environmental position…they are always telling us that our standards,
we’re pushing the standards too high…so we’re in a bind. And you wind up
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looking, and all of a sudden one of your allies is the chlorine industry – oy!
They’re the prime culprit and all of a sudden they are our big buddies… So it’s a
real serious problem there which people like to kind of overlook, but at some
point you have to face it. (J. Klotz, interview, February 13, 2004)
Although the Sierra Club remained an ally of the Croton Coalition in opposing
filtration, and probably one of the most significant ones due to its resources, recognition
and status, its participation was inconsistent. The Club’s efforts suffered from turnover
in volunteer leadership, and staff support that was divided among many different issues.
Marian Rose was the Sierra Club’s most active local leader on watershed issues. After
she turned her attention to the Croton Coalition the Club was less engaged in watershed
issues (J. Stouffer, interview, December 21, 2005). The new Sierra Club volunteer who
took the lead on the filtration issue had difficulty maintaining relationships with both the
Bronx contingent and the Croton Coalition. Thus, although it was the Coalition’s closest
ally among the three national environmental organizations involved in the New York City
water system, the Sierra Club did not play a strong, consistent role in the conflict over
filtration.

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
A second national environmental organization, the NRDC, was involved with
drinking water issues at the national level and had been involved in New York City water
issues since its founding in 1970. Eric Goldstein, who led NRDC’s efforts in this area,
was one of the two most visible advocates for New York City water. Along with Robert
Kennedy, of Riverkeeper, he was often quoted in the media. Illustrative of NRDC’s
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important role in advocacy for New York City water was that the first meeting to
organize the Croton Coalition took place at NRDC’s headquarters.
When the Croton Coalition began to challenge the need for filtration for the
Croton watershed, the leaders of the Coalition hoped that NRDC would join them.
NRDC, unlike Riverkeeper, was not a signer of the New York City Watershed
Memorandum of Agreement, and Eric Goldstein had criticized the terms of that
agreement. At first NRDC did not declare itself on the issue of filtration for the Croton.
But in May 2003, NRDC made a public statement in favor of filtration (Johnson, 2003).
This was seen as a significant betrayal by many opponents of the filtration plant, and was
especially galling because the timing of the statement was interpreted as support for the
siting of the filtration plant at the Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park. This
incident is representative of the conflicts that can arise between national, more
bureaucratized environmental organizations and grassroots organizations based on
different priorities, scales of operation and organizational maintenance considerations
(Dowie, 1996).
In 2003, when NRDC made this public statement, NYC DEP was trying to
procure approval to build the filtration plant at the Mosholu Golf Course site in Van
Cortlandt Park. This required approval of alienation legislation by the New York State
Legislature. As we saw in Chapter 3, New York City was not assured of obtaining this
legislation. According to Goldstein, NRDC was approached by NYC DEP
Commissioner Christopher Ward with a request to support the need for filtration of the
Croton water supply. Goldstein believed that the NYC DEP had “botched the public
relations” of filtration by consistently maintaining that the Croton water supply was
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meeting water quality standards and failing to put the public on notice about the need for
filtration in the future. Goldstein told Commissioner Ward that the NYC DEP needed to
make a clear scientific case that filtration was necessary. In response, the NYC DEP
issued a “white paper” justifying the need for filtration. NRDC asked ten water quality
scientists to review this paper. According to Goldstein, eight water quality scientists
responded and endorsed the need for filtration of the Croton. In explaining his position to
me, Goldstein said:
…I love these groups (like the Croton Coalition) and what they stand for in terms
of watershed protection. I wish it were possible to have found a way in which it
were not necessary to filter this, but ultimately we have to listen to the
predominant view of the scientific community which was that from a public
health standpoint it was necessary that the system be filtered. (Eric Goldstein,
interview, June 20, 2005)
Goldstein emphasized to me that NRDC’s position was based on the “scientific
consensus” and the “precautionary principle.”
NRDC’s statement, which was joined by Environmental Defense and the League
of Conservation Voters, was announced by the NYC DEP in a context that suggested that
the three organizations supported building the filtration plant at the Mosholu Golf Course
site in Van Cortlandt Park. Goldstein denied that it had been the intention of NRDC to
support the specific site in Van Cortlandt Park. Goldstein told others that he was angry at
the Commissioner for making it look like NRDC supported the site (Eadie, interview,
March, 12, 2004). But Goldstein told me merely that he felt it was unfortunate that it had
been made to appear that NRDC supported the siting. He emphasized that NRDC does
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not take a position on siting issues, and that he hoped that the community near the site
would be treated fairly. But others felt it was clear that NRDC had supported the siting.
John Stouffer, the Sierra Club’s Atlantic Chapter Legislative Director, said that NRDC
did not participate in the coalition of organizations that lobbied the state legislature in
opposition to the passage of the alienation legislation that would allow the Mosholu Golf
Course site to be used, and that NRDC’s support had definitely facilitated the siting.
NRDC and the other two organizations’ official position may have been neutral on the
siting, but it “translated as support” (J.Stouffer, interview, December 21, 2005). The
Croton Coalition activists derided the NYC DEP’s May 2003 white paper justifying
filtration as a fluff piece lacking in scientific data and even footnotes. They characterized
the NRDC’s scientific review as being purely for political cover, since they felt that no
scientist could make a reasonable determination about the filtration issue on the basis of
such a report.
It is important to note that at other times the Croton Coalition worked together
with NRDC. As we have seen in regard to the Sierra Club, NRDC had resources that the
Croton Coalition lacked, such as relationships with the NYC DEP and credibility with the
media. The Coalition credited NRDC’s intervention with forestalling an expansion of
Route 120, a road which passes over the Kensico Reservoir, a critically important issue of
watershed protection. The Kensico is the terminal reservoir for the West of Hudson
system, which means that most of New York City’s water passes through it. Although it
contains water from the Catskill and Delaware systems, the Kensico is located in
Westchester County within the Croton watershed. Paul Moskowitz, the Croton Coalition
activist, described NRDC’s role in that case:
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The DOT [New York State Department of Transportation] wanted to make Route
120 from a little country lane into a highway, which would have just helped the
cause of development along the shores of the reservoir, aside from the polluting of
the highway directly. And it was the watershed coalition [the Croton Coalition]
that started the opposition. When the DOT first started hearings, we were the
people who showed up, and then the Riverkeeper, and then NRDC, and
eventually it was the intervention of the NRDC which really helped. It’s been
very difficult for us, as the watershed coalition, to get national groups like the
NRDC on our side, because they bought the argument that the Croton water needs
to be filtered. They appear to have, although we are still working on bringing
them around… (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004)
The cooperation over this issue illustrated the collaborative relationship between
NRDC and the Croton Coalition, but also that NRDC was primarily interested in the
success of filtration avoidance for the West of Hudson watersheds. As an organization
involved at the regional scale, and concerned with the entire New York City water
system, NRDC’s first priority was the West of Hudson watershed which provided most of
New York City’s water and for which New York City had secured a filtration avoidance
determination. NRDC, as an organization that had been involved in lobbying for the
federal water laws under which filtration was required, may have also weighed its
commitment to implementation of these laws at the national scale in making its decisions.
As noted above, NRDC had been involved in water quality water issues at the national
level since its founding in the 1970’s. In November 1977, an NRDC publication entitled
Our Children at Risk, stated that drinking water was one of the five worst environmental
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threats to children’s health. And in June 2003, NRDC published an analysis of problems
with drinking water entitled, What’s on Tap: Grading Drinking Water in US Cities. The
relationship between NRDC and the Croton Coalition is an example of the multiple levels
of relationships between national, bureaucratized environmental organizations and
grassroots organizations, as well as of how the different characteristics of these
organizations may lead to their adoption of opposing policy positions.

Grassroots Anti-toxics and Environmental Justice Movements
In contrast to the Sierra Club and NRDC, which were national, professionalized
organizations, we can situate the Croton Coalition within the large number of grassroots
environmental organizations that emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century.
Scholars variously define this phenomenon as beginning in the 1970’s (Andrews &
Edwards, 2005 citing Carmin, 1999) or the 1980’s and 1990’s (Glazer & Glazer, 1998;
Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002). The emergence of these grassroots organizations
came to the attention of the wider national public in 1978 following media attention to
the issue of hazardous wastes at Love Canal, a working class white community, in upstate
New York. As similar conflicts over hazardous wastes erupted across the country, the
Love Canal issue came to be viewed as the symbolic origin of the anti-hazardous wastes
or anti-toxics movement. Then, in 1982, the issue of disposal of toxic waste containing
polychlorinated biphynels (PCB’s) in a landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, a
black community, became the focus of community opposition. This conflict was viewed
as the symbolic origin of the environmental justice movement. McGurty (2000) explores
a series of reasons why this conflict became symbolic, including that the terminology of
environmental justice received media attention for the first time, and that this conflict
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inspired a spate of research regarding environmental injustice that documented the extent
of the problem. The watershed movement, also of relevance to our case study, expanded
in a similarly impressive fashion during this period and will be discussed separately. The
role of Riverkeeper, the third environmental organization most involved in the filtration
issue, will be discussed in relation to the watershed movement.
Scholars offer different interpretations of the roots and development of the antitoxics and environmental justice movements as well as of the relationships between them.
Some emphasize the distinctions between these movements’ constituencies. The antitoxics movement was made up primarily of organizations established in working, lower
and lower-middle class white communities. The term environmental justice was adopted
by organizations of people of color. In Chapter 1 I have described the roots of this
movement in protests against environmental conditions that stemmed from racial
oppression, or were tolerated due to the racial composition of the affected community.
As we have seen, siting of noxious facilities in communities of people of color has been
an important issue for environmental justice activists and is an important issue in the
current case. Some scholars also describe the environmental justice movement’s societal
critique as more extensive as a result of the sub-altern position and awareness of its
members (Di Chiro, 1998). Both movements have engaged women in far greater
numbers, and more frequently in leadership roles, than the national environmental
organizations (Freudenberg & Steinsapir, 1992; Gottlieb, 1993).
Other scholars see the two movements as components of one grassroots
movement or sector that encompasses resistance to various manifestations of
environmental injustice (Szasz, 1994; Brown & Masterson-Allen, 1994; Dryzek, 1997;
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Gottlieb, 1993; Mertig, Dunlap & Morrison, 2002). These scholars offer varying
interpretations of the significance of the movement. Freudenberg and Steinsapir (1992)
identify four principles or beliefs that were shared by the grassroots organizations. These
were: (1) strong belief in the right of citizen participation in decision-making; (2) human
health rather than wilderness preservation as the primary concern; (3) an ambivalent
attitude toward scientific expertise; and (4) questioning the belief that economic growth
ultimately benefits everyone. For example, Szasz (1994) views it as the latest
manifestation in American history of opposition to business and big government. He
calls it radical environmental populism, distinguishing it from other kinds of
environmentalism. Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg (1996) see it as an expression of
local communities attempting to assert their democratic rights as citizen-workers. Gould,
Schnaiberg and Weinberg emphasize that local community organizations protesting
environmental injustices may include people of diverse social locations, even including
investors and employees of large corporations who participate as local citizens. They
suggest that it is thus inaccurate to identify this movement as populist. Their insight is
relevant to the Croton Coalition which encompassed this kind of diversity.
In any case, the organizations that made up the grassroots movement generally
did not identify themselves with the environmental movement. The leaders of grassroots
organizations distanced themselves from what they perceived as the narrow agenda and
demographics of the national environmental organizations (Mix & Cable, 2004). White
(1996) described this distance in a now classic essay entitled, “‘Are You an
Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’ Work and Nature.” Concerned with
issues that affected their communities directly, the leaders of grassroots organizations
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worried that the label of environmentalism would marginalize them (Tesh, 2000). This
was despite the fact that many of their arguments and allies were drawn from the
environmental movement. Similarly, David Ferguson said of the Croton Coalition,
Of course we are an environmental group, but we don’t really like to be called
that. I come from housing, which is environmental justice because people have a
right to have a home. We have community groups. Suzanne is connected with
the NAACP… Environmentalists are seen as an interest group, but we can’t
separate it from life. We’ve got to think of it in a larger way...saying you’re an
environmentalist boxes you in. When you say you’re an environmentalist, people
say “that’s great,” meaning that they’re glad you’re taking care of it. …It’s
dangerous to disassociate the environment from everything else. …We’re not
focused on spotted owls, we’re focused on the whole enchilada (D. Ferguson,
interview, December 23, 2005).
As we have seen, some of the Croton Coalition activists from Westchester similarly
distanced themselves from the environmentalist label. Paul Moskowitz, the board
member from Yorktown, called himself a community activist (P. Moskowitz, interview,
April 4, 2004). These comments echo the environmental justice movement’s mantra that
the environment is where people “live, work and play” (DiChiro, 1996).
In addition to the issue of their relationship to the national environmental
organizations which we have already begun to explore in this chapter, the grassroots
organizations had two characteristics of particular relevance to this case study. These
two characteristics are the place-based nature of grassroots activism and the grassroots
organizations’ critique of the industrial production system.
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Regarding the first characteristic, in contrast to the national environmental
organizations, the grassroots environmental movement was made up of organizations that
emerged out of local, place-based struggles. Activists have emphasized, and scholars
have also noted, that a sense of attachment to place and concern for its protection or
defense is a motive force of environmental activism (Hays, 1987, p529). The centrality
of this motive is a major distinction between the policies and strategies of national,
professionalized environmental organizations and grassroots organizations. As Harvey
(1999) notes, the division between the established, bureaucratic, national organizations
and the environmental justice movement “reflects class, race and gender. It also reflects
an intense politics of place versus the more abstract politics of the mainstream
environmental movement” (p. 158).
The personal connection to place provides a powerful impetus for activism. Some
activists have contrasted single-issue activism with place-based activism, describing
place-based activism as more holistic, melding environmental, social and political
concerns (Shutkin, 2000). This place-based activism has been a factor in the growth of
what has been called community-based environmentalism or civic environmentalism
(other factors are the complexity of addressing a diffuse source of pollution and
devolution as a response to resistance to regulation expressed by politically influential
polluters). These are policy-making efforts that promote collaborative, individualized
solutions to environmental problems involving land-use for specific places (Kemmis,
1990; Shutkin, 2000; Landy, Susman & Knopman, 1999). The phenomenon of local
political reactions against threats to places has provoked scholarly study of the
significance of place (Relph, 1996). Understanding of this phenomenon is informed by
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research by environmental psychologists about perception of place, place attachment and
place identity (Chawla, 1992; Low and Altman, 1992; Proshansky, Fabian & Kaminoff,
1983). The connection to place has also received attention from conservation
psychologists concerned with how to increase the public’s involvement in protection of
the environment (Cantrill & Myers, 2003). The field of environmental education also has
explored how to strengthen students’ connections to places for the purpose of motivating
environmental activism (Thomashaw, 2002).
Activists and scholars both note that place-based activism does not mean
parochial activism. As discussed in Chapter 3, place-based activism is often denigrated as
NIMBYism. However accounts of the grassroots toxics and environmental justice
movements stress that activists frequently reach the conclusion that fighting off the siting
of a noxious facility only to see it be sited elsewhere is not a satisfactory solution. The
politics of NIABY grew out of this realization (Szasz, 1994). The Croton Coalition drew
its strength from the commitment of its activists to their local places, whether in the
Bronx or in the watershed counties, as we saw in Chapter 3. But from the first, the
Coalition also struggled with the implications of what it meant to protect the multiple
places to which its activists were committed.
Regarding the environmental critique of the industrial production system, an
important contribution of the grassroots movement was its focus on urban environmental
problems. These problems, and various attempts to address them, were not new. But in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century they had been defined as issues of public
and occupational health. In the early years of the twentieth century these issues had
become the purview of public health professionals and other specialists (Gottlieb, 1993;
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Steinberg, 2002). Consequently, the national environmental organizations that grew out
of the conservation movement did not include urban issues within their purview. By
focusing grassroots efforts on the environmental problems confronted in everyday life,
the grassroots movement redefined environmentalism and opened the door for
environmental activism directed toward problems of urban water supplies and suburban
watersheds such as those that were the focus of the controversy over filtration (Gottlieb,
1993; Greenberg, 2000).
Drawing on the work of earlier movements to improve public health and reduce
the negative effects of industry, the grassroots organizations were influenced by new
critiques of industrial production, the influence of technology in society, and capitalist
political economy by important figures such as Ralph Nader and Barry Commoner.
Nader and Commoner, among others, provided the movement with a coherent analysis of
the sources of waste and a framework for understanding the connection between ecology
and the specific threats to human well-being (Gottlieb, 1993). The combination of these
ideas with the practical necessity of establishing a politics that did not pit communities
against each other, resulted in a growing commitment to pollution prevention as the
solution to the problems of waste disposal. Szasz (1994) credits the grassroots
environmental movement with significantly advancing the cause of pollution prevention
through its tactics of increasing the costs and risks of waste producers. This was
achieved despite minimal progress in instituting federal policies to address these
problems. Grassroots activists found that the mere threat of protest, litigation, and
increased regulation persuaded producers to improve their practices. The Croton
Coalition applied these ideas about prevention to water pollution and made the practical
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point that prevention could provide an opportunity to avoid the dilemma of where to site
the undesirable filtration facility. However, as we have seen, it turned out to be difficult
to apply these ideas to the issue of drinking water filtration which is usually viewed
purely as a public health measure and not as an environmental issue.

Watershed Movement
As we have seen, the Croton Coalition shared some of the concerns and
characteristics of both anti-toxics and environmental justice organizations. In addition,
the Coalition’s focus on watershed protection placed it within another sector of the
environmental movement - the watershed movement. This movement expanded rapidly
in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Based on the directory of the River Network, an organization
that supports watershed organizations, there were some 3600 watershed associations in
the United States in 2000 (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz & Mete, 2002; Griffin, 2000).
Although this movement has not attracted the same degree of attention from scholars of
the environmental movement, it should also be viewed as expression of grassroots
environmentalism alongside the anti-toxics and environmental justice movements.
Like anti-toxics and environmental justice organizations, watershed organizations
have a place-based focus, although they define their area of activity as a water body or
watershed rather than a neighborhood or community. Bio-regionalism was one source of
inspiration for this movement. As Nelson and Weschler (2001) explain, “This
perspective sees the watershed as an organic boundary for community life, stresses the
intrinsic value of natural places, and aims at preservation and restoration of natural
systems. The bioregional approach also affirms spiritual and cultural dimensions of
place. This approach is partly aesthetically appreciative and interpretive, but also critical
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and transformative in its use of these symbols as ways to see beyond the empirical,
instrumental aspects of place” (p. 16). Historically, the watershed movement can be seen
as a grassroots response to urban sprawl and suburbanization (Woolley, McGinnis and
Kellner, 2002). The degradation of water bodies and water quality are one of the effects
of sprawl that threaten everyday life in communities. (For a fascinating account of the
reaction of suburban residents to water quality problems, see Rome, 2001.) The
watershed movement is motivated by hopes that regionally-based approaches can be
more successful at protecting ecosystems than are piece-meal approaches that
characterize more conventional management efforts.
Although research on watershed activism remains sparse, studies of watershed
organizations in various states and regions have begun to form a picture of these groups
(Cline & Collins, 2002; Griffin, 2000; Wooley, McGinnis & Kellner, 2000; Draeger,
2001). A study of watershed organizations in California concluded that watershed
activists “tend to be rooted in particular places and are politically active. We find that
values shape the role of science in planning and decision making. Watershed activism
should be understood as the politics of place. The politics of watershed organizations
includes a place-based sensibility with “situated” scientific understanding” (Wooley,
McGinnis & Kellner, 2002, p. 135). The watershed movement may properly be viewed
as part of an expansion of citizen participation that resulted from the new rights included
in the environmental legislation of the 1970’s such as the National Environmental Policy
Act and the Clean Water Act (Sirianni and Friedland, 2001).
Growth of the watershed movement has been a result of the efforts of grassroots
activists, but has also been encouraged by the US EPA as a response to the complex
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challenges presented by non-point source pollution (Burger, 2004; Cline & Collins, 2002;
Lubell, 2004; Nelson & Weschler, 2001; Lewicki, 2001; Griffin & Gannon, 2000).
Reducing point source pollution requires either voluntary actions by, or regulation of,
specific sources of waste such as industrial polluters and sewage treatment plants.
Addressing non-point source pollution requires taking actions that will influence the lives
of many people, such as restricting land uses, changing farming practices, and limiting
the use of polluting substances such as fertilizers, pesticides and road salt. Collaborative
watershed protection efforts are viewed as a way of obtaining political support for these
unpopular measures and persuading people to comply with them.
Emerging in an era in which the federal government was committed to
deregulation and devolution, watershed organizations have been encouraged as an
alternative to the environmental policy process as it developed in the 1970’s. Across the
country many, and perhaps most watershed organizations were established by
government agencies for the purpose of engaging stakeholders in developing
collaborative or partnership approaches to watershed management challenges. Cline &
Collins (2002) cite a study by Draeger (2001) that found that only 3 of 79 watershed
organizations in Minnesota were not founded by local governments. Watershed
partnerships have been criticized as neoliberal (Guldbrandsen & Holland, 2001) or neocorporatist (Faber & McCarthy, 2001) efforts that obscure the power exerted by
government and corporate stakeholders. However, there are also many oppositional
watershed groups that use tactics of protest to further their goals (Andrews and Edwards,
2005).
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The Croton Coalition was an example of how the idea of a watershed can provide
a focus for identity and activism. As suggested by bio-regionalism, the Croton Coalition
activists adopted the Croton watershed as a bounded area that could be recognized as a
special place. Calling on the watershed as the focus of activism implied an organic
relationship between residents of New York City, and Westchester and Putnam Counties.
It established a common ground for the local, place-based concerns of activists from
different communities. It also lent a moral gravity to the activists’ cause, elevating their
concerns as it made reference to the preservation of natural systems and valued features
of the landscape. In terms of a strategy for addressing water quality, the Croton Coalition
recognized the same challenge that regulators have responded to with collaborative
approaches – that addressing non-point source pollution requires extensive public
support. This was the motivation behind the Coalition’s efforts to build a “citizens dual
track.” However, unlike many other watershed organizations, the Croton Coalition did
not have the support of government. This research cannot answer the question of why
this was so, but factors included the oppositional stance of the Croton Coalition regarding
filtration, as well as the focus of federal, state and New York City agencies on the West
of Hudson watersheds.

Riverkeeper
Riverkeeper, the third of the three environmental organizations that were
significantly involved in the New York City watershed, was a leading organization of the
watershed movement. Riverkeeper was formed in the 1960’s as a grassroots, place-based
organization established in New York State to protect and restore the Hudson River and
its watershed. It had an activist orientation and was well-known for its confrontational

225
tactics. Over time it became professionalized and adopted a legal and scientific focus.
Although it retained its local character, it also spawned an international movement of
“waterkeepers” and founded a separate association to support similar organizations
outside the United States (Cronin & Kennedy, 1997). Riverkeeper had a very visible
public spokesman in Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and a close relationship with the Pace
University environmental law clinic, which provided additional resources to support the
organization’s litigation efforts.
From the Croton Coalition’s perspective, Riverkeeper presented a mixed picture
as an ally. On the negative side, Kennedy was personally involved in the New York City
Watershed Memorandum of Agreement negotiations and Riverkeeper was the lead player
among the environmental organizations that signed that agreement. Thus he was
complicit, in the view of the Croton Coalition activists, in the decision to filter the
Croton. Although seemingly sympathetic to the Croton Coalition’s position against
filtration, Riverkeeper never took a public position opposing filtration for the Croton
water supply. This may have been a strategic decision not to support a cause that the
organization perceived as being hopeless, and to focus instead on the goal of
implementation of the New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement and
retaining the Filtration Avoidance Determination for the West of Hudson watersheds
from the US EPA.
On the positive side, from the Croton Coalition’s perspective, Riverkeeper
focused on watershed protection and was the most active regional organization trying to
protect water quality in the Croton watershed. Riverkeeper’s hard-hitting research and
reports, Cops in Cuffs: The Failure of Enforcement and Security in the NYC Watershed
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(Kennedy, 1999), Watershed for Sale (Kennedy, Sullivan & Postman, 1999) and Finger
in the Dike - Head in the Sand (Kennedy, Odefey, Wegner & Yaggi, 2001), were
important sources of information about the NYC DEP. As one Croton Coalition activist
said, “Thanks to those papers I don’t believe anything that the DEP writes and I try to
look underneath and see what they are really saying and what they are really doing.”
Riverkeeper employed a lawyer who served as director of New York City watershed
activities and as a liaison to the grassroots groups in the watersheds.
As with the NRDC, the Croton Coalition collaborated with Riverkeeper despite
policy differences. Riverkeeper’s focus on the connection between water quality and
land use, and its attention to NYC DEP’s enforcement efforts in the watersheds,
dovetailed with the Croton Coalition’s goal of protecting the watershed and water quality.
The Coalition often worked with Riverkeeper on opposition to development projects in
the Croton watershed. A high point was the Coalition and Riverkeeper’s collaboration in
opposition to the expansion of the General Electric campus located near the Kensico
Reservoir. Riverkeeper filed a suit to stop the expansion and General Electric backed
down (D. Ferguson, interview, December 23, 2005). In fact, despite the organization’s
regional scope, and in contrast to NRDC, Riverkeeper focused most of its local efforts on
stopping development in the Croton watershed where more development was taking
place, rather than in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds.
Despite the high degree of cooperation between the Croton Coalition and
Riverkeeper, some of the Croton Coalition activists were deeply disappointed by Robert
Kennedy Jr.’s position on filtration. Frank Eadie described his understanding of
Kennedy’s position and his feelings about it:
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Bobby Kennedy was grateful we did it… [took the position against
filtration for the Croton]. In general we’ve stayed in touch and worked with them
[the environmental organizations] on Cat Del [West of Hudson] issues. And they
have in general refrained from taking stances in favor of filtration – or at least in
favor of filtration in the Bronx in Van Cortlandt Park. But they have also not
been of help. Although Kennedy, for example, has included us in meetings he has
held on Croton…to this day Kennedy’s stance bothers me. He lives in the
watershed, in Bedford. It’s clear he is very involved in the Croton emotionally,
his kids are growing up there. And he was on radio one day and they asked him,
where is your favorite place, and he said “the Croton” [River]. (F. Eadie,
interview, March 12, 2004)
The Coalition activists perceived Kennedy as the person who could have had the most
persuasive voice on the issue of filtration, and his lack of support for their position was
hard to accept. They took his lack of support personally, and they often attributed his
position to his hands being tied by his participation in the New York City Watershed
Memorandum of Agreement.
Riverkeeper seems to have considered taking a position against filtration for the
Croton water supply, but in fact it never took the step of publicly opposing filtration.
Several Croton Coalition board members who had discussed the issue with Kennedy felt
that he was sympathetic to their position. In my discussions with Riverkeeper staff
members, I also had the impression that Riverkeeper agreed with the Croton Coalition’s
assessment that filtration might not be needed, and that construction of the filtration plant
would accelerate undesirable development. Riverkeeper also did not take a position on
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the siting of the filtration plant. The key to Riverkeeper’s position may have been a
political calculation. Or, what one source told me in confidence, that while the Croton
Coalition was able to take uncompromising stands, Riverkeeper had to be selective at
expending resources and had to take care not to lose credibility by taking on fights it was
bound to lose.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have situated the Croton Coalition within the environmental
movement and contrasted the Coalition with the three environmental organizations most
active in advocacy around the New York City water system. None of the three
organizations took the role adopted by the Croton Coalition, each for its own reasons.
Although the Sierra Club took the same stand on the issue of filtration as the Coalition, it
did not maintain the same high level of engagement in the issue. In this case, the main
reason may have been that the Sierra Club’s most active leaders on the issue transferred
their activities to the Croton Coalition. As part of a larger organization, the Sierra Club
activists also divided their energies between multiple issues and functioned within a
semi-bureacratized system.
Of the three organizations considered here, NRDC was the most easily
characterized as a bureaucratic and professionalized national environmental organization.
Common criticisms of such organizations were reflected in NRDC’s positions and
activities. NRDC’s positions prioritized the scale of the entire New York City water
system, and perhaps also the national regulatory system, and it appeared to be willing to
compromise in order to husband its social capital and achieve its objectives at this
broader scale. It justified its position by calling on “the science,” despite awareness of
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how science was being contested in this case. It refused to get involved in the siting
issue, despite awareness of the price to be paid by the Norwood community. Although
NRDC was critical of the NYC DEP’s management of the water system and of the siting
process, NRDC chose to stay away from the siting issue – and even allowed itself to be
used to justify the NYC DEP’s decision.
Riverkeeper was an important ally of the Croton Coalition. The organization’s
focus on the protection of the watershed dovetailed with the Croton Coalition’s concerns.
Riverkeeper had a staff person devoted to New York City watershed issues, who focused
mostly on the Croton watershed and was able to be involved in many of the individual
development battles that so engaged the Coalition. However, as a bureaucratized and
professionalized organization with a focus on litigation, Riverkeeper’s strategy was to
pick and choose its battles. This was a disappointment to the Coalition which was
formed precisely to take on what might have appeared to others to be a lost cause from
the beginning.
As we have seen, all three groups were influenced by the sorts of organizational
constraints that have been identified as limiting the freedom of national, professionalized
organizations (Brulle, 2000). Each of the three took a somewhat different position on
the Croton filtration issue. In contrast, as a single issue organization of volunteers, the
Croton Coalition was unconstrained by a prior history with the issue, commitments at a
broader scale, prior compromises, general policies that might or might not have been
applicable in this particular situation, the need to maintain the credibility of their
organization, or the need to husband resources for battles they were more likely to win.
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The Croton Coalition was free to take a position against filtration and the siting of the
plant in the Mosholu Golf Course, and to pursue these positions relentlessly.
The Croton Coalition’s diverse constituency was an important factor in
determining its positions. The grassroots environmental movement, and particularly the
environmental justice movement, has focused attention on the way that who is at the table
determines what issues are considered and what positions are articulated. The concern of
the movement is often with the poor and people of color who bear the burden of
environmental inequities. These inequities are intertwined with other kinds of political
and social oppression. The Coalition included such voices, and their participation did
influence the Coalition’s position (as well as contribute to internal tensions). The Sierra
Club also responded to these concerns and opposed the siting in Norwood. But
Riverkeeper and NRDC, which were professionally-directed organizations that did not
need to respond to these concerns, did not actively oppose the siting.
It is significant that neither Riverkeeper nor NRDC took a public position on the
siting of the plant. This is an important difference between these environmental
organizations and the Croton Coalition (and the local Sierra Club branches). The stance
of Riverkeeper and NRDC is an example of the kind of position criticized by the
environmental justice movement, which argues that elitist environmental organizations
ignore the concerns of oppressed communities. Their stance dismissed the concerns of
the Norwood community in favor of what they perceived as a greater purpose. While
these organizations could perhaps take this stand because they did not have to consider
the views of the community, the Croton Coalition was in a different position due to its
membership and its position opposing filtration anywhere.
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Despite the contrast I have drawn, it should be noted that this case study reveals
the inadequacy of conventional categories such as “mainstream” and “grassroots” to
characterize environmental organizations. Although scholars referring to these categories
sometimes do so with a caveat (Pulido, 1996, citing Dunlap & Mertig, 1992), sweeping
generalizations still abound in the literature. Andrews and Edwards (2005), in their
analysis of local environmentalism, point out that the preponderance of research on the
national level as well as the tendency for scholars to examine single sectors in isolation
have led to an excess of dichotomizing generalizations about the environmental
movement. As has been noted by Bullard (1993) and others, there is a coalescing of
agendas discernible in the environmental movement. During the 1980’s, for instance,
many of the national environmental organizations adopted issues that had been brought to
the fore by grassroots organizations, and they began to establish programs to help local
groups to organize (Gould, Schnaiberg & Weinberg, 1996; Szasz, 1994). My research
provides another example of how organizations that may be primarily identified with a
certain sector and may have significant differences can at times collaborate with each
other.
The contrast between the Croton Coalition and the other environmental
organizations involved in the Croton filtration controversy reveals the unique role played
by the Coalition and its necessity. This role was contingent, a result of the diverse
constituency brought together within the Coalition. But it also reflected possibilities
inherent in grassroots activism that are not shared by more bureaucratic and
professionalized environmental organizations.
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Chapter 5: Grassroots Contributions to a Sustainable
Urban Future

I began this research to learn why and how people respond to environmental
problems. I became intrigued by the case of the Croton Coalition and its struggle against
filtration for at least two reasons. One reason was that it promised to open a window into
the complexity of environmental policy-making. Here was a case involving
conservation, urban sustainability, and environmental justice, among many other issues.
The second reason was that the case seemed hopeful. I was excited about the potential
contribution of a grassroots coalition established to advocate for a win-win-win solution –
a win for urban water consumers, for suburban watershed residents, and for ecosystems.
The case of the Croton Coalition proved to be a good choice, providing me with insights
about the nature of environmental problems, emerging responses to these problems, and
the political obstacles to turning new approaches into policies.
In this chapter I discuss a number of issues that emerged as central in my research
about the Croton Coalition. This case provides many lessons that are applicable to other
controversies about complex environmental challenges. It also raises questions deserving
of further research. Here I focus on the unique and important role that grassroots
organizations play in reframing policy questions and introducing new ideas into the
policy-making process; my use of the concept of scale to illuminate controversies over
environmental policies; and the potential of, and challenges to, place-based and coalition
organizing. The chapter ends with discussion of the implications of this research for New
York City’s water system.
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Reframing of Filtration
This research documents the Croton Coalition’s efforts to reframe filtration as an
environmental problem, rather than a solution. The reframing of policy issues is a critical
first step in the emergence and adoption of new approaches to environmental problems.
This account of the Croton Coalition’s arguments and activities provides an example of
how this process occurs. It also raises issues about filtration as a policy and technology
that deserve attention in light of emerging developments in the management of water
supplies.
As we have seen, until the Croton Coalition came along, the need for filtration of
the Croton water supply was basically unchallenged. The NYC DEP and the US EPA
claimed that filtration was a necessary public health measure. Their perspective was that
pollution was the inevitable result of development, and thus filtration was unavoidable.
From their point of view, the controversy was not about filtration but about where to site
the filtration plant.
The Croton Coalition reframed filtration as an environmental policy issue. The
Coalition activists claimed that the real policy issue was not where to site the plant, but
whether it should be built at all. They claimed that the real issue was whether the
watershed’s natural filtering capacity could be preserved. They called the filtration plant
a technical fix that would worsen the problem it was designed to solve by encouraging
more pollution. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Coalition’s arguments reflected emerging
environmental ideas. I argue that the Coalition reframed the choice between filtration
and watershed protection as a choice between application of a technical fix to the
problem of pollution and application of the precautionary principle.
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My account of the Coalition’s argument against filtration, and the difficulties that
it faced in making this argument, illustrates the obstacles to adoption and implementation
of the precautionary principle in response to environmental problems. The sheer
difficulty of explaining the argument was the first of these obstacles. Some
environmental problems are obvious. But what are the risks of treating water to protect
public health? The answer is that the risks lie in the unintended and long term
consequences. Filtration is good for public health when viewed in the short run, but in
the long run it may undermine long term environmental quality goals. The most
important of the unintended consequence of filtration may be that it can induce further
development in the watershed. Implementing the precautionary principle requires us to
see problems in a broader perspective. Solutions require moving to higher scale, taking
the long view, and taking into account the interests of future generations. When viewed
through the lens of the precautionary principle, the most appealing solutions usually
involve creativity, innovation and the cooperation of many partners. Since they require
changing the usual way of doing things, they always involve stepping on the toes of
vested interests that have benefited from doing things the old way (Cooney, 2004;
Jasanoff, 2003; Jordan & O’Riordan, 1999; Tickner, 1999).
So we see that implementation of the precautionary principle involves changing
both people’s perceptions of problems, and changing their behavior in response to these
problems. While all solutions to environmental problems require changing human
behavior, consideration of the precautionary principle may raise the stakes considerably.
From this perspective, its implementation presents challenges to every discipline that
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seeks to understand how human behavior can be changed at every level, including my
own discipline of environmental psychology.
More specifically in terms of water management, the Croton Coalition’s novel
arguments against filtration raised significant concerns about the use of this technology
that deserve consideration. For example, the Coalition highlighted the connection
between filtration and land use, arguing that filtration diminishes incentives to preserve
open space. The Coalition also brought to light questions about the wisdom of
continuing to invest heavily in technological fixes. The Coalition argued that
investments in broader scale ecosystem protection would create greater long term equity
for New York City and surrounding communities. But these kinds of investments are
difficult to carry out under current regimes. These issues deserve further research and
public attention.

Unique Role of Grassroots Activism
This research documents the unique role that the Croton Coalition played in the
controversy over filtration, and argues that the Coalition was able to play this role
because it was a grassroots organization. But the Coalition faced immense hurdles in
bringing its perspective into the policy process, precisely because it was a grassroots
organization. Thus this case raises important questions about how grassroots voices and
new ideas can be incorporated into the policy process.
As we have seen, in contrast to the government agencies responsible for New
York City’s water supply, the Croton Coalition took the position that filtration could be
avoided for the Croton water supply. The Coalition identified filtration as an unnecessary
technological intervention that would be likely to accelerate deterioration of water
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quality. The Coalition’s position highlights the dynamic relationship between human
activities and natural processes in the watershed, particularly the relationship between
land use and water quality. But unlike the NYC DEP and other regulators, the Coalition
emphasized that this dynamic process could result in improvement of water quality at the
source, rather than its deterioration.
The Croton Coalition’s position was also unique among the environmental
organizations most significantly involved in advocacy for the New York City water
system. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Coalition’s role in the filtration controversy
revealed how differences emerge within the environmental movement between different
types of organizations. Established, professionalized organizations play a different role
in environmental controversies than grassroots organizations. They make different
calculations about which particular positions are worth adopting, and their ongoing
relationships with other participants in the policy process provide them with different
opportunities for influence. In the controversy over filtration for the Croton water
supply, even organizations that were involved in advocacy for watershed protection
measures for the Croton watershed decided not to join the Coalition in advocating for
filtration avoidance.
Since the focus of this research was the grassroots activism of the Croton
Coalition, I did not explore the perspectives and actions of the government agencies and
environmental organizations in great depth. Clearly it is important to complement my
study with this kind of research. How do we understand the actions of these agencies and
organizations? How can they be made more open to grassroots interventions and to
significant policy changes, like the adoption of the precautionary principle? No research
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of this kind has been done to examine the NYC DEP, although research about other water
agencies generally characterizes them as resistant to change (Gottlieb, 1988).
Perhaps it is inevitable that bureaucracies such as government agencies and
established environmental organizations will be less likely to bring new issues and policy
proposals to the fore. These organizations make a different contribution to society by
building ongoing relationships and providing resources to assure implementation of
policies and programs. As we have seen, the Croton Coalition activists credited NRDC
and Riverkeeper with providing crucial support for their efforts. However, if we accept
that the role of these established organizations is different from that of grassroots groups,
we must also recognize that grassroots organizations fulfill an absolutely critical role in
the furtherance of environmental goals. This is a daunting conclusion in light of the
experiences of the Coalition. It raises difficult questions about how to mobilize
significant grassroots activism around environmental issues as complex and multidimensional as filtration, and how to make this activism more effective.

Scale as a Tool of Analysis
Analysis of this case would have been impossible without recourse to the concept
of scale as it has been developed by scholars of political ecology and environmental
justice (Bakker, 1999; Cox, 1998; Herod, 1997; Howitt, 2000; McGuirk, 1997; Silvern,
1999; Smith, 1992; Towers, 2000; Williams, 1999). This case highlights the relevance of
scale as a concept that can illuminate controversies over environmental policies.
Scholars have challenged us to examine every environmental problem or controversy in
terms of this concept: At what scale is this problem generated? Where is it manifested?
Where should it be addressed? Contestation and negotiation are elements of the process
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through which a problem is defined as occurring at a specific scale or scales. Viewing
scale as produced, rather than as given, we recognize that new scales may emerge as part
of this process. As the scale of a problem is defined, attention becomes focused on
solutions at that scale. Solutions at other scales may be ignored. As new participants
enter the controversy, they may challenge the assignment of the problem to a given scale.
This research explores how the Croton Coalition challenged the construction of the
filtration issue at a particular scale. It raises questions about what it takes to get others to
imagine and address a problem at a specific scale and what the consequences of rescaling
are. These are questions that enable us to explore the production of scale as a political
tactic.
The formation of the Croton Coalition is an example of rescaling as a political
strategy. At first, when the founders of the Croton Coalition in the northwest Bronx were
faced with the construction of the filtration plant in the Jerome Park Reservoir, they
accepted the NYC DEP’s definition of the problem as being about where to site the plant.
Viewed from this perspective, the controversy was only of local interest, and the problem
could only be solved at the local scale. The question was about which neighborhood
would get the unwanted filtration plant. The Coalition’s founders redefined the scale of
the problem by focusing attention on the need for filtration. They recognized that if the
water could be kept clean, there would be no need for the plant. But to keep the water
clean, New York City would have to have the support of the communities where the
water came from. Protecting the watershed to a great extent depended on the actions of
towns in the watershed. Seeking allies in these communities, the founders created an
organization that could address the problem at the watershed scale.
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The Coalition’s success in attracting support in the suburban communities in the
Croton watershed, that is at the scale of the watershed, is a striking example of how
regional dynamics in the management of water were changing during the period of my
research. Many studies of urban water systems emphasize conflict between cities and the
regions that provide them with water in a kind of populist narrative of exploitation of
rural areas by cities (Steinberg & Clark, 1999). As in other places, the construction of
New York City’s water system between the 1840’s and the 1960’s created resentment in
watershed communities that experienced displacement due to reservoir construction and
had to observe regulations meant to protect the water supply (Calhoun, 1997; Galusha,
1999; Pfeffer & Wagenet, 2003). The negative response to the new watershed
regulations proposed by New York City in 1990 was partly a result of this legacy. In
deciding to filter the Croton water supply, NYC DEP was influenced by concerns about
the difficulty of persuading communities to accept restrictions sufficient to protect water
quality. As we saw in Chapter 2, the reality was more complex. Although developers
opposed restrictions on land use, and local governments had concerns about the
curtailment of their home rule prerogatives, the latter also saw some benefits in the new
regulations and in the financial support for water quality improvements offered as an
incentive to cooperation by New York City.
Factors that contributed to these changing dynamics have emerged in this
research. One of these factors was the interest that watershed residents had in preserving
the quality of their own environment. Activists on behalf of preservation of open space
as well as protection of local water bodies, recognized that metropolitan water users
shared their interest in curtailing development in the watershed. The Croton Coalition
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activists drew attention to how New York City’s watershed protection efforts also
protected the water resources of communities and residents within the Croton watershed.
Steinberg and Clark (1999) uncovered similar attitudes to the ones revealed in this
research in a study of residents in communities within Boston’s watershed. They
describe how residents near the Wachusett Reservoir supported a more active presence of
the metropolitan water management agency because they recognized that by protecting
water quality and the water system, the agency was protecting their own quality of life.
Pfeffer and Wagenet (2003) identified a similar evolution of attitudes in West of Hudson
communities following the implementation of the New York City Watershed MOA of
1997. They found that following the conclusion of the New York City Watershed MOA
residents expressed understanding of a community of interests with New York City in
place of previous expressions of hostility.
These changes reflect the dynamic processes associated with the production of
scale, and the particular promises and pitfalls involved in focusing attention at the scale
of the watershed. As indicated in Chapter 4, both the government and grassroots activists
are increasingly organizing their environmental protection efforts around watersheds.
Watersheds recommend themselves for such purposes because they reflect the boundaries
of ecosystems, rather than the boundaries of political jurisdictions. But defining the scale
at which a watershed exists is as subject to human construction as any other definition of
scale. Watersheds are nested within each other, and we choose where to draw the
boundary between the watershed of the tiniest stream and the watershed east or west of
the continental divide. As this case makes clear, promoting identification with a
watershed does not ensure an identity of interests. Moreover, this case points to the
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difficulties in promoting identification by urban residents with a remote watershed.
Further research about the educational and psychological processes that can foster such
identifications and inform watershed-based environmental protection efforts for urban
areas is urgently needed.

Place-based and Coalition Activism
This case study provides insights into the nature of place-based activism, and how
such activism may support or undermine political strategies based on a coalition model.
The Coalition was founded by activists who responded to threats to their local
communities stemming from New York City’s policy on filtration. Despite the history of
tension and conflict between New York City and the watershed communities, these
grassroots activists joined together to advocate for a policy that could protect all of their
communities. However the promise of this strategy was not fulfilled. At one point, many
of the New York City groups left the Coalition and each side accused the other of
selfishness and parochialism. And the Coalition failed to achieve its primary goal,
forestalling construction of the filtration plant.
On the one hand, this research provides a rich account of how attachment to place
can be a positive and powerful motivation for environmental action and a spur to join
forces with others to protect shared natural resources. The Croton Coalition built on local
activists’ attachment to their communities to foster identification with place at a broader
scale; the Croton watershed as a whole. In fact, like many grassroots activists in the
environmental justice movement, their commitments to their local communities led them
to pursue a strategy of NIABY (not in anyone’s backyard) that had the potential to

242
benefit not only their own communities, but many communities that were not directly
involved in the controversy.
On the other hand, the evolution of the Croton Coalition also raises questions
about such place-based activism. One such question is about the parochialism of placebased activists. Attachment to place is often denigrated as NIMBYism (not in my
backyard), which characterizes such activism as an exaggerated and parochial concern for
one’s own community. The watershed activism of suburban residents raises questions
about the extent to which watershed protection may serve the class interests of the
wealthy. Some watershed protection strategies, such as preservation of open space and
zoning for large lots that reduces the potential for population growth in the suburbs, may
also be used as strategies to prevent development of housing for people with lower
incomes. These strategies may provide a pretext for exclusion on the basis of race.
Charges of NIMBYism were a feature of the controversy over filtration. Close
attention to the motivations of the Croton Coalition activists reveals that accusations of
NIMBYism fail to capture the complexity of their motivations and the wider benefits of
the activities that they undertook on behalf of their own beloved places. The direct
connection that the activists were able to make between construction of the filtration
plant in the Bronx and the need for watershed protection, lent an unusual clarity to the
Coalition’s assertion of a community of interests between the urban and suburban
residents. As indicated in Chapter 3, the inclusion of various organizations in the Croton
Coalition led to the consideration of a variety of concerns. For example, the inclusion of
the Housing Development Fund Cooperative Coalition led the Coalition to highlight the
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impact of filtration and watershed protection on the cost of inner-city low-income
housing.
While this case serves as an example of the value of place-based activism, it does
raise questions about how coalitions made up of diverse place-based organizations can
survive in a highly politicized and conflictual setting. Unlike many watershed
organizations, the Croton Coalition was not formed by government to support
government programs. Instead, it was formed in opposition to an established government
policy on filtration. New York City employed a strategy of divide and conquer to
undermine the Coalition’s efforts. The City proposed alternative sites, which pitted
neighborhood against neighborhood, and proposed alternative water treatment
approaches which pitted the urban-based organizations against the suburban ones. This
strategy is among the most obvious of ways to diminish the threat from any coalition. In
response, the Coalition activists felt that they were forced to make choices within the
framework established by New York City. In these circumstances, identification at the
watershed scale competed with identification at the neighborhood or village scale for the
allegiance of Coalition activists.
The environmental justice movement has emphasized the need for support and
guidance, as well as new forms of organization that can help grassroots coalitions to
remain cohesive in the face of outside pressures such as those faced by the Croton
Coalition (Schlosberg, 1999). The Coalition’s founders realized that a coalition that
crossed urban-suburban and class boundaries would attract attention, and have the
potential to address the problem of water quality at the regional scale at which it was
produced. However, the founders did not appreciate the challenges inherent in such an
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alliance. (For an example in New York City, see Checker, 2001; for cross-class
coalitions, see Mix & Cable, 2004.) The Croton Coalition did not identify itself with any
particular sector of the environmental movement. Some activists even felt that it was
important to distance themselves from the environmental movement. Consequently the
Coalition missed out on opportunities to obtain support and guidance. For example, the
Coalition did not affiliate itself with the River Network, which links together watershed
organizations, or the Center for Health, Environment and Justice (formerly the Citizen’s
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, founded by Lois Gibbs), which supports anti-toxics
and environmental justice organizations and emphasizes pollution prevention as a
solution to problems of waste. The Coalition did not seek out assistance for coalition
maintenance activities such as developing leadership and resolving conflicts; one source
for such support is the Institute for Conservation Leadership. The Coalition focused its
limited resources exclusively on external threats, not realizing that a strong coalition
requires attention to internal cohesion if it is to survive (Minkler, 1997).
The trajectory of the Croton Coalition reflected both the growing realization of
shared interests described above, as well as the differences in the relationship of residents
of the watershed communities and New York City residents to the Croton watershed.
This research documents the difficulties experienced by people who recognized common
interests in addressing regional environmental problems and wanted to act cooperatively
to address them. The problems faced by New York City residents and watershed
residents at the local scale were linked through the issues of water quality and ecosystem
protection more broadly. As we saw in Chapter 3, the founders of the Coalition
recognized a possibility for regional cooperation going beyond what government
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agencies believed possible. Given the regional scale of many environmental problems
and the potential benefits from regional cooperation in addressing them, the experience of
the Croton Coalition suggests that there is a need for more research about how such
seemingly unlikely, but potentially fruitful, grassroots regional coalitions evolve and can
have influence.

Changing Policy
The Croton Coalition failed to achieve its main goal. Despite a multi-faceted
campaign maintained over a period of years, the Coalition was not able to stop the
construction of the filtration plant. This result may be attributed to multiple factors
including the timing of the Coalition’s entry into the political process, the failings of the
mechanisms provided for citizen participation in environmental decision-making, the
influence and resources of the supporters of the filtration plant, the politics of New York
City including the targeting of the Norwood community for the plant, and the Coalition’s
own internal weaknesses.
The Croton Coalition entered the scene too late, after the policy issue had been
framed and the decision to construct the plant had already been made. This was an
obstacle that the Coalition was unlikely to surmount in its efforts to achieve a policy
change on the part of New York City. The Coalition activists found that their
opportunities to participate in the process were structured by the NYC DEP, and mostly
limited to opportunities to challenge the environmental impact statement prepared for the
filtration plant. They could try to raise questions about whether filtration was needed, but
these were easily ignored since the issue on the table was only the selection of a site for
the plant.
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Furthermore, New York City had plenty of power and money to back up its
decision. As we saw in Chapter 3, New York City promised that $243 million dollars of
water system funds would be distributed throughout the Bronx. These funds, allocated
for capital improvements for parks, were categorized as amelioration payments to
mitigate the impact of the construction of the filtration plant. And New York City had
political support from people and organizations that would benefit from this vast
construction project, including unions and construction firms. While touting the financial
benefit to the Bronx, and the water quality improvements that would accrue to the entire
City, the NYC DEP chose to locate the plant – and its attendant burdens – on a poor
neighborhood with little political power.
The Coalition undoubtedly failed to accrue as much influence in the Bronx and in
New York City as it might have. After the dissolution of the alliance between the
organizations from New York City and the organizations from the watershed
communities, the Coalition never regained significant support in New York City. The
New York City contingent in the Coalition, made up mainly of organizations from the
Bronx, had been led by the activists who had successfully sought to prevent the
construction of the filtration plant in the Jerome Park Reservoir. After these activists
became alienated by the Coalition’s positions, they and their allies left the Coalition.
Although the Coalition’s leaders made some efforts to reach out to the Norwood
neighborhood, where the new site chosen for the filtration plant was located, they were
unsuccessful in engaging people and organizations there. The Coalition had lost both its
credibility and its contacts in the Bronx. The Coalition also did not significantly expand
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the number of city-wide organizations, or organizations based outside the Bronx, that
were members.
In contrast to its lack of progress in derailing the construction of the filtration
plant, the Coalition was considerably more successful in its efforts to advance watershed
protection. The Coalition acted to protect water quality in the local communities
throughout the Croton watershed, and encouraged other organizations and politicians to
take such action. As we have seen, the Coalition played an important part in stopping or
modifying individual development projects such as the expansion of Route 120 next to
the Kensico Reservoir. The Coalition had numerous successes and was credited by
knowledgeable observers, such as Eric Goldstein of the NRDC, with significant
achievements:
CWCWC has had a very huge impact. Aside from this battle (over filtration),
almost everything else they’ve done, they’ve been successful at. So they’ve been
enormously successful at challenging local projects in the watershed, they have
valiantly fought off some of the worst development proposals. (E. Goldstein,
interview, June 6, 2005)
One indication of the Coalition’s success was that during the years of the struggle
over filtration, Westchester towns began setting aside their own funds to purchase and
preserve open space. Paul Moskowitz, a Croton Coalition board member active in
Yorktown politics, said, “Maybe 9-10 towns in Westchester have passed laws setting
aside money to buy open space. So there are things you can do. It was said 7 to 8 years
ago that people of the watershed - meaning the developers controlling the planning
boards – are against limiting development. Now we see that people of the watershed,
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when given a chance to vote, have voted to slow down development and buy open
space…” (P. Moskowitz, interview, April 4, 2004).
The Coalition’s successes in furthering watershed protection may be attributed
partly to the characteristics of the goal. While the Coalition activists achieved some
encouraging successes in their campaign against the filtration plant, ultimately success
was defined in terms of whether or not the plant would be constructed. Watershed
protection, on the other hand, could be furthered by many small achievements. If one
government agency was not responsive, they could move on to another one. While the
Coalition was disappointed with the response of the NYC DEP and the New York State
Department of Health to its proposals, it did make headway with the New York State
Department of Transportation, county governments and town planning boards. If one
development project was not stopped, the size of another one could be curtailed. The
achievements were cumulative and no one defeat was definitive. As promoters of
watershed coalitions have recognized, a coalition of local place-based activists and
organizations is a good match for the distributed problem of non-point source pollution.
Another reason for the Coalition’s effectiveness in furthering watershed pollution
was the political influence it accrued in the watershed communities. The Coalition’s
leaders were in their element in the watershed communities. Most were politically active,
some had held political office, and others were leaders in local organizations. They had
the knowledge and connections to be effective in their own communities. They also had
the advantage of being able to achieve their goals by working within the small polities of
the watershed. Scholars of citizen participation have concluded that participation is
usually more effective when it takes place at the local scale (Fiorino, 1996; Landy, 1993).
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In the small towns within the Croton watershed, the Coalition was able to mobilize
residents and have an influence in local politics. Something that is more difficult to
achieve in a polity the size of New York City.
The Coalition’s successes and failures challenge us to consider the implications
for similar grassroots efforts that seek changes in environmental policies with a regional
scope. The filtration issue is representative of many environmental challenges that are
facing cities and involve the sustainability of regional ecosystems that have to be
managed across jurisdictional boundaries. As we saw in Chapter 4, in organizing at the
scale of the watershed the Coalition was joining a growing movement that has been
encouraged by government to address such challenges. Like the Croton Coalition
activists, grassroots groups across the United States have seized upon the idea that a
watershed provides an appropriate geographical unit for efforts to protect ecosystems and
quality of life. However it must be recognized that there have been many efforts in the
past to organize water management efforts around watersheds. These efforts have
usually failed because the boundaries of watersheds do not correspond to the boundaries
of political jurisdictions (Rogers, 1993). It is not yet clear whether this new form of
watershed organizing can overcome longstanding obstacles and the new ones they create.
The Croton Coalition’s experience points to some of the potential and the pitfalls
of organizing along the lines of a watershed. The Coalition’s strategy was to create a
grassroots force at the watershed scale that could accrue more influence than local
neighborhood and community activists acting alone. Although the Coalition did have
some success in creating a watershed-scale network of grassroots activists, this proved
difficult to maintain. Urban and suburban residents who joined the Coalition were
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motivated by different concerns.

Despite their recognition of some common interests,

they were unable to maintain a unified position. The political influence they accrued was
insufficient to overcome obstacles in the policy process and the pressure exerted by their
political adversaries, and to achieve policy goals that required action at the town, county,
city, state and federal levels.
Finally, this case illustrates the lack of appropriate political frameworks for
addressing regional environmental policy challenges such as those affecting the Croton
watershed. In its efforts to stop construction of the filtration plant and promote watershed
protection efforts, the Coalition found it was necessary to engage multiple political
bodies at various levels of government but there were no effective governmental
frameworks for discussion of the regional issues raised by the filtration controversy.
Even the non-governmental bodies that might have provided a forum for these
discussions, such as the Regional Plan Association of New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut, did not do so. It is difficult to imagine that even the most effective regional
grassroots coalition could succeed without governmental and non-governmental
frameworks responsive to environmental challenges at this scale. This is not a new issue,
but the Croton Coalition’s experience serves as another lesson about the need for more
robust regional frameworks for addressing environmental problems.

The Future of the New York City Water System
While this study has ramifications for many environmental controversies, the
lessons it raises for New York City may be the most immediate. Reasonable people may
differ about whether building a filtration plant for the Croton water supply is the right
policy for New York City. But there is no question that watershed protection is crucial to
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ensure good water quality over the long term, as the Croton Coalition has asserted.
Simply put, the quality of the water before treatment determines both the extent of the
treatment that is necessary and influences what the quality of the water will be after
treatment. Some water cannot be made potable at any price. Deteriorating water quality
could make the City’s $1.5 billion water filtration plant obsolete at some point, although
this is unlikely. The NYC DEP acknowledged the need for watershed protection and
claimed that filtration would not deter the agency from protecting water quality with a
multi-barrier approach that includes land purchases, upgrades of sewage treatment plants
and enforcement of regulations limiting development (M. Principe, interview, September
1, 2005).
However, as we saw in Chapter 2, despite these claims, watershed protection in
the Croton was not as high a priority for New York City, New York State or the US EPA,
as was protecting the West of Hudson watersheds. The NYC DEP’s motivation for
protecting the West of Hudson watersheds was provided by the desire to maintain the
filtration avoidance determination (FAD) granted by the US EPA. In order to maintain
the FAD, and continue to avoid filtration for the West of Hudson watersheds, the NYC
DEP was required to report on its progress in implementing its obligations under the New
York City Watershed MOA to New York State and the US EPA on a regular basis (New
York State Department of Health & New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, 2002). Another cause for concern regarding the future of the Croton
watershed was that the US EPA turned over primacy for the Croton watershed to New
York State, and the New York State Department of Health was not aggressive about
using its enforcement powers. This was in contrast to the situation in the West of Hudson
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watersheds, where US EPA retained primacy in order to ensure that New York City
would meet the terms of the filtration avoidance determination. Ironically, the Croton
watershed was not receiving the same level of attention, precisely because it was more
populated, considered to be more degraded, and filtration was planned. Although
environmentalists and the NYC DEP agreed that watershed protection would still be
important after construction of the filtration plant, it appeared that the NYC DEP had
greater motivation to protect water quality in the West of Hudson watersheds where the
goal was to avoid filtration.
The NYC DEP, NYS DOH and the US EPA were concerned with New York
City’s entire water supply. For them, focusing on the West of Hudson watersheds that
supplied up to 90% of the City’s water seemed an obvious choice. Unlike them, the
Croton Coalition was focused on the scale of the Croton watershed. The Coalition
brought attention to the unintended negative effects of the regulatory process that resulted
in the short-changing of the East of Hudson watershed. The Coalition pointed out that
the regulators and management agencies were focused on the relatively undeveloped
West of Hudson watersheds while threats to water quality from previous and continuing
development were more severe in the East of Hudson watershed.
The Croton Coalition brought to public attention the NYC DEP’s slow progress in
implementing watershed protection programs that it had committed to undertake in the
Croton watershed. The NYC DEP lagged in many areas, including protection of land
from development through purchase and the use of land trusts, and in implementation of
sewage treatment plant upgrades. The New York City Watershed MOA provided for
$17.5 million to be spent on land purchases in the Croton watershed. (An additional $25
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million was pledged later.) However, from the signing of the MOA in 1997 until 2004,
the DEP had only acquired 443 acres in Westchester and Putnam counties at a cost of
$7.4 million (CWCWC Croton Management Plan, 2004). The Croton Coalition
estimated in its management plan that it would cost $250 million to purchase 30,750
acres in the watershed, enough to reach a general guideline for protection of 25% of the
watershed (CWCWC Croton Management Plan, 2004). The Coalition argued that this
was about the same amount as the $243 million to be provided for Bronx parks as
mitigation for the construction of the filtration plant, and much less than the $1.5 billion
that would be spent to construct the plant. Environmental organizations, including
NRDC and NYPIRG, also urged the NYC DEP to increase land purchases in the Croton
watershed. But to my knowledge no other organization prepared an estimate of the
amount of land that should be protected or of the cost of reaching such a goal. Another
measure of the NYC DEP’s lack of commitment to watershed protection was the
agency’s slow progress on upgrading of sewage treatment plants in the Croton watershed.
These projects were put on hold awaiting the outcome of the debate over diversion of
sewage outside of the New York City watershed to waste water treatment plants that
discharge into the Hudson River, outside of the Croton watershed (Tierney, 2000).
While this research focused on the Croton watershed, the developments there can
only be understood within the wider context of the entire New York City water system.
As we saw in Chapter 2, a complex policy process led to New York City’s decision to
build a filtration plant for the Croton watershed while it sought to avoid filtration for the
West of Hudson watersheds. This process led New York City to seek cooperation from
the watershed communities through the New York City Watershed MOA of 1997. New
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York City negotiated with the watershed communities about the implementation of
watershed protection measures, and agreed to pay both for these measures and for
economic development programs in the watershed. The New York City Watershed MOA
has received international attention as an example of a major city adopting a policy that
acknowledged dependence on ecosystems and communities on the regional scale
(Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998; Daily, 2002; Wilson, 2002; Mas, 2004; Postel, 2005a,
2005b; see Sagoff, 2002 for an alternative view). My study provides some insights into
the process through which this agreement was reached, but as the context within which
the Croton Coalition operated the New York City Watershed MOA deserves much more
extensive study. There has been no research that I am aware of about the negotiations
that led to the New York City Watershed MOA, and only a few studies about its effects
(some examples are Pfeffer, 2002; Pires, 2004; Stave, 1998; Stycos, 1999; Wagenet et al.,
1999). Both are areas that deserve further research because of the important implications
of this agreement for the future of the New York City region’s ecosystems, patterns of
land development within the watersheds, and the cost of water in New York City.

Looking Ahead
The New York City water system, often described as the city’s greatest capital
asset, is facing major challenges. Watershed protection programs and filtration are
intended to ensure a clean water supply. The current programs have been designed to
respond to the familiar threats from agricultural runoff, sewage, and non-point pollution
from stormwater. As we have seen, New York City’s progress in implementing these
programs has been uneven. Now, in addition to the familiar problems, new threats to the
water supply are developing such as pollution from pharmaceuticals and other chemicals.
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There is also concern about the potential for collapse of the water system’s decaying
infrastructure, particularly a significant leak that has been discovered in the Delaware
Aqueduct. Although water rates continue to rise, New York City may not have enough
money to invest in the maintenance of its vast infrastructure. The Municipal Water
Finance Authority has projected that by the year 2008, 56 percent of the water system’s
revenue will be devoted to interest payments on the system’s debt (New York City
Independent Budget Office, 2004). In the wake of the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center in 2001, security of the water supply has become a significant concern for the
NYC DEP, leading to increased resources devoted to patrolling water infrastructure and
other security measures.
My investigation of the Croton Coalition’s involvement in the controversy over
filtration leads me to the conclusion that New York City is not investing enough effort in
watershed protection. It seems certain that ten years from now it will be obvious that the
City should have made a more aggressive commitment to pollution prevention. New
York City has taken pride in its planning for the future. It has frequently begun water
supply projects that were expected to take decades to be completed. The perspective of
the NYC DEP is bound to evolve, as is that of water management agencies around the
world, from a focus on engineering and technical solutions to a broader focus on the
management of water as a natural resource. As this occurs, it will become clear that
water quality must be protected at the source, and the sooner the better. At the point
when this evolution occurs, it will be clear that the Croton Coalition was a few years
ahead of its time in advocating for the application of the precautionary principle to the
issue of filtration.
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Although the focus of this research was the Croton watershed, which did not
receive the full benefit of the Agreement, the conclusion of the New York City
Watershed MOA was a positive turning point for New York City. In the Agreement,
New York City took an important step in the direction of acknowledging the regional
dynamics involved in procuring its clean water. The City leadership recognized the
critical importance of protecting water quality at the source and the role that people living
in the watershed can play in preventing pollution. The controversy over filtration of the
Croton water supply added another element to the process begun by the New York City
Watershed MOA. This controversy brought the issue of sustainability of the water
supply closer to home for New York City. Protecting the Catskill and Delaware
watersheds was about protecting nature far away from New York City, in an area
relatively unmarred by development. The Croton Coalition asserted that even the Croton
watershed, close to New York City and more developed, could and should be protected.
The Croton Coalition’s assertion and actions challenge us to reconsider our assumptions
about the potential for people to protect the nature we live with everyday.
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Appendix I: Chronology of the Croton Filtration
Controversy
1905
Recommendation that a filtration plant be constructed at Jerome Park Reservoir
1913
Funds allocated for construction of the Croton filtration plant, but plans are discontinued
when chlorination is introduced
1971
NYC DEP conducts pilot studies of Croton filtration
1974
Safe Drinking Water Act passed by US Congress
1980’s
Pilot filtration plant built by NYC DEP in the Jerome Park Reservoir
1986
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (SDWA) passed by US Congress
1989
Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) added to SDWA by US Congress
1990
NYC DEP announces proposed new watershed regulations leading to negotiations for the
New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
November 30, 1991
NYC DEP completes report on New York City’s Long Range Water Quality, Watershed
Protection and Filtration Avoidance Program to assess whether filtration is necessary
(report is not released to the public)
October 30, 1992
NYC DEP signs stipulation with NYS DOH agreeing to build Croton Water Treatment
Plant (CWTP)
December, 1993
Scoping hearings held for environmental impact statement (EIS) for CWTP to be built at
Jerome Park Reservoir (EIS process is terminated in December, 1995)
January 15, 1993
US EPA adopts October, 1992 stipulation
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March, 1994
Community Advisory Committee (CAC) for Jerome Park CWTP established by DEP
December, 1995
EIS process is terminated when Mayor Giuliani puts siting process for CWTP on hold
and agrees to consider alternative sites
November, 1996
First meeting to discuss possible coalition takes place at NRDC offices
January, 1997
Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition (CWCWC) is established at meeting at home of
Marian Rose in Bedford, Westchester County
January, 1997
New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concluded
April 24, 1997
US DOJ sues New York City for violation of SWTR (97-CV-2154), action joined by
New York State
May 19, 1997
Croton Joint Community Advisory Committee (CAC) established by NYC DEP with
members from New York City and Croton watershed communities
June 18, 1997
CWCWC files to become intervenor in US DOJ action against New York City
October 18, 1997
CWCWC holds “Celebrate Clean Water,” a public event
November, 1997
NYC DEP Extended Special Study Program completed by the Joint Venture of Metcalf
& Eddy and Hazen and Sawyer evaluates non-filtration alternatives and suggests addition
of alum at the Muscoot Dam as one component of water treatment plan that could
substitute for filtration
February, 1998
Hearings begin for new EIS process for CWTP
April 27, 1998
New York City signs consent decree with US DOJ and New York State agreeing to build
CWTP
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May, 1998
Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park proposed as site for CWTP, in addition to 7
sites already under consideration, and added to scope of work for Draft Environmental
Impact statement (DEIS)
July, 1998
Final Scope of Work for EIS for CWTP issued by NYC DEP
December 1, 1998
DEP announces choice of Mosholu Golf Course in Van Cortlandt Park for the CWTP
January 1999
CWCWC files own suit on filtration alternatives and participation because denied
intervenor status US DOJ action against New York City
May, 1999
NYC DEP releases Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for CWTP
June 1, 1999
New York City Planning Council (CPC) approves Mosholu Golf Course site as part of
New York City Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) process despite
disapproval of local community boards and Bronx Borough Board
June 6, 1999
CWCWC issues report on cost of filtration entitled “The Real Price of Filtration: Is it
Worth it?”
July 21, 1999
New York City City Council grants approval to Mosholu Golf Course site
October, 1999
Norwood Community Action files suit claiming use of Mosholu Golf Course site requires
legislation allowing alienation of parkland. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park also files suit
and the two suits are combined and moved from New York State to Federal court at
request of the New York State Attorney General
September, 2000
Trout Unlimited, New York Water Watch and CWCWC release study of stormwater
runoff problems in the Croton Watershed
CWCWC launches website
May, 2000
Judge Gerson, Eastern District Court of Appeals, rules legislative approval is not needed
for alienation of Mosholu Golf Course site
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November 15, 2000
US Court of Appeals for 2nd Circuit rules that New York State Court of Appeals should
rule on whether alienation is required for Mosholu Golf Course site
December, 2000
Bronx groups leave CWCWC
February 8, 2001
New York State Court of appeals rules that alienation of Mosholu Golf Course site for
the CWTP must be approved by New York State legislature
May 10, 2001
Judge Gerson rules fines required by 1998 consent decree may be held in abeyance while
New York City seeks approval for Mosholu Golf Course or an alternative site for CWTP
July 16, 2001
First Circuit Court of Appeals allows Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to avoid
filtration for City of Boston’s water supply
December 12, 2001
Supplement to consent decree obligates New York City to examine two additional sites in
case alienation of Mosholu Golf Course site is not approved by New York State
Legislature
May 23, 2002
US Army Corps of Engineers approves designation of Croton as critical resource waters
after campaign by CWCWC
May, 2002
Consent decree modified to permit choice between three potential sites for the CWTP,
Mosholu Golf Course and Harlem River sites in New York City, and Eastview site in
Westchester
April 17, 2003
DEIS for CWTP is released
May 23, 2003
NYC DEP releases White Paper entitled “Why New York City Needs a Filtered Croton
Supply”
May 23, 2003
New York Times reports that NRDC, New York League of Conservation Voters and
Environmental Defense accept conclusions of NYC DEP White Paper and endorse
filtration for Croton water supply
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June, 2003
New York City City Council sends home rule message to New York State Legislature
requesting approval of alienation legislation allowing construction of CWTP at Mosholu
Golf Course site
June 20, 2003
Alienation legislation passed by New York State legislature on last day of session
August 22, 2003
Draft Scope of Work for Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS)
for CWTP released by NYC DEP
June 30, 2004
Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) is released, identifying
Mosholu Golf Course as the NYC DEP’s preferred site for CWTP
July, 2004
NYC DEP announces selection of Mosholu Golf Course site for CWTP
August, 2004
Four lawsuits are filed with aim of preventing construction of CWTP at Mosholu Golf
Course site by Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, Town of Eastchester, Bronx Environmental
Health and Justice and CWCWC
December, 2004
NYC DEP begins work on the CWTP at the Mosholu Golf Course site
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Appendix II: List of Interviews
Albert Appleton
Former Commissioner, NYC DEP
6/28/05
Karen Argenti
CWCWC
Friends of Jerome Park Reservoir
Former Chair Community Board 7
Bronx Council for Environmental Quality
5/6/04
Matthew Bennett
CWCWC
1/24/04
Aaron Bock
Former Yorktown Town Supervisor
9/2/05
Cathleen Breen
Watershed Protection Coordinator
New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG)
1/31/06
Assemblyman Jeffrey Dinowitz and Ryan Miday, Chief of Staff
81st New York State Assembly District
7/25/05
Frank Eadie
CWCWC
Sierra Club
3/12/04
Ann Fanizzi
CWCWC
Putnam County Coalition to Preserve Open Space
1/29/04
David Ferguson
CWCWC
HDFC Coalition
12/7/01
12/23/05
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Suzannah Glidden
CWCWC
Hands Across the Border
3/26/04
Eric A. Goldstein
Co-Director, Urban Program
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
6/20/05
Sabrina Charney Hull
Westchester County
1/31/06
Steven B. Kaplan
CWCWC
Friends of the Clearwater
3/17/04
John Klotz
CWCWC Attorney
Sierra Club
2/13/04
Dr. Juliana Maantay
Lehman College
6/28/05
Dr. Paul Moskowitz
CWCWC
Huntersville Association
4/4/04
Dr. Paul Mankiewicz
Gaia Institute
1/7/05
Fay Muir
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Council
Clean Water for the Bronx
Norwood Community Action
CWCWC
12/4/00
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Dr. Michael A. Principe
Deputy Commissioner and Director, Bureau of Water Supply, NYC DEP
9/1/05
Dr. Marian Rose
CWCWC
11/30/01
Oreon Sandler
CWCWC
Federated Conservationists of Westchester County
2/6/04
Paul Sawyer
Director, Friends of Van Cortlandt Park
11/10/04
Lois J. Schiffer
Former Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources, US DOJ
6/25/05
Karen Schultz
CWCWC
Sierra Club Lower Hudson Group
12/16/04
John Stouffer
Legislative Director
Sierra Club Atlantic Chapter
12/21/05
James M. Tierney
New York City Watershed Inspector General
Office of the New York State Attorney General
1/7/05
Mark Yaggi
Senior Attorney, Riverkeeper
6/21/05
Anonymous
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Appendix III: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Alum

Aluminum sulphate

BMP

Best Management Practice

CAC

Community Advisory Council

CEQRA

City Environmental Quality Review Act

CWCWC

Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition (Croton Coalition)

CWTP

Croton Water Treatment Plant (filtration plant)

DAF

Dissolved air flotation

EDF

Environmental Defense Fund

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

EOH

East of Hudson (Croton) watershed

FAD

Filtration avoidance determination

HDFC

Housing Development Fund Cooperative Coalition (now, Council)

MOA

New York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement

NAACP

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NIABY

Not in anyone’s backyard

NIMBY

Not in my backyard

NRDC

Natural Resources Defense Council

NRWTP

North River Water Treatment Plant

NWBCCC

Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Council

NYC DEP

New York City Department of Environmental Protection

NYS DEC

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation

NYS DOH

New York State Department of Health

NYC MWFA

New York City Municipal Water Finance Authority

NYPIRG

New York Public Interest Research Group

SDWA

Safe Drinking Water Act

SEQR

State Environmental Quality Review Act

SPDES

State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
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SWTR

Surface Water Treatment Rule

US EPA

United States Environmental Protection Authority

WOH

West of Hudson (Catskill and Delaware) watersheds
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Appendix IV: Definitions of Watershed and Filtration
Watershed
The term watershed refers to the land that drains into a watercourse. Watersheds
are also called catchments or drainage basins. The boundary between two watersheds is
called the divide. This is an area of high land from which water flows in different
directions. Every small stream has a watershed, and as a tributary stream joins a larger
stream or river, its watershed is joined to the watershed of the larger stream. Thus
watersheds are nested within each other. The watershed of the tiniest stream is located
within that of a larger stream and then an even larger river. The increasingly smaller
units within a watershed are sometimes referred to as sub-watersheds. Any human
activity that is defined as being related to a watershed must specify the area under
consideration (Allaby, 1998; Griffin, 1999; Pielou, 1998). In this dissertation, I use the
definitions established by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection to
refer to the New York City watershed and the areas within it. The Department uses the
term New York City watershed to describe the entire area from which it collects water to
be used to supply New York City. This area is divided between the West of Hudson
watershed, which includes the Catskill and Delaware watersheds, and the East of Hudson
watershed, which is also called the Croton watershed. It should be noted that these areas,
as the Department defines them, do not correspond to the natural watershed of any
specific stream or river. Thus, although much of the land included in the New York City
watershed drains into the Hudson River, the New York City watershed is not identical
with the Hudson River watershed.
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Water Filtration
Filtration refers to the process of allowing water to pass through layers of porous
material in order to remove suspended particles. This process mimics the way in which
water is naturally filtered by seeping through layers of earth. The original filtration
plants were constructed to allow water to seep slowly through layers of sand of
progressively finer grade. Rapid gravity filtration is faster and takes up less space.
Filtration is only one step in water treatment. Water treatment plants may use a number
of different processes. These processes include preliminary screening to remove large
particles. Smaller particles may be removed with the help of chemicals such as alum
(aluminum sulphate) through the coagulation and flocculation process. The chemicals
and particles are then removed through coagulation and flocculation. The chemicals are
then removed through sedimentation or other means. Water may also be disinfected with
chlorine, chlorine dioxide, chloramines or ozone. Although disinfection of water was a
major health advance when it was first introduced, concerns have been raised about
disinfection because it may result in harmful by-products. Ultraviolet irradiation (UV)
and membrane filtration are newer methods of water treatment (Stouffer, 1996).
Wastewater and residuals from the treatment process must then be disposed of.
The Croton water treatment (filtration) plant, as proposed by the New York City
Department of Environmental Protection, was to employ coagulation and flocculation
followed by dissolved air flotation which was to replace sedimentation.

These steps

would be followed by filtration, disinfection with ultraviolet light, and chlorination.
Wastewater from the treatment process would be conveyed to an existing wastewater
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treatment plant (New York City, Department of Environmental Protection, Croton Water
Treatment Plant Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, January 12, 2004).
The Croton Coalition, and experts which the Coalition consulted, claimed that the
technique of dissolved air flotation was rapidly becoming obsolete. The Coalition
researched alternative treatment methods and recommended use of membrane filtration,
which would require considerably less space and result in a much smaller footprint for
the filtration plant (Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition, remarks by Michael Cole
included in Levine, 2004).
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Cheers,
Steven
========================================
Steven Romalewski
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